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The laws of successful war in one generation 
would ensure defeat in another. 

— General of the Army Ulysses S. Grant 

Never tell people how to do things. 
Tell them what to do and they will 
surprise you with their ingenuity. 

— General George Patton, Jr., USA, 1947 

Organizations created to fight the last 
war better are not going to win the next. 

— General James Gavin, USA, 1947 

There's a risk. I submit that the risk 
of not sharing [information] today is 
a lot greater than the risk of sharing. 

— General Richard Myers, USAF 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005 

AIR national guard 

coming next . . . 

Logistics and Support 


Special Feature: CJCS Essay Contest Winners, 

Strategic Gaming, 

New Series: Interagency Dialogue 
Air Support of the Allied Landings in Italy, 

and more in issue 39, 4 th Quarter 2005 of JFQ 





A Professional Military and Security Studies Journal 
Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
by National Defense University Press 
National Defense University 
Washington, DC 


1 From the Chairman 

by Richard B. Myers 

7 From the Editor 

by Merrick E. Krause 


8 Transformation During War 

1 0 Defining Integrated Operations 

by Richard D. Downie 

14 How Joint Are We and 
Can We Be Better? 

by Chuck Harrison 

20 Getting Transformation Right 

by Richard D. Hooker, Jr., H.R. McMaster, 
and Dave Gray 

28 Transformation in Concept 
and Policy 

by Stephen J. Cimbaia 

34 Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 
New Proposals for 
Defense Reform 

by Clark A. Murdock and 
Richard W. Weitz 

42 The Military Utility 
of Understanding 
Adversary Culture 

by Montgomery McFate 

49 Transforming 

Military Diplomacy 

by Timothy C. Shea 

53 Expert Knowledge in a Joint 
Task Force Headquarters 

by Joseph C. Geraci 

The cover shows Air Force pararescuemen extraction train- 
ing at Baghdad International Airport, (U.S. Air Force/James 
W. Bowman). Front inside cover features [top to bottom | 
air support operations Airmen, attached to 1st Infantry 
Division, calling in close air support at Sammarah, Iraq (U.S. 
Army); Marines positioning for close air support assault in A1 
Anbar Province, Iraq (1st Marine Division Combat Camera/ 
Jonathan C. Knauth); Army OH-58D provides close air sup- 
port in A1 Shahabi, Iraq (U.S. Air Force/Shane A. Cuomo); 
and Navy ordnancemen loading laser-guided GBU-12 
bombs aboard USS Harry S. Truman (U.S. Navy/Kristopher 
Wilson). The table of contents shows [left] Marine observing live fire operations 
(Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific/Ted Banks); [right] postflight operations on 
EC-135 AWACS, exercise Red Flag 2005 (440th Communications Squadron/Patrick 
M. Kuminecz). The back inside cover is USNS Artie guided through Suez Canal by 
Egyptian tugboat (U.S. Navy /Kristopher Wilson). Back cover shows [top] loading 
C-5 for Operational Readiness Inspection (125th Fighter Wing/Shelley Gill); [left 
to right] Marines set to board LCU at Kuwait Naval Base (Fleet Combat Camera 
Group, Pacific/Richard J. Brunson); Indonesian child aboard USNS Mercy (Fleet 
Combat Camera Group, Pacific/Jeffrey Russell); and Soldiers mount M1A1 Abrams 
tanks in South Korea (1st Combat Camera Squadron/Susanne M. Day). 

60 A Deployable Joint 
Headquarters for the 
NATO Response Force 

by Michael L. McGinnis 

68 Expeditionary Airborne 
Battlespace Command 
and Control 

by Paul Dolson 

76 Chinese and American 
Network Warfare 

by Timothy L. Thomas 

2 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 




100 Joint Operations in the 

Southwest Pacific, 1943-1945 

by Kevin C. Holzimmer 


109 Strategy for Chaos: 

A Book Review 

by Barry Watts 

110 The Modern Prince: 

A Book Review 

by Jaknb J. Grygiel 

11 2 A War of a Different Kind: 
A Book Review 

by Randall J. Larsen 

84 Transforming the 
"Retention Sector" 

by Meredith Leyva 

92 Joint Professionals: 

Here Today, Here to Stay 

by Michael A. Coss 


In issue 36, the caption for the cover photo states that 
National Guardsmen and Marines are shown, but Marines 
attached to a Virginia National Guard unit in Iraq are depicted. 

The caption for the photograph on page 30 in issue 36 
mistakenly identifies Marines as Army Reservists. 

In issue 36, book reviewer Janeen M. Klinger was 
misidentified. She is a professor of national security in the 
Command and Staff College at the Marine Corps University. 

In issue 37, the caption for the photograph on page 35 
misidentifies F-16CGs as F-16CJs. 

Joint Force Quarterly 

Stephen J. Flanagan, PhD 


Institute for National Strategic Studies 


Colonel Debra Taylor, USA 

Deputy Director of NDU Press, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies 
Managing Editor 

Colonel Merrick E. Krause, USAF 

Director of NDU Press, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies 

Martin J. Peters, Jr. 

Production Supervisor 

Calvin B. Kelley 
George C. Maerz 
Jeffrey D. Smotherman, PhD 
Lisa M. Yambrick 

Editorial Staff 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Creative Services 


Garrett M. Mills 


Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense 
University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ 
is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal 
designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and 
other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security 
polity and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland secu- 
rity; and developments in training and joint professional military 
education to transform America’s military and security apparatus 
to better meet tomorrow’s challenges while protecting freedom 
today. NDU Press produces JFQ four times a year. The goal of NDU 
Press is to provide defense and interagency decisionmakers, allies, 
and the attentive public with attractive, balanced, and thoroughly 
researched professional publications. 

This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense 
edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be 
reproduced or extracted without permission of the copyright pro- 
prietors. Joint Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever 
material is quoted from or based on its content. 

The last page of this issue contains information on 
contributing to JFQ. Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quar- 
terly online at for more 
on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and 
access to many other useful NDU Press publications. Constructive 
comments and contributions are important to us. Please direct 
editorial communications to the convenient electronic feedback 
form on the NDU Press Web site or write to: 

Editor, Joint Force Quarterly 
National Defense University Press 
300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62, Room 212) 

Fort Lesley J. McNair 
Washington, DC 20319-5066 
Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325-4220 
FAX: (202) 685-4219/DSN 325-4219 

ISSN 1 070-0692 3 d Quarter, July 2005 

The views expressed or implied are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect 
the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 


issue thirty-eight / JFQ 3 

A Word from the 

Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF, 
talking with commanders at 
Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan 

We must hold our minds alert and receptive to the 
application of unglimpsed methods and weapons. The 
next war will be won in the future, not in the past. 
We must go on, or we will go under. 

— General Douglas MacArthur, USA, 1931 

M any in the military community 
are familiar with change, but the 
rate of today's change — as we 
fight a new kind of war against a 
new kind of enemy — presents unique challenges. 
Understanding this landscape is essential; trans- 
forming in response is imperative. 

Our response is a continuing, deliberate cam- 
paign to transform the military across the ser- 
vices. This issue of Joint Force Quarterly highlights 
the need to maintain our transformation efforts 

while we are at war. We must continue moving 
forward with the right capabilities to meet today's 
challenges while also ensuring that the Armed 
Forces are positioned to meet the threats of the 
21 st century. 

Though much has been written and dis- 
cussed concerning the technological aspects of 
transformation, material solutions alone cannot 
transform our forces. Successful transformation 
must include a cultural component — creating an 
environment conducive to change within our or- 
ganizations. Without creating a parallel culture of 
change in the Armed Forces, our transformation 
will fall far short of its fullest potential. Changing 
organizations always begins with leadership. 

(continued on page 4) 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 1 

11 th Communications Squadron (Scott M. Ash) 

Joint Force Quarterly 

■ a word from the chairman 

Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF 



Lt Gen Michael M. Dunn, USAF ■ National Defense University 

BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) ■ Office of the Chairman 
Maj Gen John J. Catton, Jr., USAF ■ The Joint Staff 
A. Denis Clift ■ Joint Military Intelligence College 
RADM Patrick W. Dunne, USN ■ Naval Postgraduate School 
Maj Gen Robert J. Elder, Jr., USAF ■ Air War College 
Col George E. Flemming, USMC ■ Marine Corps War College 
Brig Gen (S) Randal D. Fullhart, USAF ■ Air Command and Staff College 
MG David H. Huntoon, USA ■ U.S. Army War College 
RADM Richard D. Jaskot, USN ■ National War College 
VADM Timothy J. Keating, USN ■ The Joint Staff 
Col Walter L. Niblock, USMC ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College 
MG Kenneth J. Quinlan, Jr., USA ■ Joint Forces Staff College 
RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN ■ Naval War College 
BG Volney J. Warner, USA ■ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
MajGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces 


Stephen J. Flanagan ■ National Defense University 

Richard K. Betts ■ Columbia University 
Col John M. Calvert, USAF ■ Joint Forces Staff College 
Stephen D. Chiabotti ■ School of Advanced Air and Space Studies 
Eliot A. Cohen ■ The Johns Hopkins University 
COL Robert A. Doughty, USA ■ U.S. Military Academy 
Aaron L. Friedberg ■ Princeton University 
Alan L. Gropman ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces 
Douglas N. Hime ■ Naval War College 
Mark H. Jacobsen ■ Marine Corps Command and Staff College 
Daniel T. Kuehl ■ Information Resources Management College 
Col Anne E. McGee, USAF ■ Industrial College of the Armed Forces 
Thomas L. McNaugher ■ The RAND Corporation 
Kathleen Mahoney-Norris ■ Air Command and Staff College 
William H. J. Manthorpe, Jr. ■ Joint Military Intelligence College 
John J. Mearsheimer ■ The University of Chicago 
LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) ■ Hudson Institute 
Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF ■ Air War College 
COL Robert E. Smith, USA ■ U.S. Army War College 
LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) ■ Harvard University 
Col Gary West, USAF ■ National War College 

(continued from page 1 ) 

Developing a culture of change in a complex 
and uncertain security environment is hard. We 
naturally rely on past practices and pull from a 
vast reservoir of successful experiences to guide 
us through periods of uncertainty, ffowever, we 
shortchange our efforts if we simply use new tech- 
nology in old ways. For example, the enhanced 
situational awareness provided by Common Oper- 
ating Picture technology would be lost if we relied 
on the Cold War risk-averse approach to sharing 
information — the "need to know" mindset versus 
today's "need to share." 

Creating a culture of change in the Armed 
Forces requires leaders at all levels who are will- 
ing to take action, to take informed risk, and to 
infuse their organizations with new energy. As 
military leaders take visible, concrete steps to 
make their organizations more flexible and adapt- 
able, they create a new environment — one that 
supports and rewards innovation, adaptation, and 
new processes. 

Following the Cold War, each service recog- 
nized the momentous change in the geopolitical 
environment and began historic change in their 
respective organizations — change that not only 
embraced the technology of the time but that also 
reflected a break from the past and ushered in 
new ways of thinking. 

In the 1990s, the Navy shifted the focus of 
future operations away from the open sea to the 
coastlines. The emphasis on littoral warfare, ac- 
cording to ... From the Sea: Preparing the Naval 
Service for the 21 st Century, "is a new doctrine that 
marries Navy and Marine forces priorities. . . . 
The Navy and Marine Corps will now respond to 
crises and can provide the initial 'enabling' capa- 
bility for joint operations." The Army instituted 
the Louisiana Maneuvers, which helped lay the 
groundwork for the total redesign of the Army for 
the 21 st century under Force XXI. The new force 
structure would feature a CONUS-based force 
projection Army, which was more modular, more 
lethal, and more deployable. In the Air Force, the 
Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) was a 
new approach to providing forces to the combat- 
ant commander. The ten AEFs — composed of 
paired Air Force combat forces and expedition- 
ary combat support resources — were organized, 
trained, and equipped to deploy and employ air 
and space power quickly. 

These changes illustrate the bold leadership 
required to break from the past. Such leaders and 
their actions reflected a new environment, new 


4 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


Crewmen conducting 
runway check on 
F— 117 at Kunsan Air 
Base, Korea, where 
Airmen from Holloman 
Air Force Base are 
deployed in support 
of air expeditionary 
forces in Pacific Region, 
August 13, 2004 

ways of thinking, and new support for a culture 
of change in each of the services. However, these 
actions took place during a less volatile and less 
threatening security environment. Time was more 
abundant. Execution was rooted in tradition and 
was at times ponderous and plagued by bureau- 
cratic inertia. Today, the threat is unprecedented, 
and we must not only respond to the rapidly 
changing security environment, but we must do 
so at an accelerated rate. 

The events of September 11, 2001, coupled 
with a global resurgence of terrorism and wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, have ushered in another 
period of significant change to the security land- 
scape. Like their predecessors, today's Joint Chiefs 
of Staff recognize that the post-9/ 11 security envi- 
ronment requires adjustments. They also under- 
stand the important role a culture of change plays 
in the transformation of the Armed Forces and are 
taking steps to effect change at an accelerated rate. 

■ The Army Chief of Staff is leading change 
with a plan to develop the Army into a modular 
force. This total redesign from Cold War-style 

divisions to more lethal brigade combat teams 
(BCTs) is turning the operational Army into a 
larger, more powerful, flexible, and rapidly de- 
ployable force. BCTs represent a break from the 
past — they are stand-alone, self sufficient, tactical 
units organized the way they will fight. 

■ The Chief of Naval Operations is leading 
change in the Navy by instituting the Fleet Re- 
sponse Plan (FRP), which enhances the Navy's abil- 
ity to surge and augment deployed forces as threats 
develop. This initiative provides the Nation's lead- 
ers with unprecedented responsiveness in sup- 
port of the Global Naval Forward Presence Policy. 
The FRP represents a dramatic departure from the 
Navy's longstanding approach to readiness. 

■ The Air Force Chief of Staff is integrating 
the unique strengths of the Active and Reserve 
components with the Future Total Force (FTF). 
Under this plan, FTF integration models will 
enable certain Guard, Reserve, and Active units 
of the Air Force to live, work, and train more 
closely together. The Future Total Force represents 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 5 

U.S. Air Force (Val Gempis) 

■ a word from the chairman 

Soldiers taking 
positions during Quick 
Reaction Force exercise 
at Lackland Air Force 
Base, preparing 
to provide flexible 
response to any region 
in domestic incident, 
December 8, 2004 

a new approach to use of manpower, of basing 
infrastructure, and of current weapons systems. 
The enhanced integration taking place under FTF 
combines all Air Force capabilities as they meet the 
challenges of today's complex threat environment. 

These examples are only a few of the initia- 
tives the service chiefs have taken to transform 
the Armed Forces beyond technological advances 
to inspiring a culture of change. They reflect sup- 
port for a culture of innovation — from service 
staffs in Washington to individual servicemem- 
bers in the field. Developing a culture of change 
adds value to the technological aspects of trans- 
formation by serving as an enabler, allowing us 
to maximize the potential of new technologies by 
using them in new ways, with a new mindset, as 
we face a rapidly changing security environment. 

The Department of Defense is also taking steps 
to institute a culture of change beyond the services. 
Revisions to the Unified Command Plan included 
creation of U.S. Northern Command, with the mis- 
sion to defend the homeland and territories. The 
plan also combined the U.S. Space Command mis- 
sion and forces with those of U.S. Strategic Com- 
mand. In addition, the Department of Defense has 
initiated the National Security Personnel System 
and programs such as Network Centric Warfare 

and Operationally Responsive Space — actions that 
think past traditional approaches and help create 
a culture of adaptation and innovation. Though 
there has been measurable progress, there is still 
much room for improvement in key areas such as 
interagency coordination, joint acquisition, and 
information sharing. 

Beyond the issues facing America's military 
loom the challenges of integrating all the instru- 
ments of national power as well as international 
partners. A similar culture change may be neces- 
sary to pull these new elements together. 

To maximize the potential of our trans- 
formation efforts, we must not only embrace 
the promise of technology, but we must do so 
with the courage and confidence to break from 
the constraints of the past to create a culture of 
change — one that supports new thinking, new ap- 
proaches, and new ideas. The steps taken by the 
Department of Defense and each of the services 
represent a starting point. Ultimately, success de- 
pends on the willingness of every member of the 
Armed Forces to embrace the new mindset that is 
required to meet the challenges of our time. JFQ 


of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

6 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

U.S. Air Force (Derrick C. Goode) 

55 th Signal Company (Jory C. Randall) 

From the Editor 

Stryker Brigade Combat 
Team loading into Stryker 
vehicle in Mosul, Iraq, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 

A t Walter Reed Army 
Medical Center in 
Washington, DC, 
I recently met a re- 
markable Army Soldier. A young 
troop sitting near me noticed my 
Air Force uniform and wings. He 
asked, "Sir, what kind of pilot 
are you?" At the Officer's Club, 
I might have said, "the best" (or 
something equally brilliant and 
punch worthy). But he was genu- 
inely interested, and we talked a bit about military 
aviation. I wanted to hear about his experiences, 
so I steered the conversation to why he was visit- 
ing the hospital. 

The Soldier had returned from battle over 
a year ago, after he was injured in combat and 
spent about a year in rehabilitation. Unfortu- 
nately, his wounded leg caused him tremendous 
pain. At 20 years old he faced potential medical 
retirement with little prospect of regaining much 
use of his damaged limb. 

So what does this have to do with the prin- 
cipal topic of this issue of Joint Force Quarterly, 
transformation during war? Undaunted, this Sol- 
dier has chosen a courageous route, one only 
recently viable. After consultation with his doctors 
and thoughtful consideration of his options, he 
requested to have his leg removed — so he could 
get back to work! Refusing to be deterred by his 
wound, he not only wanted to return to his job in 
the Army, but he also hoped to become an Army 
aviator. Amazingly, based on the transformation 
of America's military, I think he could have a shot. 

This Soldier's decision is a perfect metaphor 
for transformation, and it exemplifies the com- 
mitment, culture of selflessness, and sophistica- 
tion of those serving in the Armed Forces. 

He is also emblematic of the transformation 
that the Chairman describes in his message and 
our contributing authors explore in this issue: 
New thinking, new technology, and new partners 
create new ways of providing for the common 
defense. This Soldier wasn't simply a casualty; he 
is an experienced combat veteran, and his leaders 
recognize both his sacrifice and his continuing 
value to the Nation, the mission, and the Army. 

By providence or destiny, we find ourselves 
in a time when free men and women, even those 
who have suffered grievous injuries and other 
sacrifices and privations, can look beyond impair- 
ments and continue to devote their efforts to 
sustain and cultivate liberty. Leaders and follow- 
ers alike understand that the secret to successful 
transformation lies not in the newest rifle, satel- 
lite, or ship. Those are helpful tools, but they are 
still simply tools. As the 2005 National Defense 
Strategy, Chairman, and Secretary of Defense have 
stated, America and like-minded nations are in- 
tegrating and blending the instruments of na- 
tional power in new and potentially useful ways. 
Transformation is thus a growing process — one 
of realization, assessment, and reassessment, and 
ultimately, its unlimited potential resides in the 
hearts and brains of the men and women who 
defend the Nation and its allies. 


issue thirty-eight / JFQ 7 

55 th Signal Company (Jory C. Randall) 

From the Editor 

Stryker Brigade Combat 
Team loading into Stryker 
vehicle in Mosul, Iraq, 
Operation Iraqi Freedom 

A t Walter Reed Army 
Medical Center in 
Washington, DC, 
I recently met a re- 
markable Army Soldier. A young 
troop sitting near me noticed my 
Air Force uniform and wings. He 
asked, "Sir, what kind of pilot 
are you?" At the Officer's Club, 
I might have said, "the best" (or 
something equally brilliant and 
punch worthy). But he was genu- 
inely interested, and we talked a bit about military 
aviation. I wanted to hear about his experiences, 
so I steered the conversation to why he was visit- 
ing the hospital. 

The Soldier had returned from battle over 
a year ago, after he was injured in combat and 
spent about a year in rehabilitation. Unfortu- 
nately, his wounded leg caused him tremendous 
pain. At 20 years old he faced potential medical 
retirement with little prospect of regaining much 
use of his damaged limb. 

So what does this have to do with the prin- 
cipal topic of this issue of Joint Force Quarterly, 
transformation during war? Undaunted, this Sol- 
dier has chosen a courageous route, one only 
recently viable. After consultation with his doctors 
and thoughtful consideration of his options, he 
requested to have his leg removed — so he could 
get back to work! Refusing to be deterred by his 
wound, he not only wanted to return to his job in 
the Army, but he also hoped to become an Army 
aviator. Amazingly, based on the transformation 
of America's military, I think he could have a shot. 

This Soldier's decision is a perfect metaphor 
for transformation, and it exemplifies the com- 
mitment, culture of selflessness, and sophistica- 
tion of those serving in the Armed Forces. 

He is also emblematic of the transformation 
that the Chairman describes in his message and 
our contributing authors explore in this issue: 
New thinking, new technology, and new partners 
create new ways of providing for the common 
defense. This Soldier wasn't simply a casualty; he 
is an experienced combat veteran, and his leaders 
recognize both his sacrifice and his continuing 
value to the Nation, the mission, and the Army. 

By providence or destiny, we find ourselves 
in a time when free men and women, even those 
who have suffered grievous injuries and other 
sacrifices and privations, can look beyond impair- 
ments and continue to devote their efforts to 
sustain and cultivate liberty. Leaders and follow- 
ers alike understand that the secret to successful 
transformation lies not in the newest rifle, satel- 
lite, or ship. Those are helpful tools, but they are 
still simply tools. As the 2005 National Defense 
Strategy, Chairman, and Secretary of Defense have 
stated, America and like-minded nations are in- 
tegrating and blending the instruments of na- 
tional power in new and potentially useful ways. 
Transformation is thus a growing process — one 
of realization, assessment, and reassessment, and 
ultimately, its unlimited potential resides in the 
hearts and brains of the men and women who 
defend the Nation and its allies. 


issue thirty-eight / JFQ 7 


A merica and its allies face 
a threat as great as any in 
the Nation's history. The 
danger posed by extrem- 
ists, particularly terrorists armed with 
weapons of mass effects, spans borders 
and threatens the stability and eco- 
nomic prosperity of free states across 
the globe. This fourth year after the 
9/11 attacks against citizens, civilians, 
and allies finds America still in recov- 
ery and engaged in a war on terror and 
a global economy slowly stabilizing. 

Although individual memories 
may be short, the return to normalcy 
is not complete. We are recalibrating 
to find a new definition of normal. 
The world has changed: we live with 
color-coded alerts, anthrax scares, and 
not-so-friendly skies. Lest we become 
accustomed to this state of affairs, we 
must remember that the war is not over 
and liberty remains threatened. With 
enough commitment, resolve, and co- 
operation, those who embrace fear over 
freedom can again be overcome. But we 

will not win by guns and guts alone. In- 
deed, all freedom-loving nations, using 
their combined instruments of national 
power, will be required to establish and 
maintain a lasting peace. Unfortunately, 
those are a lot of moving parts to syn- 
chronize, so the challenge is vast. 

On December 17, 2004, the Presi- 
dent of the United States signed the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Support Act. This was a major change 
to America's traditional security sys- 
tem, and it demonstrated a recogni- 

8 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

tion and willingness to act and move 
beyond legacy arrangements of gov- 
ernment into new and more effective 
relationships. Before signing the bill, 
President Bush said: 

Nearly six decades ago, our nation and our 
allies faced a new threat — the new world 
of the Cold War and the dangers of a new 
enemy. To defend the free world from an 
armed empire bent on conquest, visionary 
leaders created new institutions such as the 
NATO Alliance. The NATO Alliance was 

begun by treaty in this very room. Presi- 
dent Truman also implemented a sweeping 
reorganization of the Federal Government. 
He established the Department of Defense, 
the Central Intelligence Agency, and the 
National Security Council. 

America, in this new century, again faces 
new threats. Instead of massed armies, 
we face stateless networks; we face killers 
who hide in our own cities. We must con- 
front deadly technologies. To inflict great 
harm on our country, America's enemies 
need to be only right once. Our intelli- 
gence and law enforcement professionals 
in our government must be right every 
single time. Our government is adapting 
to confront and defeat these threats. We're 
staying on the offensive against the enemy. 
We'll take the fight to the terrorists abroad 
so we do not have to face them here 
at home. 

The new National Defense Strategy 
for the United States describes in more 
detail the Department of Defense ap- 
proach to modern security threats and 
the war on terror. The March 2005 
document presents five strategic objec- 
tives: securing the United States from 
direct attack, securing strategic access, 
retaining global freedom of action, 
strengthening alliances and partner- 
ships, and establishing favorable secu- 
rity conditions. 

Are these merely organizational 
changes, or is this strategy transforma- 
tional? Many contend that transforma- 
tion of America's military is resident 
in a set of capabilities, an extension of 
former debates about the decades-old 
Soviet theory of military technological 
revolutions and American revolution 
in military affairs programs popular 
in the 1990s. But, as the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs has said, transforma- 
tion is not just about technology and 
platforms — "transformation takes place 
between the ears." The cultural and 
intellectual factors of transformation 
are more important than new ships, 
planes, and high-tech weapons. 

In past issues of /FQ, General Rich- 
ard Myers described the transformation 

of America's military, and the militaries 
of our allies, in three parts: technologi- 
cal, intellectual, and cultural. Battling 
extremists the last several years has 
helped create new operational strategies 
shaped by innovation. This is why Joint 
Forces Command and forward thinkers 
in the services have recently moved be- 
yond dogma and challenged old doctri- 
nal approaches that may be less useful 
in today's strategic environment. 

The military is adapting and suc- 
ceeding, capturing lessons learned and 
changing the Cold War status quo. As 
the next Quadrennial Defense Review 
approaches, military and civilian de- 
fense professionals will debate trans- 
formation in a context of acquisitions, 
new systems, and evolving visions. 
Clearly, America's military is moving 
from a legacy, post-Cold War contain- 
ment force to something new. But new 
technology, although necessary, is not 
sufficient to ensure international stabil- 
ity and prosperity. Recent successes in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and other fronts in 
the war on terror have proven that the 
military instrument of power cannot 
succeed in the long term if used inde- 
pendently. In fact, transformation dur- 
ing this war on terror has demonstrated 
that new partners — agencies, allies, in- 
dustry, nongovernmental organizations, 
and the private sector — must together 
provide a front that blends all the tools 
of national power to defeat modern, 
transnational threats. Joint operations 
are the baseline; integrated operations 
with these new partners are the future. 

This // Q forum poses a variety of 
researched opinions on transformation 
of the military — and transformation 
of security strategy. Some essays pro- 
mote conventional visions and some 
are more controversial. With these es- 
says, fFQ hopes to encourage debate 
and engage further dialogue — among 
services, agencies, nations, industry, 
nongovernmental organizations, and 
private sector partners. JFQ m.e, Krause 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 9 



If language is not correct, then what is said is not meant; if what is said is not what is meant, 
then what must be done remains undone; if this remains undone, morals and art will deteriorate; 
if justice goes astray, the people will stand about in helpless confusion. Hence there must be no 
arbitrariness in what is said. This matters above everything. 

— Confucius 

Defining Integrated 


C onfucius emphasizes that 
the lack of clear language 
causes confusion and possi- 
bly disastrous consequences. 
As military, interagency, and multi- 
national operations become more 

complex and integrated, we need to 
say what we mean. In this vein, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen- 
eral Richard Myers, USAF, has taken an 
important step to clarify some terms, 
although this article argues that more 

steps are necessary. General Myers has 
noted that we operate on nonmilitary 
and cross-border fronts, involving law 
enforcement, diplomacy, and finance, 
and we need to "transform our mili- 
tary competencies from joint opera- 
tions to integrated operations [emphasis 
added]." 1 He also mentions the require- 
ment for standardization across the 
joint force to maximize effectiveness. 
One of the first — and easiest — things 
we can standardize is the terminology 
we use to define important, though 
perhaps amorphous, operational con- 
cepts. In the past, we have loosely de- 
fined what are considered interagency 
operations. But what are integrated 
operations — and for that matter, what 
are interagency operations? Distinctions 
matter as we more frequently conduct 
operations that include counterparts 

Colonel Richard D. Downie, USA (Ret.), is Director of the Center for Hemispheric 
Defense Studies. He served as the first commandant of the Western Hemisphere 
Institute for Security Cooperation and is the author of Learning from Conflict: The 
U.5. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War. 

lO JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

1 st Combat Camera Squadron (Cherie A. Thurlby) 

D o w n i e 

from U.S. Government and nongovern- 
ment agencies, private industry, and, 
perhaps more importantly, partners 
from allied countries and international 

Toward the Chairman's goal of 
standardization, this commentary of- 
fers a taxonomy of terms to describe 
various types of interagency and inte- 
grated operations. The intent is to gen- 
erate discussion on how to standardize 
the way we define and address such 

operations. The faculty of the Center 
for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the 
National Defense University developed 
the terms. We based our approach on 
differentiation and categorization of 
the entities participating rather than 
on the functional objective of an op- 
eration (such as peacekeeping, disaster 
relief, or counterterrorism). 

Taxonomy of Terms 

Joint operations, combined opera- 
tions. The explanations of the taxon- 
omy start with basic terms on which 
most agree, then proceed to more 
contentious ones. Most members of 
the defense and security community 
routinely recognize and use the terms 
joint and combined. The Department 
of Defense (DOD), in its Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, defines 
joint operations as military actions con- 
ducted by joint forces or by service 
forces working together. The definition 
implies actions by the military forces 
of a single country. For instance, Op- 
eration Just Cause in Panama in 1989 
was a joint operation that involved 
the elements of the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and Marines in a coordinated 
effort. The DOD dictionary refers to 
combined operations as those conducted 

Commander of Combined Support Force 526, 
working with international militaries and 
nongovernmental organizations, briefing Special 
Coordinator for the Secretary General for Tsunami 
Relief, United Nations, January 20, 2005 

by military forces of two or more al- 
lied nations acting together for the 
accomplishment of a single mission. 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, de- 
signed to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait, 
was considered a combined operation, 
as it involved a coalition of forces from 
the United States, Europe, the Middle 
East, and other regions. 

Interagency operations. The lack of 
precision starts with the use of the term 
interagency operations, which I contend 
serves as an umbrella over various 
types of operations that should be 
defined separately. The term inter- 
agency operations evokes opera- 
tions involving a variety of agen- 
cies; without further explanation, one 
might assume he understands the type 
of participants or agencies involved. 
Indeed, two individuals could conduct 
a discussion with very different im- 
pressions. What the specific operation 
includes or does not include is unclear. 
The receiver must ask additional ques- 
tions. The divergence between what 
each speaker is saying may not be 
pronounced if they are from the same 
service or even represent two services 
working on the same staff. However, 
when a military official talks with his 
counterpart from the Departments of 

State or Justice, there is great potential 
for misperception. That potential in- 
creases dramatically when one speaks 
with an international counterpart. 

Federal interagency operations. 
A military colleague recently responded 
to my assertion that interagency opera- 
tions is a vague term by declaring that 
joint staff officers have a common 
understanding of the expression and 
routinely use it. Without missing a 
beat, he defined interagency operations 
as those involving two or more U.S. 
Federal agencies — a worthy response. 
Clearly, an interagency operation can 
involve only Federal agencies. Take the 
example of a counterdrug operation 
to interdict a suspected narcotrafficker 
boat moving through Caribbean waters 
toward the U.S. coastline. An Air Force 
airborne warning and control system or 
Navy P-3 aircraft may identify a suspi- 
cious boat and pass the information to 
the Joint Interagency Task Force South 
(JIATF-S) Operations Center. U.S. Cus- 
toms, the Department of Justice, and 
other Federal agencies manning the 
operations center may direct a Coast 
Guard or Navy vessel to intercept the 
boat. If drugs are found, Coast Guard or 
Federal law enforcement officers seize 
them and apprehend the traffickers. 

one of the first things we can 
standardize is the terminology we 
use to define operational concepts 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ *11 

1 * Combat Camera Squadron (Aaron Allmon II) 


■ defining intergrated operations 

threats and activities. So how does one 
distinguish between those operations 
that involve only Federal agencies and 
those involving state and local authori- 
ties as well? Our taxonomy describes 
operations including entities at the 
Federal, state, and local levels as domes- 
tic interagency operations . 3 

Integrated operations. Recognizing 
the need to bring greater precision to 
how we describe various operations, 
General Myers coined the term inte- 
grated operations. After introducing the 
term enhanced jointness, he later de- 
fined integrated operations to high- 
light the participation of entities other 
than military forces: 

The term joint once referred to multi- 
ple services working together. That is the 
baseline. Many services, Federal agencies, 
allies and their governmental agencies, 
corporations, and nongovernmental or- 
ganizations must cooperate to meet the 
full spectrum of military operations, from 
peacekeeping to battle to the transition to 
a lasting peace. 4 

This distinction is useful. Never- 
theless, the question becomes when 
and how interagency operations evolve 
into integrated operations. That is, 
where do integrated operations begin 
and interagency operations stop? An 
obvious divide is between operations 
involving one country and those in- 
volving more than one. 

National integrated operations. 
While General Myers' strict defini- 
tion of integrated operations focuses 
on multinational operations, we also 
need to distinguish and describe op- 
erations that involve many disparate 
participants within the confines of 
one country. The relief effort follow- 
ing Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 
1992 involved Federal, state, and local 
emergency management and law en- 
forcement entities, the military, the 
Coast Guard, and nongovernmental 
organizations such as the Red Cross, 
not to mention private businesses and 
churches across the country. To distin- 
guish between integrated operations 

Such interagency operations are con- 
ducted frequently at JIATF-S, a true 
interagency task force located in Key 
West, Florida, and commanded by a 
Coast Guard admiral — as well as many 

other places every day. Within my col- 
league's definition, interagency opera- 
tions can either include the military or 
not. For clarification, the taxonomy 
in the table refers to such operations, 

involving only U.S. Government agen- 
cies, as Federal interagency operations. 

Domestic interagency operations. 
However, others call operations that 
include state and local authorities as 
well as Federal entities inter- 
agency operations. For example, 
there are 16 joint terrorism task 
forces across the United States 
that link the efforts and intel- 
ligence available to the military and 
to Federal, state, and local law enforce- 
ment departments. 2 The intent is to 
permit these task forces to prevent, or 
respond more effectively to, terrorist 

there are 16 joint terrorism task 
forces across the United States 
that link efforts and intelligence 

Salvadoran soldiers marking their participation 
in the Multi-National Division Center-South 
at Al Hillah, Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

12 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

U.S. Coast Guard (Tony Russell) 

D o w n i e 

within one nation and those involving 
multiple countries, our taxonomy sets 
national integrated operations apart from 
multinational integrated operations. 

Combined integrated operations. 
Some in the defense and security com- 
munity use joint, interagency, multina- 
tional to describe a type of operation 
that also fits in the integrated operation 
category. This variant involves multiple 
military services and government-level 

entities from more than one sovereign 
country — but no nongovernmental 
entities. An example would be Mili- 
tary Observer Mission, Ecuador-Peru. 
This multinational peacekeeping effort 
helped resolve a border conflict that 
erupted between Ecuador and Peru in 
1995. Representatives of military forces 
and of foreign affairs and defense min- 
istries from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and the United States monitored and 
coordinated this groundbreaking ac- 
complishment. While our taxonomy 

could have used the phrase joint, inter- 
agency, multinational for the sake of con- 
sistency — to identify clearly this variant 
as an integrated operation — we selected 
the term combined integrated operation. 

Multinational integrated operations. 
General Myers' definition of integrated 
operations actually refers to a multina- 
tional operation. A prime example is 
the international relief effort respond- 
ing to the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 
late 2004. This initiative 
included military forces 
and governmental agen- 
cies from many nations; 
nongovernmental agencies 
such as the International Red Cross, 
OXFAM, and CARE; international 
governmental organizations (IGOs), 
including the United Nations; and pri- 
vate industry partners who donated aid 
and relief supplies. The postwar recon- 
struction in Iraq, also called a stability 
and support operation, falls into this cat- 
egory. In addition to the militaries of 
many coalition countries accomplish- 
ing a variety of tasks, governmental 
agencies such as the U.S. Departments 
of State, Justice, and Defense work 
with their Iraqi counterparts 
at the national, regional, and 
municipal levels. IGOs such as 
the United Nations are involved 
in election assistance, while 
many multinational companies 
take on tasks ranging from fix- 
ing oil field machinery to con- 
structing and repairing build- 
ings, roads, power grids, and 
other infrastructure projects. 
In short, our taxonomy labels 
what General Myers calls an in- 
tegrated operation as a multina- 
tional integrated operation. 

Returning to the opening 
quotation, Confucius exhorts us 
to avoid arbitrary statements. 
In that spirit, and with Gen- 
eral Myers' effort to achieve 
standardization in mind, this 
commentary seeks to provoke 
debate on how to describe more 
accurately and efficiently today's 

governmental agencies work with 
their Iraqi counterparts at the national, 
regional, and municipal levels 

nontraditional operations. While we 
have tried to capture the variety of in- 
teragency and integrated operations 
based on the participants involved, 
there are other ways to approach such 
a categorization. Moreover, there will 
be disagreement on terms. Some may 
question whether a separate category is 
warranted if one or more participants 
listed in a type of operation is missing. 5 
Such issues and the discussions they 
generate will help bring greater preci- 
sion to how the defense and security 
community understands and discusses 
interagency and integrated operations. 
As the Chairman's term integrated opera- 
tions reflects the growing participation 
of disparate national and international 
entities, achieving clarity is increas- 
ingly important to building greater un- 
derstanding, unity, and interoperability 
with interagency, nongovernmental, 
and foreign counterparts. JFQ 


1 Richard B. Myers, "A Word from 
the Chairman," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 37 
(April 2005), 5. 

2 Note that the use of joint in this 
example of joint terrorism task forces 
is not consistent with the military 
usage, which again highlights the 
requirement for standardization across all 

3 Although the Intergovernmental 
Personnel Act uses intergovernmental opera- 
tions to describe activities involving govern- 
ments at the Federal, state, and local levels, 
this phrase fails to distinguish varieties of 
domestic municipal, state, regional, and 
provincial governments from sovereign na- 
tional governments. 

4 Richard B. Myers, "A Word from 
the Chairman," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 36 
(January 2005), 10. 

5 In other words, does the fact that a 
nongovernmental or an international gov- 
ernmental organization does not participate 
mean that the activity is not a multinational 
integrated operation? 

The Center for Hemispheric Studies 
is located at the National Defense 
University and is one of five DOD 
regional centers. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 13 



How Joint Are 
We and Can 
We Be Better? 


T he U.S. military does not 
have a system in place to 
institutionalize, direct, or 
even require regular joint 
tactical training. When I discuss this 
deficiency with senior military officers 

Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Harrison, 
USA, is assigned to U.S. Special 
Operations Command. 

and civilian analysts, they point to 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act as testa- 
ment to our jointness. We believe that 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act cured most 
of our ills and pronounced it good 
enough. But it is not good enough, 
and there is ample evidence. We need 
to develop a management system to 
ensure effective training at the joint 
tactical level. 

Because of the nature of its mis- 
sion, the Army depends on the other 
services for help. It relies on the Air 
Force or Navy for close air support from 
their fixed-wing bombers, supplies, 
weapons, and for movement to a com- 
bat zone. It depends on the Air Force for 
command and control, strategic attack, 
and interdiction as well as such forms 
of intelligence as the Joint Surveillance 
and Target Attack Radar System. 

The other services depend on 
the Army to provide security around 
airfields and ports and along ground 
routes. But by and large, these are 
missions that the Army prepares for 
during internal training. The tactics, 
techniques, and procedures for these 
operations do not change when work- 
ing with other services and do not re- 
quire training with them. The special 
operations community does conduct 
considerable joint tactical training and 
has a system that ensures that it takes 
place. Since the Army is the service 
most dependent on the other services, 

14 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

USS Harry S. Truman (Kristopher Wilson) 


this article focuses on joint training 
involving the Army, but the lessons 
apply to the entire joint community. 

It is important that we define 
tactical training to ensure that the de- 
bate does not become entangled with 
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which ad- 
dressed strategic issues and joint opera- 
tional level training. Joint Publication 
1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military Terms, defines the tactical 
level of warfare as: 

The level of war at which battles and 
engagements are planned and executed to 
accomplish military objectives assigned 
to tactical units or task forces. Activities 
at this level focus on the ordered arrange- 
ment and maneuver of combat elements in 
relation to each other and to the enemy to 
achieve combat objectives. 

The operational level of war is 
defined as: 

The level of war at which campaigns 
and major operations are planned, con- 
ducted, and sustained to accomplish stra- 
tegic objectives within theaters or other 
operational areas. Activities at this level 
link tactics and strategy by establishing 
operational objectives needed to accom- 

plish the strategic objectives, sequencing 
events to achieve the operational objec- 
tives, initiating actions, and applying re- 
sources to bring about and sustain these 
events. These activities imply a broader di- 
mension of time or space than do tactics; 
they ensure the logistic and administrative 
support of tactical forces, and provide the 
means by which tactical successes are ex- 
ploited to achieve strategic objectives. 

The tactical level of war, for the 
Army at least, is that of the division 
and below but will increasingly be- 
come that of the brigade and below. 
Therefore, it is increasingly important 
to conduct joint tactical training for 

the Army brigade, or what the Army 
will refer to as the unit of action. 

How Joint Are We? 

Recent combat experiences sug- 
gest that we are fighting as an inte- 
grated joint team. However, integra- 
tion problems remain. Major General 
Frank Hagenbeck, USA, Commander, 
10 th Infantry Division, started an in- 
terservice debate over his contention 
that close air support (CAS) was unre- 
sponsive during Operation Anaconda 
in Afghanistan. 1 Joint coordination, 
and explicitly joint fires coordination, 
seemed to improve during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, although command, 
control, communications, and intel- 
ligence (C 3 I) digital systems are still 
incompatible among the joint forces. 
The timeliness of CAS did not seem to 
be a widespread problem during Iraqi 
Freedom, but there are concerns due 
to lack of tactical training and under- 
standing of the capabilities of the CAS 
pilots from the Army perspective and 
the capabilities of ground forces from 
the perspective of CAS pilots. 

The 3 d Infantry Division's after-ac- 
tion report from Iraqi Freedom has posi- 
tive things to say about the availabil- 
ity of CAS during its rapid advance to 
Baghdad. The report specifi- 
cally gives accolades for the 
enlisted tactical air control- 
lers assigned to the brigade 
combat teams. However, the 
controllers experienced problems in 
talking pilots onto the targets, delaying 
CAS in a counterfire role against Iraqi 
artillery. This was reportedly due to the 
inability of the pilots to identify the 
targets and a misunderstanding with 
ground forces on what constituted pos- 
itive identification of targets as enemy. 
While the ground forces were satisfied 
with their counterfire radar acquisi- 
tions as a positive identification, the 
special instructions (SPINS) for the pi- 
lots did not authorize engagements 
based on acquisitions alone. On the 
surface, this appears to be a rules-of-en- 
gagement problem and should be ad- 
dressed accordingly. But if the ground 

forces had trained more with live pi- 
lots prior to the war, they would have 
known that SPINS normally requires 
a CAS pilot or observer to positively 
identify targets. Additionally, the situa- 
tion in Iraq was skewed by the fact that 
the fixed-wing aircraft were nearly all 
rigged for bombing rather than coun- 
terair. This is important because in a 
conflict with a country with fighter jets, 
many of our fixed-wing assets would 
conduct counterair operations rather 
than bombing. Therefore, it is impera- 
tive that each CAS aircraft is used ef- 
ficiently and effectively. 

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 
1986 is widely praised as having re- 
formed the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and contributed to making the 
U.S. military the most powerful ever 
assembled. Today's capabilities to plan 
and operate at the strategic level are 
unequaled. Prior to the legislation, of- 
ficers often avoided joint duty, pre- 
ferring to stay within their services. 
Goldwater-Nichols forced the services 
to send some of their best personnel to 
joint billets by setting an objective that 
joint officers would be promoted at the 
same or higher rates than officers not 
joint qualified. Additionally, the law 
created critical joint billets that had to 
be filled by the services. As a final in- 
centive, the law made it mandatory for 
all officers to be joint qualified prior 
to flag rank. Many believe that the 
law has changed the military culture. 
However, the cultural change is only 
now filtering down to the operational 
level. It is imperative to ensure that it 
continues to the tactical level. 

There are ongoing efforts by U.S. 
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to cre- 
ate a Joint National Training Capa- 
bility (JNTC). These initiatives show 
great promise in bringing joint forces 
together in the live, virtual, and con- 
structive environments to train at the 
operational level. The Deputy Secre- 
tary of Defense formally established 
the joint national training concept 
in January 2003 and made JFCOM 
responsible for the initiative. JNTC 
is envisioned as linking the tactical, 

joint coordination, and explicitly joint 
fires coordination, seemed to improve 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 15 



■ how joint are we? 

operational, and strategic players in a 
single exercise to increase joint effec- 
tiveness. Although the approach shows 
promise, little has been accomplished 
in bringing the joint players together 
at the operational and tactical level. 

An operational-level exercise was 
recently conducted by III Corps head- 
quarters, acting as the coalition joint 
task force (CJTF) headquarters. CJTF 
commanded and controlled forces 
from Arizona to Texas in live, virtual, 
and constructive environments and 

declared the exercise successful. The 
III Corps Commander wrote an article 
arguing that the exercise validated 
the joint training concept. 2 Although 
we should applaud the efforts of all 
involved to execute and validate this 
difficult and overdue training event, 
we should ask just how joint the exer- 
cise was and at what level. The table in 
the article showed the training audi- 
ence for the exercise, but conspicu- 
ously missing was any participation 
from services other than the Army. 

Potential participants are listed in the 
table below, with their involvement 

Was this joint training? As the 
author pointed out, this was a test to 
validate the JNTC concept, but it seems 
implausible to validate a joint training 
system when the full joint team is not 
participating. Even if the joint forces air 
component commander or the Com- 
bined Air Operations Center took part, 
there was no tactical participation of 
CAS or reconnaissance aircraft. 

Looking for Opportunities 

f Discussions with numerous former 
2 and serving battalion and brigade com- 
| manders and former combat training 
e center (CTC) observer/controllers indi- 
£ cate that joint tactical training is simply 
5 not happening often enough. Where it 
does occur, it takes place mainly through 
a valiant effort, mostly by an individual 
Army staff officer or Air Force air liaison 
officer (ALO), who must persuade other 
joint forces to become involved. The 
following are just a few examples from 
my own experiences serving in both the 
United States and the Republic of Korea. 

The 6 th Cavalry Brigade (Air Com- 
bat) is U.S. Forces Korea's reserve in the 
event of conflict on the Korean Penin- 
sula. It consists of two Aff-64 Apache 
helicopter squadrons and a Patriot air 
defense battalion. Plans call for ele- 
ments of the brigade to work with the 
Navy during the early stages of a po- 
tential conflict. The brigade conducts 
over-water training for this eventual- 
ity both with the Navy and indepen- 
dently. Because no other Apache unit 
in the Army has a similar mission, new 
crews must learn the particular tac- 
tics, techniques, and procedures. Train- 
ing with the Navy is key to executing 
the operation, ffowever, there is no 
mechanism to ensure that this training 
takes place other than the good rela- 
tions between 6 th Cavalry and the fleet. 
There is no command above either of 
the organizations responsible for plan- 
ning and resourcing joint training. The 
result is that scheduled joint training is 
sometimes cancelled due to changes in 

Potential Participants 



Joint Force Air Component Command 


Combined Air Operations Center 
and Battlefield Coordination Detachment 

Fixed Cost Contracting 

Air Force/Navy/Marine Corps fixed wing attack 


Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) 


Lethal and nonlethal SEAD 


Joint Airborne Command Center/ 
Command Post 


Airborne Warning and Control System 


Joint Surveillance and Target Attack 
Radar System 

(Simulation Only) 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 


Combat Search and Rescue 


Source: Thomas F. Metz and Christopher A. Joslin, "Time to Train How We Fight: 
Validation of the Joint Training Concept,” Army Aviation (December 31 , 2003). 

16 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


the operational calendar for one or the 
other commands with little regard for 
the priority of joint tactical training. 

When I served as a squadron com- 
mander in 6 th Cavalry Brigade, my staff 
searched for opportunities to train in 
a joint environment, especially in live 
fire conditions. Since we had a low 
priority on live fire ranges in Korea, 
we turned to the Air Force 25 th Fighter 
Squadron (A-lOs) to conduct training. 
This proved to be a beneficial oppor- 
tunity for both organizations because 
they had access to a range, and both 

received excellent joint air attack team 
training while over water. Although 
this worked occasionally, we should 
not depend on tactical-level command- 
ers to find joint training opportunities 
as the only alternative. 

The 2 d Infantry Division is the Ar- 
my's forward-deployed ground force in 
the Republic of Korea. The division ex- 
ecutes quarterly brigade-level exercises 
to keep its edge honed for combat. My 
squadron participated in the training 
because the division's Apache unit was 
undergoing training back in the States 
as a Longbow battalion. The division 
had issued an operations order to the 
brigade that was conducting the train- 
ing, and the brigade had completed its 
analysis and was issuing its operations 
order to the subordinate command- 
ers and to the division commander. 
Unfortunately, the exercise had to be 
conducted with no CAS and critical 
training was lost. 

An observer not familiar with the 
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) 
would probably think it is operated by 
a joint organization with full support 
of the joint team. Actually, the Army 
operates the center and depends on 
agreements with the other services, 
particularly the Air Force, for their par- 
ticipation in the training. The JRTC 
staff is constantly working to line up 
CAS sorties and lift aircraft to ensure 

that brigades rotating through the cen- 
ter receive the best joint tactical train- 
ing possible. But when CAS and lift 
aircraft are cancelled, the brigades are 
relegated to "replication," the bane of 
serious trainers everywhere. The fix is 
again an agreement between the ser- 
vices since JFCOM does not command 
combat forces in either the Army or 
the Air Force. 

Finally, despite years of increased 
focus, with talking and more talk- 
ing on joint operations by Congress, 
DOD, and military commanders at all 
levels, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) issued a critical re- 
port on joint CAS training. 3 CAS 
for ground forces is a hot issue 
when joint tactical operations are 
discussed, but problems remain. The 
report specifically notes that the De- 
partment of Defense has had limited 
success in overcoming the barriers that 
prevent troops from receiving the re- 
alistic, standardized close air support 
training necessary to prepare them for 
joint operations. This is the result of 
four interrelated factors: 

■ ground and air forces have limited 
opportunities to train together in a joint 

■ home station training is often re- 
stricted and thus does not always provide 
realistic training to prepare troops to per- 
form the mission 

■ the services use different training 
standards and certification requirements for 
personnel responsible for coordinating close 
air support 

■ within the individual services, joint 
close air support training is often a lower 
priority than other missions. 

The report goes on to say that 
when CAS training for ground forces 
does occur, usually at one of the com- 
bat training centers, it does not meet 
the requirements of the ground com- 
manders because units are not ade- 
quately trained prior to their arrival 
at the center. Additionally, the CTCs 
are the only maneuver training areas 
that offer adequate range areas to con- 
duct realistic training, but individual 
brigades only get to train at the CTCs 
every 12 to 18 months. As the senior 

we should not depend on tactical- 
level commanders to find joint 
training opportunities 

aviation observer controller at JRTC in 
2002-2003, I came to the same conclu- 
sions. Units conducted the training 
they needed prior to their arrival at 
the CTCs rather than executing profi- 
ciently on arrival. Reports from Army 
CTCs and the Center for Army Lessons 
Learned confirm that ground forces 
need to conduct more CAS training. 

The Joint National Training Ca- 
pability concept attempts to fix the 
training center problem by integrating 
the entire joint force. But brigade or 
battalion commanders will likely be 
involved less often than is currently 
the practice at the "dirt" CTCs such as 
JRTC and the National Training Center. 

Why We Must Train Jointly 

The issue of joint training is im- 
portant for the Army because the ser- 
vice is truly dependent on the other 
services for specific capabilities that 
do not exist in its inventory, especially 
CAS and airlift. Army and joint doc- 
trine call for the close integration of 
ground and air components in execut- 
ing tactical operations. A major prob- 
lem, however, is that the individual 
services are responsible for training 
and equipping their combat units. 
Title 10, U.S. Code, defines the Army's 

Members of air support operations squadron call 
in close air support during combat operations in 
Faliujah, November 13, 2004 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 17 



■ how joint are we? 

responsibility to organize, train, and 
equip forces primarily for ground com- 
bat. 4 Within the continental United 
States, the senior conventional Army 
commander is Commander, U.S. Army 
Forces Command, and he is respon- 
sible for training the forces within his 
command. Each overseas unit is led 
by a senior Army commander in the 
region, such as the 8 th Army Com- 
mander in South Korea. The regional 
combatant commanders, such as U.S. 
Central Command's, have responsi- 
bility for war planning and fighting 

but no tasking authority to individual 
service organizations for training. Any 
joint training is accomplished by coop- 
eration among individual commanders 
rather than any higher commander 
having the authority to direct joint 
training across the services. Some argue 
that this arrangement is acceptable and 
the military does not need another 

training directive issued by a head- 
quarters not in touch with the units 
affected. But the consequences of not 
conducting joint tactical training are 
potentially catastrophic. 

The one command that has au- 
thority for directing and resourcing 
joint training is U.S. Special Opera- 
tions Command. Joint training within 
the command is fairly routine since 
forces from all the services fall under 
one commander. Air support and 
operations for ground and maritime 
forces are coordinated and directed 
by the higher joint 
headquarters and 
are only subject 
to change by that 
headquarters. How- 
ever, because the 
command lacks CAS 
fixed-wing aircraft, close air support 
remains a problem within the com- 
munity; at least two incidents of 
friendly fire occurred in Afghani- 
stan against Special Forces troops by 
CAS aircraft. 

The GAO report cited earlier 
points out that there are no standards 
across the services for close air support 

the regional combatant commanders have 
responsibility for war planning and fighting 
but no tasking authority to individual 
service organizations for training 

training or for how often controllers 
must train to the task. Air Force CAS 
controllers assigned to Army brigades 
and battalions are there only tempo- 
rarily and are subject to the orders of 
their Air Force parent unit and may 
not be available for training with Army 
forces. 5 This issue becomes of even 
more concern as the Army transitions 
to units of action that are roughly 
equivalent to our current brigades, or 
more accurately to the brigade combat 
team that is formed from the standing 
maneuver brigade (infantry or armor) 
with all its support forces from other 
brigades within a division. Over the 
last decade, Army deployments have 
involved smaller and smaller units to 
the point that we are now putting bat- 
talion task forces and brigade combat 
teams on deployments that used to 
involve at least a division level com- 
mander and staff. Lower level com- 
manders must therefore deal with in- 
creasingly complex issues. What has 
not been created is a system to ensure 
that joint training is taking place at the 
brigade and battalion level. Not only 
will joint tactical training become even 
more important, but also command- 
ers at lower levels must become more 
adept at joint operations at the opera- 
tional as well as the tactical level. 

Joint Interdependence 

There is much discussion about 
joint interdependence within the De- 
partment of Defense and specifically 
the Army. The argument is that we 
achieved the ability to deconflict joint 
operations sometime in the 1990s and 
moved on not only to deconflict but 
also to integrate joint operations in 
Iraqi Freedom. The argument, as ar- 
ticulated in The Army Strategic Plan- 
ning Guidance, goes further to say that 
now, in order to reduce redundancies 
and gain efficiencies, we must become 
interdependent. That is, each service 
must depend on the other services for 
certain tasks so the entire force can 
function at the lowest cost. Given the 
Army's decision to reduce organic fire 
support assets in lieu of more ground 

18 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


forces, dependence on CAS is increas- 
ingly an issue. The bottom line is that 
support from the other services is nec- 
essary for Army success in current and 
future combat. 

There are several options for im- 
proving joint tactical training ranging 
from redesigning the entire Depart- 
ment of Defense as "purple suiters” to 
maintaining the status quo. One is to 
align all tactical Army, Navy, Marine, 
and Air Force combat elements for 
training with each other based on a re- 

gional alignment under the combatant 
commanders of the unified commands. 
Combatant commanders would direct 
multi-echelon joint training and issue 
training development guidance to the 
service commands. Commanders of 
each of the aligned service component 
commands would then develop, re- 
source, coordinate, and execute multi- 
echelon joint training. This method 
fits well with the new Army doctrine of 
a capabilities-based force that is ready 
to deploy, rapidly plug into a joint task 
force, and win the fight. 

Another option is to charge the 
JFCOM commander with synchronizing 
assets to ensure that joint tactical train- 
ing is taking place. A quarterly joint 

training conference could take place 
similar to the current joint airborne/air 
transportability training conferences 
in which aircraft are resourced for 
parachute and transport training and 
operations. This system has enabled 
the Army to achieve mission success 
in maintaining parachute proficiency 
for an entire division of paratroopers 
and other conventional and Special 
Operations Forces (SOF). It has also 
worked for scheduling lift aircraft. The 
most logical extension of this confer- 
ence would be adding close air 
support aircraft coordination. 
Additional players in the joint 
coordination arena are Navy 
carriers for joint shipboard operations 
and naval surface gunfire. The subse- 
quent close interaction of the entire 
joint team would inevitably bring up 
other training opportunities that would 
benefit all the services and further re- 
duce redundancies across the board. 

Prior to any of these options, the 
services must identify key joint tasks 
that offer high-payoff training. Obvi- 
ously, CAS is one of those areas. The 
services should establish joint stan- 
dards for aircrews, controllers, com- 
panies, battalions, and brigades that 
require training in key joint tasks. 
Next, enlisted tactical air controllers 
and ALOs should be assigned directly 
to the command they support. 

Due to the changing operating en- 
vironment, it is becoming more criti- 
cal that all forces are able to operate 
together, including SOF. As a corollary, 
all SOF troops should be included in 
training conferences to better enable 
conventional forces to schedule train- 
ing with them. 

Electronic training sensors for 
ground and air combat forces are an- 
other key aspect of enticing units to 
„ train jointly. The Navy and Air Force are 
| correctly concerned that aircraft train- 
2 ing involve the replication of enemy air 
| defenses, and both have built sophisti- 
| cated training areas for their crews. The 

| Army has sophisticated ground force 


training systems at their CTCs and in- 
creasingly at home bases, especially in 
the urban training environment. No- 
where in the military do we have both 
systems tied together to totally enable 
joint tactical training and hold com- 
manders accountable. Decisionmakers 
should review all planned and current 
electronic training systems. 

Warriors should not have to figure 
out how to fight jointly under fire. It 
is not that we are not training in the 
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 
Force; we just do not do it together 
well enough. We are executing together 
in combat, so let us not waste the les- 
sons from the last several years of com- 
bat by failing to incorporate them into 
a truly joint training system. JFQ 


1 Franklin L. Hagenbeck, "Afghanistan: 
Fire Support for Operation Anaconda," Field 
Artillery Journal (September-October 2002), 

2 Thomas F. Metz and Christopher A. 
Joslin, "Time to Train How We Fight: Vali- 
dation of the Joint Training Concept," Army 
Aviation (December 31, 2003), 51-54. 

3 U.S. General Accounting Office, 
"Military Readiness: Lingering Training and 
Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of 
Ground Forces," GAO-03-505, May 2003. 

4 Title 10, U.S. Code, subtitle B, part 1, 
chapter 307, section 3062. 

5 GAO-03-505, 9. 

the services must identify key joint 
tasks that offer high-payoff training 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 19 


U.S. Marine Corps (Will Lathrop) 

Marine views demolition of weapons 
cache in Iraq from HEV Cougar, the 
Marine Corps’ newest vehicle, wrapped 
in steel armor and ballistic glass 

Getting Transformation Right 


T oday, as never before, the 
military establishment is 
committed to dynamic and 
revolutionary change to 
produce new forms of warfare and new 
warfighting capabilities. Transformation 

Colonel Richard D. Hooker, Jr., USA, is Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps Combat 
Support Brigade; Colonel H.R. McMaster, USA, is Commander, 3 d Cavalry Regiment, 
and author of Dereliction of Duty; and Colonel Dave Gray, USA, is Commander, 

1 st Brigade, 101 st Airborne Division (Air Assault). 

offers an exciting vision of future war 
with fewer casualties, quicker victories, 
and a lower price tag. It could secure 
U.S. military dominance for genera- 
tions to come. But there are risks. Get- 
ting transformation right is second only 
to success on the battlefield as the most 
important challenge facing the military. 

Transformation plays to American 
strengths in technology and engineer- 
ing, allays the fear of casualties, assumes 

20 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

Hooker, McMaster, and Grey 

a reduced requirement for vulnerable 
ground troops, and promises short, 
sharp campaigns. It does not rely as 
heavily as current warfare on unco- 
operative allies. Theoretically, it could 
enhance deterrence through the pros- 
pect of decisive, overwhelming defeat 
of adversaries. There is a danger, how- 
ever, in embracing the transformation 
agenda entirely without addressing its 
potential shortcomings. 

The Power of the Microchip 

What is meant by transformation ? 
The Department of Defense Office of 
Force Transformation defines it some- 
what elliptically as "a process that 
shapes the changing nature of military 
competition. . . . First and foremost, 

defense transformation seeks 

transformation is a continuing pro- 
cess. It does not have an end state." 1 
While clearly an ongoing procedure, 
the lack of precisely defined waypoints, 
operating parameters, a bounded and 
developed transformational concept 
for joint operations, or disciplined pro- 
grammatics means that service and 
joint planners cannot easily prioritize 
programs and resources to satisfy what 
remains an ambiguous agenda. Many 
major programs predate the advent of 
force transformation by many years. 
They represent not the dramatic re- 
structuring of military organizations 
and institutions in accordance with 
transformational concepts, but the 
continuation of Cold War programs 
originally conceived to cope with the 
Soviet threat and now repackaged as 

In general terms, defense transfor- 
mation seeks to exploit the power of 
the microchip to control information. 
Variously described as network-centric 
or effects-based warfare, it focuses on 
the use of precision-guided muni- 
tions employed at standoff ranges — all 
networked to the same information 
grid — to defeat opponents in major 

theater war and lesser contingencies. 
This approach emphasizes the use 
of high technology on future battle- 
fields. The thrust is the exploitation 
of America's edge in high technology 
to achieve rapid victory with smaller 
ground forces and fewer casualties. In 
this construct, networked, digitized 
intelligence and information systems 
can give a precise and uniform picture 
of the battlefield to commanders for 
immediate targeting and engagement. 

Force transformation had its roots 
in the revolution in military affairs 
debates of the 1990s and gained a new 
level of interest after the 2000 Pres- 
idential election. This thinking was 
heavily influenced by business inno- 
vations and practices that exploited 
new information technologies to 
achieve business efficiencies. In 
many places, business strategies and 
jargon have been grafted wholesale 
into transformation documents, 
suggesting that armed conflict and the 
marketplace are somehow analogous 
if not equivalent. The intent was to 
apply business practices and emerging 
technologies to transform the Armed 
Forces from an industrial- to an infor- 
mation-focused military. 

Today, transformation is focused 
on technology and the networked in- 
formation grid. Human factors receive 
far less attention. Intellectually, trans- 
formation envisions an interconnected 
sensor grid able to pass information 
and intelligence instan- 
taneously to firing plat- 
forms. In theory, this 
grid will provide full 
situational awareness to 
commanders, who can 
then select and attack 
the most critical and 
vulnerable target sets 
for maximum effect. 

Information superior- 
ity, enabled by systems 
that can seamlessly 
relay data from sensors 
to shooters, thus trans- 
lates into faster decision 
cycles, forestalls enemy 

reactions, creates more friendly op- 
tions, and minimizes risks. 

Beyond Theory 

After several years, however, trans- 
lating this general description of future 
war into detailed and specific systems 
and operating concepts — concrete 
capabilities placed in the hands of 
warfighters — has not progressed much 
beyond the theoretical stage. Exactly 
how, for example, a satellite image of 
a high value target or a signal intercept 
picked up by national technical means 
would be relayed to one tactical unit 
among hundreds for real-time engage- 
ment remains to be seen. To date, no 
joint command, control, communica- 
tions, computers, intelligence, surveil- 
lance, and reconnaissance system that 
can interface securely and digitally 
across all services and commands is 
in sight. Exactly how specific systems 
might fit into an overarching transfor- 
mation framework remains sketchy. To 
be useful to the warfighter, transforma- 
tion must progress beyond broad rhe- 
torical generalities to grapple with the 
specific realities of future war. 

A second flaw in transformation 
thinking is a misconception about the 
nature of war. Transformation propo- 
nents insist that certainty can be ap- 
proached in war. But war is grounded 
in the human condition — in the hopes, 
fears, pride, envy, prejudices, and 
passions of human beings organized 

to exploit the power of the 
microchip to control information 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 21 



■ getting transformation right 

into political communities and mili- 
tary bodies. Far more than the clash of 
weapons or the neutralization of target 
sets, war is a contest of wills. As much 
today as yesterday, war is emotional, ir- 
rational, and erratic — the antithesis of 
the coldly logical and calculating view 
of many transformation proponents. 
War may begin for logical and rational 
reasons, and leaders will strive to keep 
it that way. But very quickly passions 
become inflamed, populations become 
resentful, regimes totter, and ambitions 
expand. War aims and policy objectives 
are changed, careers and administra- 

tions rise and fall, allies rethink their 
positions, and enemies begin to act in 
unexpected ways. 

Rejecting this reality, many trans- 
formation supporters instead ground 
their theories in the expectation of 
certainty, believing that war can be 
controlled, ordered, and regulated. Ex- 
plicit in their discussion is the ability 
not only to see the enemy everywhere, 

all the time, but to actually anticipate 
and predict "all opposing moves." 
Full situational awareness will largely 
if not completely dissipate the fog and 
friction of war. 

This is a dangerous and unwar- 
ranted assertion. The expectation of 
certainty in battle betrays a misplaced 
faith in technology that is hard to 
overstate; in fact, it is to misconceive 
war altogether. As Frederick Kagan 
pointed out, the essence of this vision 
is the simple reduction of warfare to 
a targeting drill. 2 In this schema, wars 
and campaigns appear as lists of targets 
to be located, attacked, and 
destroyed. This "technicist" 
view reflects the experiences 
and intellectual predisposi- 
tions of many transformation 
advocates who come from air 
and naval backgrounds. Their 
briefings reveal few conceptual distinc- 
tions between the levels of war. Fur- 
ther, they betray a misunderstanding 
of war's intensely human character, a 
failure to recognize the different war- 
fighting domains of land, sea, air, and 
space, and a misreading of service core 
competencies and their contributions 
to joint warfare. Future war, like past 
war, will be characterized by complex- 

ity, ambiguity, and uncertainty — an 
operating environment conspicuously 
absent from current transformation 

Relatedly, at the core of much cur- 
rent thinking about transformation lies 
a desire for more politically acceptable 
forms of warfare. Indeed, in military 
operations since 9/11, air and naval 
forces have sustained negligible casual- 
ties relative to ground forces, which are 
higher by a factor of 100. If war can be 
reduced to the delivery of standoff, pre- 
cision munitions against key targets, 
the political consequences of casualties 
decline correspondingly. Wars that can 
be fought quickly and decisively, with- 
out the need for major allies, mobiliz- 
ing congressional and popular support, 
or calling up the Reserve, pose lower 
political risks domestically and inter- 
nationally. But such an approach may 
not be realistic or desirable. Few would 
argue that rapid and decisive victory is 
a negative. But perhaps wars that can 
be fought without involving the Na- 
tion at large ought to give pause. 

An Emphasis on Land 

If one looks closely, a fundamen- 
tal assumption is at work here: the U.S. 
military is now, or soon will be, inad- 

if war can be reduced to the delivery 
of standoff, precision munitions, the 
political consequences of casualties 
decline correspondingly 

22 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

U.S. Air Force 

Hooker, McMaster, and Grey 

equate to its national security tasks. 
Inexplicably, our military dominance 
in recent conflicts and our growing su- 
periority relative to adversary states are 
conjugated as a "profound change in 
the strategic environment" sufficiently 
alarming to "compel a transformation 
of the U.S. military." 3 Official publica- 
tions attempt to describe a nexus be- 
tween nonstate actors such as al Qaeda 
and an urgent need to embrace net- 
work-centric warfare (NCW) — as though 
shadowy, low-tech terrorist organiza- 
tions were somehow more, not less, 
vulnerable to precision strike. In fact, 
NCW was first articulated years before 
9/11 and is clearly more suited to at- 
tacking fixed nodes and targetable cen- 
ters of gravity than small cells of loosely 
organized terrorists who communicate 
by messenger and encrypted email. 

There can be no question that 
the emerging threat posed by interna- 
tional terrorists possessing weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) is profoundly 
dangerous. Destroying terrorists along 
with their infrastructure and assets is 
relatively straightforward, however, 
once they are located. Tracking their 
communications, funding, movement, 

and access to unconventional weap- 
ons is far more important and has little 
to do with military transformation and 
much to do with improving human 
intelligence capabilities, interagency 
processes, and sharing information with 
allies. In this regard, the strategic nexus 
that has been drawn between the war 
on terrorism and transformation seems 
somewhat forced, since the resources 
allocated to "transformational" systems 
such as the F-22 may actually detract 
from solving the first order problem 
of defeating WMD-equipped terrorism, 
a far more serious threat to national 
security than the prospect of state-on- 
state conflict. 

Advancing technology is yield- 
ing striking improvements in preci- 
sion-guided weaponry and in the 
battlefield architecture for command, 
control, communications, and intel- 
ligence-sharing. The technology gap 
that has opened between our likely 
opponents and ourselves will only 
widen. These trends reinforce the argu- 
ments of transformation theorists, who 
have long contended that informa- 
tion and precision weapons alone can 
largely determine the outcome of wars 

Artist’s conception of littoral combat ship, 
designed to ensure maritime dominance 

and access for the joint force 


fought on land. The debate intensified 
following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, which brought an end to the 
Air Force preoccupation with air-to-air 
combat and the Navy focus on blue- 
water sea control. The emphasis for all 
four services today is found on land. 
For the Air Force and Navy, in particu- 
lar, this translates into standoff preci- 
sion attacks against key land targets. 
The recent campaigns in Afghanistan 
and Iraq provide a preview of current 
transformational thinking applied to 
the battlefield. Indeed, it is likely that 
campaign planning itself was crafted at 
least in part to advance the transforma- 
tion agenda. Our swift initial victories 
over primitive opponents convinced 
many that the age of transformation 
had arrived. 

Nevertheless, overemphasis on 
airpower, precision engagement, and 
information superiority at the expense 
of an ability to seize and hold ground 
will pose grave risks for decisionmak- 
ers if allowed to crowd out, rather 
than complement, other critical ca- 
pabilities. There is no question that 
airpower, encompassing missile strikes 
and unmanned aerial vehicles as well 
as manned aircraft, is the jewel in 
America's national security crown. Its 
flexibility, speed, range, and crushing 
punch make it a first among equals. 

The Problem of 
Data Transmission 

For all its virtues, airpower has 
constraints. It lacks staying power. 
Limited by aircrew endurance, weather, 
weapons load, proximity of friendly 
bases, tanker support, availability of 
trained observers on the ground, and 
other factors, combat aircraft cannot 
stay on station indefinitely to domi- 
nate and secure terrain. The targeting 
process is only as good as the intel- 
ligence it is fed. While fixed targets 
can be attacked with good results, 
a thinking, adaptive enemy (particu- 
larly if blessed with an integrated air 
defense system) will frequently move 
high-value targets, conduct decep- 
tion operations, and take refuge in 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 23 



civilian areas. Most importantly, air- 
power cannot physically seize and 
control terrain. While airpower is un- 
questionably the most effective form 
of military might in the U.S. arsenal, 
its limitations will persist for years to 
come. Airpower alone left the enemy 
in Iraq unimpressed in 2003, but it 
proved phenomenally effective com- 
bined with advancing ground forces. 

Similarly, overreliance on infor- 
mation superiority carries risks of its 

own. The advent of digitization and 
the proliferation of unmanned drones, 
increasingly capable satellite plat- 
forms, joint surveillance and target at- 
tack radar systems, and a host of other 
systems increasingly promises a high- 
resolution picture of the battlefield 

that will enable joint commanders to 
locate, attack, and destroy an enemy 
while remaining hidden themselves. 
This concept of a view of the other side 
of the hill suggests to many that the 
friction and fog of the battlefield may 
soon be a thing of the past. 

If technology alone were the an- 
swer, this might be true — although see- 
ing everything militarily significant 
will probably never happen. But see- 
ing the enemy is only half the battle. 

Transmitting accurate in- 
formation in real time to 
systems and units that can 
act on it immediately is the 
challenge. Because battle- 
field information and intel- 
ligence flows through and across mul- 
tiple organizational boundaries and 
interfaces, it will inevitably be delayed, 
altered, or otherwise distorted. Staffs 
will take time to analyze and interpret 
new information and propose courses 
of action rather than immediately 

pass it unfiltered to subordinate and 
adjacent formations. 

In this regard, the fundamental 
factor not addressed by transformation 
advocates is how human beings pro- 
cess information. This is independent 
of the network's technical ability to 
transfer information. The decision to 
engage any target requires a human de- 
cision informed by analysis. Separating 
the important from the unimportant 
has always daunted commanders and 
staffs. Time rushes on as command- 
ers and staffs wrestle with the thorny 
problems of battle command. What is 
the best system to engage an emerg- 
ing target? How can we be sure who is 
really there? Is this important enough 
to postpone other engagements? What 
about collateral damage and innocent 
civilians? How much information 
should be pushed down to small units, 
and how much can they digest? Who 
else needs to know? Are there friendly 
elements in the area that are not on 

transmitting accurate information in 
real time to systems and units that can 
act on it immediately is the challenge 

24 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

U.S. Air Force (John Ingle) 

Hooker, McMaster, and Grey 

the grid, such as intelligence elements, 
local supporters, or sources? Who must 
approve the strike? 

These and other factors affect the 
technical problem of data transmission. 
They are not trivial concerns, nor are 
they particularly susceptible to techni- 
cal solutions. In fact, the explosion of 
automation and computer systems in 
headquarters has brought an increase, 
not a decrease, in the size of head- 
quarters staffs. So long as people make 
battlefield decisions, they will stop and 
think. So long as militaries are hierar- 
chical, commanders will use their dis- 
cretion. Whenever information crosses 
an organizational boundary, it will be 
altered, however subtly. 

Perceptive adversaries will always 
strive to influence this cycle by altering 
commanders' perceptions — at times by 
using our technological edge against us 
to reinforce our operational and strate- 
gic prejudices and assumptions. Perhaps 
more than any other, this dimension 
of transformation remains neglected. 
We should work tirelessly to improve 
the link between sensor and shooter. It 
seems clear that order-of-magnitude in- 
creases in lethality and timeliness are at 
hand. Nevertheless, any vision of war 
that posits a "frictionless" battlefield, 

a "seamless" flow of information, and 
"persistent and pervasive" intelligence 
is deeply flawed. 

The Need for Strategic Balance 

There is also the very real question 
of the fragility and vulnerability of the 
network. The investment needed to 
achieve the capabilities outlined in the 
transformation agenda will be massive, 
but effective asymmetric countermea- 
sures are relatively cheap and read- 
ily available. The technology to build, 
field, and employ radiofrequency 
weapons, also known as high-power 
microwave weapons or "e-bombs," 
is rapidly proliferating. In fact, "any 
nation with a 1950s technology base 
capable of designing and building nu- 
clear weapons and radars" can build 
a crude version now, and "simple and 
effective microwave weapons are ready 
to go." 4 These weapons can profoundly 
affect information systems, particularly 
as most systems fielded since the Cold 
War (especially miniaturized, wireless, 
and off-the-shelf commercial systems) 
are not hardened against electromag- 
netic pulse and related effects. 

The fact that many of our likely 
adversaries will not be technologically 
advanced states with easily targetable 

centers of gravity also reinforces the 
need for strategic balance. These oppo- 
nents may fight us on the low end to 
bleed us over time, communicating by 
messenger, wearing no uniforms, and 
existing in the midst of large popula- 
tions unsympathetic to American war 
aims. Asymmetry cuts both ways, as 
the Russians have found in Chechnya, 
the Israelis in the occupied territories, 
and coalition forces in Iraq. 

All this is not to say that the re- 
lationship between different forms of 
military power remains unchanged. We 
may well have evolved to the point 
where the traditional roles of ground 
and air forces are reversed in major con- 
ventional operations. Tomorrow's wars, 
like Afghanistan and Iraq, will likely see 
ground formations forcing the enemy 
into the open, where airpower and pre- 
cision strike play the decisive role. But in 
urban settings, close terrain like Korea, 
or postconflict operations like Iraq, a 
strong ground capability will be central 
to success. Tomorrow's joint force can- 
not seize and hold ground from the 
air or depend on surrogate armies with 
their own agendas and doubtful capa- 
bilities. The interrelationship between 
all forms of military power — ground, 
sea, air, space, and information — is the 
wellspring of American strategic might. 

That synergy is in fact precisely the 
point. For decades, the Pentagon's great- 
est strategic asset has been strength in 
all dimensions. Able to project all forms 
of military power over great distances 
and sustain them virtually indefinitely, 
the United States combines powerful 
land forces, overwhelming air forces, 
superior naval forces, and unrivalled 
nuclear, space, and information capa- 
bilities, making it the most dominant 
power on the planet by a wide margin. 
But recent military successes must not 
obscure the fundamental basis of that 
strength. In postconflict or stability op- 
erations and major combat operations 
alike, a strong and sustainable ground 
„ force will be indispensable to achiev- 
8 ing political objectives. That capability 
| must not be allowed to wither in the 
§ rush to transform. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 25 



■ getting transformation right 

Viewing Transformation 

The history of armed conflict 
in the 20 th century supports the the- 
sis that advanced technology alone 
is not enough. In 1940, the Germans 
were equipped with fewer tanks, guns, 
and troops than their opponents, and 
the equipment they did have was in- 
ferior. Yet they overran the Norwe- 
gians, Danes, French, Belgians, Dutch, 
and British in a few weeks. Eighteen 
months later, they owned all of Eu- 
rope, from the Arctic Circle to Crete, 
and from the Atlantic to the gates of 
Moscow. The sources of German power 
lay not in numbers, equipment, or 
technology, but in leadership, training, 
organization, and doctrine. 

The Korean and Vietnam conflicts 
are also instructive. Although dra- 
matically outmatched in air and naval 
power, and lacking most of the high- 
tech weaponry of the United States, 
North Korea and North Vietnam fought 
American forces to a standstill in pro- 
longed wars that saw Washington com- 
mit hundreds of thousands of soldiers. 
Technology was unable to convincingly 
defeat a resolute opponent fighting on 
favorable terrain, enabled by "off-lim- 
its" sanctuaries across the border, and 
motivated by ideological goals. 

The examples of the Korean War 
in 1950, the Gulf War in 1991, and the 
9/11 attacks also demonstrate that con- 
fidence in our ability to assess future 
threats and conflicts must be heavily 
qualified. We cannot know for certain 
where, when, and under what condi- 
tions the U.S. military may be called 
on to fight. In fact, the very certainty 
with which transformation advocates 
assert their theories gives pause. Fore- 
knowledge of adversary intentions and 
political dynamics is an art as much as 
a science, one not always amenable to 
signal intercepts and satellite photos. 

A conflict on the Korean Penin- 
sula, for example, could obviate lessons 
learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The prize of Seoul lies just across the 
border, well inside North Korean artil- 
lery range. Pyongyang would almost 

certainly move to interdict U.S. air 
and sea ports of debarkation, employ- 
ing chemical or biological weapons 
far behind the initial line of contact. 
American airpower and precision en- 
gagement would be severely degraded 
by weather, mountainous terrain, and 
fortifications shielding much of the 
North's artillery and command and 
control. With massive forces facing 
each other at close range, the effec- 
tiveness of stand-off weapons would 
be lessened as well. Hard fighting in 
complex terrain will be needed to pre- 
vail in Korea. 

Most military officers share the 
above concerns intuitively and expe- 
rientially. Recent war college studies 
reveal that members of all four ser- 
vices view transformation more cau- 
tiously than their civilian counterparts. 
While supportive of information-based 
warfare as a way to achieve more de- 
cisive results with lower casualties, a 
strong majority are unwilling to reduce 
force structure or readiness in favor of 
new approaches to warfare. Most serv- 
ing officers express confidence in the 
military's ability to cope with current 
and projected threats without radically 
altering the force, especially in a time 
of unprecedented turbulence. Among 

Army and Marine officers particularly, 
warfare is viewed as a human endeavor, 
not a technical exercise. Thus the char- 
acter of war retains its human face. 

These considerations suggest the 
need for more serious analysis of trans- 
formation's key concepts and asser- 
tions, as well as more specificity about 
desired capabilities, programs, and 
tradeoffs. Although the momentum be- 
hind transformation is enormous, the 
future of our national security demands 
that we think clearly and holistically 
and adopt a strategically balanced and 
perhaps more evolutionary approach. 
Revolutionary or radical change is ex- 
citing, but we cannot afford to get it 
wrong. In the business world, which 
has so profoundly influenced transfor- 
mation thinking, the price of failure 
is a drop in earnings or corporate col- 
lapse. Failure in war brings infinitely 
more enduring penalties. 

An aggressive but evolutionary ap- 
proach to transformation, which pushes 
the envelope without breaking it, offers 
a balance between enhanced capabili- 
ties and acceptable strategic risk. That 
evolution need not be lengthy, but it 
must not risk everything on strategic 
doctrines that discount the funda- 
mental principle of strategic balance. 

Joint Direct Attack Munitions to be 
loaded on Marine F/A-18 supporting 

26 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

U.S. Marine Corps (Paul Leicht) 

Hooker, McMaster, and Grey 


The Department « 
of Defense... 

Continuing to Transform 
for the 21p Century 

Secretary Rumsfeld briefing reporters on 
DOD FY06 budget submission, February 2005 

A monist strategy, relying on informa- 
tion technology and precision strike 
while neglecting the means needed 
to actually seize and control the land, 
offers politically attractive but illusory 
benefits. If history teaches anything, 
it is that war is as unpredictable in its 
forms and processes as it is enduring 
in the realm of human affairs. Today, 
the United States enjoys an order of 
magnitude advantage over potential 
adversaries in the military sphere. By 
relying on a balanced and synergis- 
tic application of all forms of military 
power, we can be confident that our 
dominance will continue to serve our 
national interests. 

By all means, the exciting po- 
tential of the information revolution 
should be harnessed to make America 
safer. The ability to share information 
more quickly and deliver weapons ef- 
fects more precisely ought to be pur- 
sued vigorously. But we must not aban- 
don the true sources of our military 
power as we transform. We must not 
become a military that can do only 
one thing: standoff precision strike. 

While the conduct of war continues to 
change, its nature and character will 
not. The field of human conflict re- 
mains ineluctably human, not techni- 
cal; inherently complex, not orderly; 
and inescapably defined by the land 
and the populations and resources 
found there. 

All agree that transformation holds 
great promise for a more effective mili- 
tary and a safer America. All thoughtful 
professionals should applaud the push 
to enhance our ability to share informa- 
tion rapidly and attack enemies in a 
timely and precise manner. But we must 
not become so dependent on high-reso- 
lution information that we lose our 
capacity to fight without it. The debate 
about transformation must not be al- 
lowed to become an ideological litmus 
test. Despite efforts to tie everything the 
military is or does to it, transformation 
is not an end in itself. Enhancing the 
security of the Nation and its people 
must ever be the objective. Rigorous, 
searching analysis, which combines 
both hard-won combat experience in 

the field and a strong intellectual foun- 
dation, is needed now. 

In future years and future wars, 
America's sons and daughters in uni- 
form will reap the rewards, or bear the 
cost, of transforming our military. They 
will man the legions that will largely 
determine the course of national se- 
curity. We owe it to them and to the 
American people to get it right. JFQ 


1 Department of Defense Office of 
Force Transformation, Military Transforma- 
tion: A Strategic Approach (Washington: 
Director, Force Transformation, Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 2003), 8. 

2 Frederick W. Kagan, "War and After- 
math," Policy Review, (August 2003), 22. 

3 Military Transformation, 29. 

4 See Michael Abrams, "The Dawn of 
the E-Bomb," Spectrum (November 2003), 
11, 24-30. 

Do you have another point of view? Consider JFQ as 
an outlet. See for 

information on submitting articles and letters to the editor. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 27 

DOD (Helene C. Stikkel) 


Transformation in 
Concept and Policy 


T he subject of military trans- 
formation has expanded to 
the point that it transcends 
focused discussion. From 
a cult phenomenon among military 
historians, government officials, and 
policy analysts in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the concept has morphed into a 21 st - 
century all-purpose explanation for 
military decisionmaking. It provides a 
rationale for expanded foreign policy 
objectives. Further, it has been adopted 
as a touchstone by the Department of 

Defense (DOD), especially the civilian 
leadership, to justify weapons programs 
and operational approaches. Finally, it 
has been the object of scholastic atten- 
tion. Transformation is thus in danger 
of being the most oversold military-stra- 
tegic concept since deterrence. A vast 
academic and military literature and 
extensive policy-related discussion have 
raised important questions about U.S. 
military policy, strategy, and war. Trans- 
formation, as understood by Pentagon 
planners and the punditocracy, has the 

potential to improve military perfor- 
mance in important ways. But it is far 
from a guarantor of strategic success or 
sensible policy choices at the margin. 
This discussion asks pertinent questions 
about what transformation means and 
explores its implications for policy and 
strategy issues that have both immedi- 
ate and longer-term importance. 

A Nuclear Retro 

Despite a large literature, uncer- 
tainty remains about exactly what trans- 
formation is. A transformed military 
presumably thinks differently about the 
art of war and about preparation for 
battle than one that is not transformed. 
It might also have a different relation- 
ship with the society it serves. Financ- 
ing the Armed Forces is presumably also 
affected: transformation might make 
militaries more or less expensive, either 
per unit of effect or relative to other 
components of state budgets. Finally, 
transformation might lead to a rethink- 
ing of the very purposes of armies and 
the utility of war itself. 

Stephen J. Cimbala is a distinguished professor of political science at Pennsylvania 
State University, Delaware County, and author of The Past and Future of Nuclear 
Deterrence and Coercive Military Strategy. 

28 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Edward G. Martens) 

C i m b a I a 

Discussions of the revolution in 
military affairs, as military transfor- 
mation was first known among aficio- 
nados, sometimes assumed that the 
impact of technology on strategy was 
straightforward and progressive. But 
history refutes the assumption of a lin- 
ear relationship. Consider an example. 

Nuclear weapons were first used 
in anger to bring World War II to a 
conclusion. Many observers assumed 
that atomic weapons were a continu- 

ation of the industrial age technology 
of mass destruction. And so they were, 
from a strictly technical standpoint. 
Thus early Cold War military plan- 
ning incorporated nuclear weapons 
within a broader strategic framework 
of total war with the Soviet Union. 
All available nuclear weapons would 
be used in the early phases of such a 
conflict. Once those were expended, a 
large-scale protracted conventional war 
between mass armies, air forces, and 
fleets would take place across Europe 
and Asia until one side or the other 
was exhausted of its war resources. 
Nuclear weapons did not appear to 
have changed military strategy and 
preparedness for major war in any fun- 
damental way from this perspective. 

It soon became apparent that strat- 
egy had been changed not only at the 
margin, but also in essence. Fighting 
to prevail in combat with the most de- 
structive weapons at hand was now 
applicable only in wars fought below 
the nuclear threshold. Further refine- 
ment of strategic thinking established 
that the numbers of U.S. and Soviet 
warheads and delivery systems were 
less important than the survivability 
of those forces against any plausible 
first strike and their ability to inflict 
retaliation on enemy targets. It also 
came to be understood that not only 
did nuclear forces need to be survivable, 

but also their command, control, and 
communications systems needed to be 
safe from two types of errors: launching 
a "retaliatory” strike when no actual at- 
tack was under way, or failing to launch 
a timely strike despite a clear indication 
that the United States was under attack. 

This review of how nuclear weap- 
ons evolved, from apparent strategic 
garnishes on prior weapons of mass 
destruction into true instruments that 
revolutionized warfare, makes an im- 
portant point. The early 
stages of a military revo- 
lution may conceal more 
than they reveal about 
the ultimate impact of a 
particular set of technolo- 
gies on warfare and armed 
forces. Only in hindsight can we ap- 
preciate how far the U.S. and Soviet 
strategies of the Cold War had to de- 
part from prior tradition and training. 
This example should be kept in mind 
as we generalize about the impact of 
the information age on warfare. 

The Afghan Model 

The conjunction of breakthroughs 
in electronics, communications, and cy- 
bernetics has impacted every aspect of 
American life, including military affairs. 
Accordingly, some argue that informa- 
tion-based warfare is a true military 
revolution, or a new revolution in mili- 
tary affairs, comparable to the Napole- 
onic, industrial, or nuclear revolutions, 
and potentially bigger on account of 
its global impact. The United States, by 
adapting faster and more effectively to 
information-based technologies, can 
achieve global military preeminence 
by linking a system of systems that 
will provide nearly comprehensive bat- 
tlespace awareness for U.S. command- 
ers while denying it to enemies. 

The most pertinent technologies 
to be leveraged in order to maintain 
U.S. superiority in information-based 
warfare have been described as com- 
mand, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (C 4 ISR); precision- 
guided weapons, especially those of 

longer range; stealth or low-observ- 
able delivery systems; and more reli- 
able and flexible networks, permitting 
coordination of battlespace awareness 
among diverse force elements; and the 
synchronization of multiple fires from 
various platforms and arms of service 
on assigned targets. In addition, the 
United States is assumed to require 
superior capability to exploit space for 
military purposes relative to the ca- 
pabilities of any enemy. Space denial 
practiced against the United States 
would negate advantages in most of 
the categories of information age sys- 
tems just noted. 

Policymakers and defense analysts 
further contend that superiority in 
C 4 ISR and long-range precision strike, 
in particular, were displayed in Afghan- 
istan and Iraq. Some find the Afghan 
model a particularly vivid demonstra- 
tion of how leveraging technology can 
permit rapid and decisive victory at low 
cost in U.S., noncombatant, and even 
enemy lives. This new American way of 
war has, according to some, superseded 
the previously dominant U.S. military 
paradigm of protracted wars of attrition 
fought by mass armies, as in the Ameri- 
can Civil War and the two World Wars. 

Were the wars in Afghanistan in 
2001-2002 and in Iraq in 2003 exam- 
ples of successful transformation? The 
Donald Rumsfeld Pentagon thinks so. 
It has used these conflicts to sweep 
aside the more cautious proponents 
of gradual, as opposed to accelerated, 
changes in technology, organization, 
and doctrine (to include operational 
art and tactics). The sudden collapse of 
Iraqi resistance around Baghdad and 
the meltdown of Saddam Hussein's 
crack Republican Guard divisions set to 
defend the capital appeared to silence 
the critics and justify the Pentagon's 
strategy of substituting speed, agility, 
and savvy for size and strength. In the 
government as well as in the defense 
analytic community, proponents of 
network-centric warfare and "shock 
and awe" as new templates for U.S. 
warfighting felt vindicated. As Frederick 
W. Kagan noted: 

the early stages of a military revolution 
may conceal more than they reveal 
about the ultimate impact of a 
particular set of technologies 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 29 



■ transformation in concept and policy 

"Shock and awe," network-centric war- 
fare, dominant (or predictive) battlespace 
awareness — these are the critical con- 
cepts that define the current visions of 
U.S. military transformation as they are 
being planned, programmed, and executed 
today. They rely unequivocally on having 
essentially perfect intelligence about the 
enemy such that American commanders 
will be able to predict what he will do in 
time to take action to prevent it. 1 

Some experts doubt that the U.S. 
and allied war against the Taliban and 
al Qaeda in Afghanistan demonstrated 
an Afghan model of warfare that can 
serve as a paradigm for other conflicts. 
According to Stephen Biddle, Afghani- 
stan is neither an example of military 
revolution nor an idiosyncratic fluke. 
The victory was made possible by the 
combination of long-range, lethal fire- 
power and skilled ground maneuver 
in a campaign that was close to a typi- 
cal 20 th -century mid-intensity conflict. 
Biddle writes: 

Many now believe that in Afghanistan we 
turned a ragtag militia into conquerors 
who subsequently overwhelmed a supe- 
rior enemy by simply walking forward in 
the wake of our precision bombing. This 
belief is largely responsible for the general 
perception of military revolution in Af- 
ghanistan — and if the war had really been 
fought this way, then the perception would 
be right. But the war was not actually 
fought this way. And what did happen 
was much closer to the long-standing his- 
torical precedent on the need for integrat- 
ing fire and maneuver to overcome skilled, 
resolute opponents. 2 

New technology makes it possible 
to apply the Afghan model where allies 
provide ground maneuver forces that 
are at least the equal of their enemies in 
combat skills. But fire superiority aided 
by all the bells and whistles of domi- 
nant battlespace awareness and special 
operations forces cannot guarantee vic- 
tory where indigenous forces are poorly 
trained, led, or motivated compared to 
their opposite numbers. The Afghan 
model is less a generic template for fu- 
ture war than a model for those limited 
situations in which U.S. allies can pro- 

vide sufficient maneuver forces to tip 
the balance against their adversaries. 

The United States and Britain pro- 
vided their own maneuver forces for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Indig- 
enous allies such as Kurdish forces in 
northern Iraq and Shi'a militia in the 
south moved occupation forces into 
contested areas after the Americans 
had cleared them of the enemy. Trans- 
formation proponents found that the 
Pentagon had demonstrated a new way 
of fighting major regional conflicts or 
theater wars with limited numbers of 
ground forces and without significant 
indigenous assistance. U.S. and allied 
dominating firepower was supported 
by rapid and decisive maneuver warfare 
that rolled up resistance by organized 
Iraqi formations within several weeks. 
A campaign that began on March 19 
was effectively finished by mid-April, 
and President Bush declared that the 
active combat phase concluded on May 
1. According to Max Boot: 

Previously, the gold standard of opera- 
tional excellence had been the German 
blitzkrieg through the Low Countries 
and France in 1940. The Germans man- 
aged to conquer France, the Netherlands, 
and Belgium in just 44 days, at a cost of 
"only" 27,000 dead soldiers. The United 
States and Britain took just 26 days to 
conquer Iraq (a country 80 percent the size 
of France), at a cost of 161 dead, making 
fabled generals such as Erwin Rommel 
and Heinz Guderian seem positively in- 
competent by comparison. 3 

The contrast between the Wehr- 
macht thrust of 1940 and the U.S. 
military campaign against Iraq in 2003 
might be misleading on several counts. 
First, the Pentagon was not fighting a 
military opponent of the first rank in 
Iraq, as was Germany against France. 
Second, Germany's victory was not 
based on superior technology (French 
armor was actually better), but on its 
operational art and field leadership. In 
both wars against Iraq, the United States 
was dominant in technology and in op- 
erational art. Third, if the Germans had 
failed to conquer France and the Low 
Countries in a rapid and decisive cam- 

paign, it would have spelled the end of 
their plans for expansion in Europe and 
quite possibly of Hitler's political mas- 
tery at home. Germany had everything 
at stake in 1940. The United States, on 
the other hand, so overmatched its op- 
ponent in Baghdad that loss was in- 
conceivable. A more delayed campaign 
than originally conceived was an out- 
side possibility, but military defeat in 
Mesopotamia was not. 

Numbers Matter 

The most important transforma- 
tion in the Armed Forces since World 
War II was the change from a draft to 
an all- volunteer force (AVF). Related was 
the deliberate shift in the relationship 
between the Active and Reserve forces. 

The first change, ending the draft 
and creating the all-volunteer force 
in the 1970s, really made possible the 
American military preeminence of the 
latter Cold War, post-Cold War era 
(1990s), and early 21 st -century. Those 
who fail to see this have put the cart 
before the horse, crediting technol- 
ogy with accomplishments that rightly 
belong to an empowered military with 
smarter and more motivated people. 
The all-volunteer force obtained qual- 
ity personnel who not only enlisted 
but also reenlisted at unprecedented 
rates. This improvement was critical 
for enhancing the quality of the force, 
for reenlistees provided the nucleus 
from which the senior sergeants, chief 
petty officers, and other drivers of 
combat effectiveness in the field were 
recruited. Although the AVF recruit- 
ment had a rocky beginning in the 
1970s, by the end of the Reagan years 
the military, compared to its 1950s or 
Vietnam counterparts, was unrecogniz- 
able in terms of the motivation, cogni- 
tive ability, and leadership skills of its 
junior officers and enlistees. 

Military innovation is both top- 
down and bottom-up. For technology 
to find its way into military transfor- 
mation, it must impact on doctrine, 
organization, and training related to 
combat. DOD and service leaders must 
push from the top. Technologies not 

30 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

C i m b a I a 

owned by any service or supported by 
high-ranking officers have little chance 
of survival. Joint technology devel- 
opment requires collaboration across 
services and high-octane promotion 
from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. DOD and service technol- 
ogy development programs are part of 
the larger budgetary process, which 
Congress ultimately controls. 

Technology means nothing in 
war if it is lodged with a general staff 
that is remote from the field forces and 
rankers who must apply it for more 
effective fire and maneuver against an 
enemy. Soldiers are the best arbiters of 
mission effectiveness, and the lower 

the rank, the more ground truth is ob- 
tained. The validation of technology 
effectiveness in terms of mission re- 
quires smart soldiers who are empow- 
ered to speak frankly. "Zero defects" 
mentalities or preformatted "lessons 
learned" are killers of the initiative re- 
quired for a fast-moving, quick-think- 
ing, and cyber-smart military. Even 
before the information age, militar- 
ies that encouraged lower-level initia- 
tive and responsibility were rewarded 

with superior performances. The Ger- 
man armed forces in the World Wars 
are examples. 

Command was optional prior to 
the information age. Armies could still 
prevail under a totally top-down sys- 
tem that treated the enlisted soldier 
and junior officer as serfs, as the Soviet 
army did in World War II. The option 
of cannon-fodder command no longer 
exists for any state that aspires to be a 
regional power, let alone a global one. 

The United States provided a quick 
syllabus to this effect in Iraqi Freedom. 
The opposing military was decisively 
routed, and the regime was displaced in 
a matter of days. One reason was Iraq's 
obsolete command sys- 
tem, modeled on the So- 
viet structure. Lower-level 
initiative was precluded 
within the chain of com- 
mand: all orders were bot- 
tlenecked through central 
bureaus and command centers. When 
those pressure points were rendered 
dysfunctional by destruction or cyber- 
corruption, orders to Republican Guard 
and other field commanders were non- 
existent or garbled. Absent meaningful 
and timely orders, Iraqi commanders 
and rankers lay down their arms, de- 
fected, or otherwise dissolved. 

The performance of the U.S. 
Armed Forces in Afghanistan against 
the Taliban and al Qaeda stands in 

transformation proponents found that 
the Pentagon had a new way of fighting 
with limited ground forces and without 
significant indigenous assistance 

strong contrast to the Iraqi showing. 
Adaptive mission successes resulted 
from the impact of smart people ex- 
ploiting technology for maximum ef- 
fect. Predator drones were used not 
only as reconnaissance or surveillance 
platforms, but also as launchers of air- 
to-ground missiles that could be used 
to attack detected but elusive targets. 

Special operations forces really 
came of age in the Afghan war. Dur- 
ing most of the Cold War they were 
stepchildren, and a separate joint spe- 
cial operations command was not es- 
tablished until the Reagan administra- 
tion, and then by congressional fiat. 
Special operations forces were accepted 
into Desert Stonn with reluctance by the 
theater command and were used only 
for carefully circumscribed missions. By 
Iraqi Freedom, the emergence of special 
operations forces as pillars of strategy 
instead of optional adjuncts to regular 
forces was not an issue. Their perfor- 
mance there was followed by the DOD 
announcement that U.S. Special Opera- 
tions Command (SOCOM) would have 
its own planning structure like other 
unified or specified commands. It would 
no longer be a mere supplier of forces 
but could now plan its own missions. 
The Pentagon decision in 2003 to ap- 
point General Peter Schoomaker, USA 
(Ret.), formerly Commander, SOCOM, 
as Army Chief of Staff, sent a signal that 
the centrality of special operations forces 
in transformation was irreversible. 

SOCOM had come a long way from 
the days when President John Kennedy 
had to authorize personally the green 
beret as approved headgear for Army 
special forces over the objection of the 
service brass. Equally telling was Army 
Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki's 
controversial decision to assign black 
berets to regular Army troops. His move 
was widely derided by former Army 
Rangers and others who understandably 
coveted the black beret as a special sym- 
bol of valor and branch solidarity. But 
the critics missed the larger message: 
in a post-Cold War force that must be 
smaller, faster, and smarter, everybody 
is required to think "special" and be 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 31 



■ transformation in concept and policy 

"special.” There is no more room for 
menu-driven personalities. 

A danger lurks in this otherwise 
optimistic assessment of military per- 
sonnel. In the conduct of warfare, 
especially land warfare, numbers still 
matter — in peace, in war, and in the 
postconflict phase of nationbuilding. 
They matter for deterrence, defense, 
and postwar reconstruction. The mili- 
tary is currently spread too thin across 
geostrategic and sociopolitical space. 
Geostrategically, the United States has 
substantial troop commitments from Af- 
ghanistan to Bosnia. Planners say more 
instead of fewer troops may be needed 
to stabilize and rebuild Iraq, and Af- 
ghanistan has yet to be fully pacified or 
freed of danger from warlords and the 
Taliban. Sociopolitically, increased op- 
erational tempos imposed on a smaller 
active-duty force have strained the pa- 
tience of military families and caused 
the Pentagon to rethink its rotation 
policies in Iraq. The postconflict phase 
of Iraqi Freedom has already exposed an 
interagency fiasco in prewar planning 
for postwar nationbuilding, including 
an underestimation of the numbers of 
troops needed for internal security and 
other nationbuilding missions. 

Empires by Consent 

This essay argues that the U.S. mili- 
tary supremacy of the 21 st century is the 
result of a smarter and more motivated 
military that could take maximum ad- 
vantage of technological innovation. 
Less competent personnel would have 
taken information technology into their 
bosoms more slowly and to less effect. 
There remains another issue: the char- 
acter of civil-military relations. 

After Iraqi Freedom, DOD an- 
nounced plans to reorganize the Armed 
Forces so that prolonged or manpower- 
intensive deployments would require 
less Reserve component mobilization, 
especially in the Army. That seemed 
like a merely technical matter, but it 
was more far-reaching. The Pentagon's 
interest in relying less on Reserves and 
more on active-duty forces for overseas 
deployments and foreign wars has a 
history that should not be forgotten. 

As the Army licked its wounds 
from Vietnam and considered how to 
adapt to the all-volunteer force, General 
Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff, initi- 
ated important organizational reforms. 
He and other Army leaders decided to 
restructure the service so policymakers 
could never again wage a large-scale, 

protracted war without mobilizing 
broad popular and congressional sup- 
port. To that end, they placed impor- 
tant capabilities needed for any major 
regional contingency or theater war in 
the Army National Guard and Reserve. 

This structure would raise the vis- 
ibility of the deployments for members 
of Congress and the media, making 
middle America immediately aware of 
military call-ups and mobilizations. In 
short, there would be no more escala- 
tions of limited wars into major wars 
by stealth, as happened in Vietnam, 
with the Army left holding the bag 
after the aims of policymakers shifted 
| from victory to stalemate. As the 1980s 
| and 1990s demonstrated, a President 
■§■ can still act rapidly and decisively in a 
| short and intensive military operation 
I without extensive mobilization, as in 
§ Grenada, Panama, and Haiti. But apart 
from small wars and local conflicts, 
including humanitarian rescues and 
military operations other than war, the 
Reserve would be involved like Chi- 
cago voters: early and often. 

Policymakers anxious for maxi- 
mum flexibility in using military power, 
apart from the vicissitudes of public 
opinion, were understandably unhappy 
with the Abrams reforms that embed- 
ded vital military competencies in the 
Reserves. But noted academic experts 
on civil-military relations have also ar- 
gued that the Abrams reorganization is 
too restrictive. Eliot Cohen, for exam- 
ple, after acknowledging that General 
Abrams was a true patriot and believer 
in the U.S. Constitution, argues: 

Fhis was, nonetheless, an extraordinary 
effort by the military to limit the choices 
available to their civilian masters, to tie the 
hands of policymakers through the seem- 
ingly technical manipulation of organiza- 
tional structures. ... It does not seem to 
have occurred to either soldier or statesman, 
however, that there is something highly 
improper, to say the least, in allowing the 
armed services to thus determine the ways 
in which they could be used in combat.* 

The argument is clever but wrong. 
The issue is not constitutional subver- 
sion of policymakers' options, inten- 

32 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

C i m b a I a 

tional or otherwise. Properly framed, 
it is whether policymakers receive the 
most brutal and honest advice about 
the costs of war not only from their 
appointed civil and military counsel- 
ors, but also from the American popu- 
lace and their elected representatives 
in Congress. The Army belongs not to 
the Congress or the President but to 
the American populace. If the President 
cannot mobilize broad public support 
for a war, then he has no business send- 
ing troops into that theater for pro- 
longed combat. This prescription is not 
a recipe for isolationism but for realism. 

Proponents of a new American 
empire ignore the reality of histori- 
cal European and other empires, even 
those that survived into the 20 th cen- 
tury. America fights most effectively as 
a united country when it fights wars 
of liberation — not of imperial con- 
quest or subjugation. Some argue that 
since the Spanish-American War, the 
United States has been in the business 
of steadily building an American global 
empire that has come to fruition at the 
dawn of the 21 st century. The empire 
is fact: the only argument should be 
about how to run it. 

The controversy over empire con- 
trasts the European experience with 
American options. The empires of the 
19 th and 20 th centuries preceded glo- 
balization and the information revolu- 
tion. These domains, including the So- 
viet Union, have vanished. Nowadays, 
peoples are not as easily repressed in 
the name of a foreign power, ideol- 
ogy, or commonwealth. Future empires 
must thus be based on voluntary con- 
sent and exist within a global village of 
finance, information, and technology. 

Influence is based on soft power — 
the appeal of national culture and 
norms — as much as on hard power — 
the ability to coerce or destroy. Infor- 
mation makes repression harder and 
resistance easier, even against totalitar- 
ian regimes. Mikhail Gorbachev was 
brought down by many forces, but 
among the more important was the 
information revolution, which leaped 
across state boundaries and revealed 

to the Soviet peoples that they were 
locked into an archaic political system. 

Whether the United States prevails 
in the postconflict stage of the Iraq war 
of 2003, for example, will have as much 
to do with its ability to exercise soft 
power as hard power. The information 
war and the culture war after May 2003 
will dictate whether the active com- 
bat phase was a success or a premature 
declaration of victory. Regardless of the 
outcome, Washington is not headed for 
any empire in the Middle East, and its 
military is already spread so thin that 
taking on any additional opponent in 
that region is virtually precluded, even 
assuming there is no outbreak of war 
on the Korean Peninsula during the 
George W. Bush presidency. The sec- 
ond Gulf War that toppled Saddam 
revealed that, despite Pentagon deni- 
als, the Army is short of people for the 
missions it already has. Plans to replace 
some military positions with civilians 
might add to efficiency but will not 
make up for missing battalions and 
divisions. The case for reducing the 
number of active-duty divisions from 
10 to 8, proposed prior to Iraqi Freedom, 
appears ever less convincing. 

Arguments against an American 
global empire are not rebutted by cit- 
ing the historical experience of U.S. 
forces fighting small wars in the West- 
ern Hemisphere, including Marine ex- 
peditions in the Caribbean and Central 
America. The banana wars and other 
engagements were of a different geostra- 
tegic character than expansive designs 
for a Middle Eastern or South Asian 
empire. The Western Hemisphere is the 
military and political U.S. back yard. 
Regimes hostile to American interests, 
especially those close to U.S. shores 
and connected to foreign adversaries, 
cannot be tolerated if the Nation is to 
maintain credibility as a great power. 
Acting as sheriff of the hemisphere is 
not an option. Nor is Washington free 
to withdraw its commitment to act, 
in concert with North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Allies, in support 
of European pacification and democ- 
ratization. Making Europe a war-free 

zone was one of the greatest political 
achievements of the 20 th century, and 
U.S. support for NATO was a key ele- 
ment of that achievement. National 
credibility is also at stake in historic 
commitments to Israel, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Japan. 

Given commitments already ta- 
bled prior to our 21 st -century wars in 
Afghanistan and in Mesopotamia, it 
seems imprudent for the military to 
remain mute in the face of policymak- 
ers' tastes for imperial overstretch. The 
best photo of the postwar occupation 
of Iraq in summer 2003 showed a Re- 
servist driving a jeep whose windshield 

read: "One month my ." Whether 

full- or part-time, American soldiers are 
civilians in uniform, not janissaries or 

U.S. soldiers are not a military 
class apart from their civilian origins. 
They draw their strength from family 
and friends in their communities. That 
strength is the cultural and spiritual 
expectation that they are doing the 
right thing for the right reasons. Under 
those conditions the United States is 
unstoppable. Absent those supports, 
war is a risky proposition, as likely to 
destroy what we value as enhance it. 
Our civil-military relations should not 
make wars easy to wage, but rather 
hard, so that once we agree, the debate 
can end and the fighting to good effect 
can begin. That is the real lesson about 
our 20 th -century wars. JFQ 


1 Fredrick W. Kagan, "War and After- 
math," Policy Review (August 2003), 5. 

2 Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the 
Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and 
Defense Policy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strate- 
gic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
2002), 48-49. 

3 Max Boot, "The New American Way 
of War,” Foreign Affairs (July/ August 2003), 
41-58, citation 44. 

4 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: 
Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime 
(New York: The Free Press, 1992), 187. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 33 





New Proposals for Defense Reform 


O n March 18, 2004, the 
Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 
(CSIS) released Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a 
New Strategic Era: Phase 1 Report. This 


event culminated almost 2 years of 
effort at CSIS, which began by develop- 
ing an approach for both revisiting the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of De- 
fense Reorganization Act of 1986 and 
for addressing issues that were beyond 

Clark A. Murdock is senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. Richard W. Weitz is associate director of the Center for Future Security 
Studies at the Hudson Institute and a member of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 
study team. 

the scope of that landmark legislation. 
The project was officially launched in 
November 2002. When a CSIS team 
briefed Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and his top advisers on Janu- 
ary 10, 2003, the Secretary urged CSIS 
to accelerate its efforts so the results 
would be available for the 2004 legisla- 
tive cycle. In response, the center de- 
cided to address its issue agenda in two 
tranches, planning initially to release 
a Phase 1 report in February that both 
analyzed and made recommendations 
on a smaller set of issues, with a Phase 
2 report to follow in December 2003. 

Congressional interest in defense 
reform grew as a result of the Bush 
administration's last-minute (that is, 
shortly before the House and Senate 
voted on the defense authorization 
bill) submission of its proposals for 
changes in the military and civilian 
military personnel system. Although 
the provisions affecting military per- 
sonnel were stripped from the autho- 
rization bill, the House version, which 
was largely accepted by the Senate 
during conference negotiations in the 
fall, substantially revamped the civil- 
ian personnel system. Congressional 
appropriators, however, decided that 
defense reform issues warranted addi- 
tional attention and provided $1 mil- 
lion in the fiscal year 2004 defense 
appropriations bill to support further 
work. This enabled CSIS to address a 
much broader range of issues during its 
Phase 2 effort, which will end with the 
release of its report. This article sum- 
marizes the Phase 1 report and outlines 
the Phase 2 agenda. 

The CSIS Approach to 
Defense Reform 

Acutely aware of the risks asso- 
ciated with making changes to orga- 
nizational structures and processes, 
the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study 
team employed a problem-centric ap- 
proach to defense reform. It would 
recommend organizational or process 
changes only if the problems appeared 
sufficiently important to warrant the 
risks of unintended consequences. 

34 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

Murdock and Weitz 

"If it ain't broke, don't fix it" was the 
first operating assumption. 

For example, Goldwater-Nichols 
sought improved military effective- 
ness through greater jointness in the 
planning and conduct of military op- 
erations. Although one can identify 
insufficient jointness in how the U.S. 
military has planned (such as Opera- 
tion Anaconda in Operation Enduring 
Freedom), it routinely conducts awe- 
somely effective operations, making 
additional defense reforms unnecessary 
in this area. On the other hand, the 

unity of effort that Goldwater-Nichols 
brought to the planning and conduct 
of military operations has not charac- 
terized U.S. interagency operations. As 
illustrated most recently in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, that problem is sufficiently 
severe to warrant accepting the risks as- 
sociated with organizational change. 

To enhance its understanding of 
these complex issues, the Beyond Gold- 
water-Nichols team relied heavily on 
the experiences of former practitioners 
to both identify problems and develop 
pragmatic recommendations. In par- 
ticular, team members chaired multiple 
meetings of 5 working groups consist- 
ing of 120 former civilian and military 
officials who held senior positions in 
the national security apparatus. The 
team also drew on interviews, case 
studies, and real-life lessons learned. 
The initial drafts, findings, and recom- 
mendations were extensively vetted 
throughout the Department of Defense 
(DOD). John Hamre, President of CSIS, 
also hosted three "murder board" ses- 
sions of high-level former officials to 
review the Phase 1 results. Recommen- 
dations were arrived at not deductively 
from some ideal organizational end- 
state, but inductively from the collec- 
tive experience of participants. The 
team developed experience-grounded 
solutions to clearly identified problems. 

Although initially focused solely 
on defense reform, the CSIS approach 
soon looked beyond the scope of the 
original Goldwater-Nichols Act as it 
addressed national security issues that 
concern the entire U.S. Government, 
not just DOD. As we now see in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, ultimate suc- 
cess requires that effective post-con- 
flict "stability operations" ensue from 
victorious "major combat operations." 
Defense reform must look beyond 
purely defense issues because, in many 
instances, ultimate success hinges on 
how well DOD inte- 
grates with other gov- 
ernment agencies and 
coalition partners. Dur- 
ing its initial prepara- 
tory stages, the Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols team identified lack 
of unity in strategy development, plan- 
ning, and the conduct of interagency 
operations, as well as the increasingly 
difficult relationship between Con- 
gress and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD), as two of the most 
vexing problems for DOD. Thus, it ad- 
opted the title Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 
rather than Goldwater-Nichols Revisited 
or Goldwater-Nichols II. 

The team's final operating assump- 
tion was its belief in the necessity of 
building capability to ensure that any 
individual or organization given new 
roles or responsibilities can execute 
them. Recommending that an insti- 
tution, with its current structure and 
capabilities, assume expanded respon- 
sibilities in a new process is an empty 
mandate. Telling people to improve or 
change without providing the means 
and resources consistent with their 
new responsibilities typically leads to 
inaction, ineffectiveness, and failure. 

In its approach to defense reform, 
the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols team 
has employed six guiding principles to 
shape its analysis. The first core prin- 
ciple is that preserving civilian control 
over the military represents a para- 
mount value in the American political 
system and a prime responsibility of 
the Secretary of Defense. Since the es- 

tablishment of DOD in 1949, the Presi- 
dent has relied on the Secretary — who 
has absolute authority, subject to the 
consent of the President, over the de- 
partment — to ensure the execution 
of laws, congressional mandates, and 
Presidential priorities in the area of de- 
fense policy. Over time, the Secretary 
has turned increasingly to his Under 
Secretaries as the principal means for 
exercising control of the military. The 
Service Secretaries, however, continue 
to assist in providing direction to the 

The team's second guiding princi- 
ple is the need to maintain the institu- 
tional vitality of the military services. 
It is they who build and sustain the 
profession of arms in their respective 
mediums of warfare — that is, the body 
of expert knowledge and the men and 
women trained in the application of 
that knowledge to new circumstances. 
Identifying with the services also mo- 
tivates young men and women to 
withstand the rigors of combat. In the 
words of Major General Tom Wilker- 
son, USMC, "I didn't sign up to be a 
'DOD-er.' I wanted to be a Marine.” As 
force providers to the combatant com- 
mands, the services are charged with 
formulating coherent budgets that bal- 
ance the near-term demand of current 
operations with the need to invest in 
future capabilities. 

The third principle guiding the 
team's approach is that extending 
jointness in some areas will produce 
superior military, interagency, and co- 
alition operations. Jointness, however, 
is not an end in itself, but a means to 
achieving improvements in areas of 
importance to national security. For 
example, the increasingly seamless 
use of forces in the field makes the 
lack of integration in how the services 
equip their forces less acceptable. As 
seen most recently in Iraqi Freedom, 
interoperability problems continue to 
plague tactical communications and 
contribute to friendly fire casualties. In 
an effort to overcome such problems, 
DOD has already restructured some 
functions, such as Special Forces and 

the unity of effort that Goldwater-Nichols 
brought to military operations has not 
characterized U.S. interagency operations 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 35 



■ beyond goldwater-nichols 

missile defense, as integrated Depart- 
ment-wide programs. Extending no- 
tions of jointness to the interagency 
and coalition levels could also improve 
performance in these dimensions. 

The fourth guiding principle is 
that defense resources should continue 
to be organized, managed, and bud- 
geted along service lines. Goldwater- 
Nichols has helped enable the separate 
services to fight as a joint team. This 
success in enhancing jointness in the 
conduct of operations has led some 
to advocate additional jointness in 
how DOD organizes and prepares for 
warfare. The study team gave serious 
consideration to less service-centric ap- 
proaches to managing resources, in- 
cluding the British Defence Ministry's 
reliance on joint capability managers 
to define requirements and a central 
procurement office for weapons acqui- 
sition. But the analysis showed that the 
services remain the single best source 
for coherent and integrated budgets 

within their respective domains. There- 
fore, the team does not advocate alter- 
ing the basic organizational formula 
for how DOD allocates resources. Man- 
aging resources on a distributed basis, 
however, requires the continued devel- 
opment of coordinating structures to 
compensate for interservice seams. 

The fifth guiding principle is that 
the combatant commanders, services, 
and defense agencies are the chief op- 
erating elements. The primary func- 
tion of OSD is to supervise DOD man- 
agement. The main responsibility of 
the Joint Staff is to oversee military 
operations. As a rule, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) should not 
manage programs and the Joint Staff 
should not function as an operational 
general staff. As staffs supporting the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) and the Secretary, OSD and the 

Joint Staff should focus on policy for- 
mulation, policy representation, and 
policy oversight. These represent essen- 
tial responsibilities that no other DOD 
element can perform. 

The sixth guiding principle is belief 
in the need to ensure a healthy compe- 
tition of ideas on major issues among 
the combatant commanders, services, 
Joint Staff, and OSD. Each of these DOD 
elements can offer valuable perspectives. 
Having a diversity of views informs de- 
cisions by ensuring the surfacing of all 
key considerations. A balance must be 
struck, however, between processes that 
ensure a diversity of views on the most 
critical issues and processes that create 
too many competing power centers and 
unnecessary friction. 

Pragmatism has defined the Be- 
yond Goldwater-Nichols study team 
approach to defense reform. The team 
relied heavily on experience when 
identifying and analyzing problems. It 
desired to preserve civilian control and 
maintain the institutional vitality 
of the services while extending 
and broadening jointness where 
it makes sense. While the team 
wanted the best ideas to emerge 
from a healthy struggle between 
competing offices, it sought to 
limit that competition to major issues. 
Organizational reforms are rife with 
unintended consequences. Like the sa- 
gacity of the Hippocratic oath, the core 
precept has been to do no harm. 

Rationalizing DOD Structures 

The current organizational struc- 
tures of the military departments, the 
Joint Staff, and OSD too often pro- 
duce unnecessary overlap. In addition, 
their sometimes oversized headquarters 
staffs promote a narrow focus on small 
issues and neglect of the big picture. 
Duplicative and excessive staffs also 
require wasteful coordination pro- 
cesses. The arduous drill of securing 
all the "chops" required to advance a 
proposal frustrates innovators because 
those supporting the status quo have 
so many opportunities to block or di- 
lute suggested changes. 

Focusing on the core roles and 
responsibilities of each principal DOD 
actor exposes those institutions that 
do not add sufficient value to out- 
weigh these inefficiencies in process 
and structure. The team favors a tar- 
geted consolidation of organizational 
structures that preserves a diversity of 
ideas where warranted and strengthens 
civilian oversight without impeding 
independent military advice. 

Fundamentally, all DOD elements 
should support the Secretary because 
he has ultimate responsibility for all 
actions of the department. By focusing 
on policy formulation, representation, 
and oversight, OSD serves the Secretary 
best. In the first role, the office con- 
ducts analyses, develops policy options, 
provides advice, and makes recommen- 
dations. It also represents the Secretary 
in the interagency process, before Con- 
gress and foreign governments, and 
with the general public. Finally, OSD 
oversees implementation of DOD poli- 
cies and programs to ensure they are 
consistent with the Secretary's intent. 

The office, of course, can perform 
other duties as the Secretary prescribes. 
Although OSD elements have managed 
programs on occasion (for example, 
environmental cleanup and nuclear 
threat reduction during the Clinton 
administration), their track record 
has been uneven. More importantly, 
managers of programs tend to become 
advocates. Program management com- 
promises OSD's essential role in policy 
formulation, providing an indepen- 
dent source of advice to the Secretary. 
The office should renew its focus on 
policy formation and oversight and 
resist the temptation to manage pro- 
grams, which is the proper province of 
the services. Its oversight should focus 
on what a particular program or activ- 
ity is accomplishing rather than how it 
achieves those accomplishments. 

The team also recommends 
consolidating all OSD housekeeping 
functions into one portfolio under an 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Ad- 
ministration. Integrating the Washing- 
ton Headquarters Service (currently a 

a balance must be struck between 
processes that ensure a diversity 
of views and processes that create 
competing power centers 

36 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

Murdock and Weitz 

field operating agency) and the Execu- 
tive Secretariat will give the Secretary 
greater control over OSD mechanics. 

The search for potential consoli- 
dation of OSD and Joint Staff offices 
should begin with the role of CJCS as 
the principal military adviser to the 
President and Secretary of Defense. Al- 
though the Secretary would welcome 
the Chairman's advice on all DOD 
matters, it is not clear that he needs 
CJCS to have independent staff on 
every issue before the department. On 
some issues, the Secretary would be 

better served by having a consolidated 
staff of civilian and uniformed person- 
nel that reports directly to him while 
keeping the Chairman informed. In 
particular, the team recommends in- 
tegrating military and civilian staffs 
with respect to managerial functions 

and retaining as separate organizations 
those Joint Staff directorates that fall 
most directly within the Chairman's 
military purview. 

The Armed Forces increasingly 
wage joint and interdependent combat 
operations. Yet Operations Enduring 
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom show that 
DOD still fails to acquire and field joint 
interoperable command and control 
(C 2 ) capabilities. Therefore, the team 
recommends the merger of J-6 (Com- 
mand, Control, Communications and 
Computers [C 4 ]) with appropriate ele- 
ments of the Defense Information 
Systems Agency into an indepen- 
dent joint task force (with bud- 
getary and acquisition authority) 
for joint C z . An Under Secretary 
for Command, Control, Commu- 
nications, and Intelligence (C 3 I) would 
be appointed to provide oversight of 
this critical area by elevating the C 3 
function to the Under Secretary level 
and combining it with Intelligence. 
For the personnel and logistics func- 
tion, J-l (Manpower and Personnel) 

and J-4 (Logistics) should be merged 
into integrated civilian and military 
offices under a military deputy who 
reports directly to its respective Under 
Secretary. J-7 (Operational Plans and 
Joint Force Development), whose re- 
sponsibilities have migrated steadily to 
U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), 
should be disbanded. 

The most significant consolidation 
of staffs should occur at the level of the 
military departments. The Secretary 
of Defense relies primarily on OSD for 
the oversight function, not the now- 
duplicative service secretariats. The 
civilian secretariats and the military 
staffs found in each military depart- 
ment constitute virtual mirror images. 
The team recommends merging most 
of them into a single smaller staff that 
reports to both the Service Secretary 
| and the Service Chief of Staff. Creating 
| integrated staffs that pair the Assistant 
| Secretaries of each department with a 
| military deputy would reduce frictions 
!§ from coordination mechanisms, make 
service positions more coherent, and 
provide clearer lines of accountability. 

Allocating Resources 
More Effectively 

Many critics call the DOD resource 
allocation process "the Pentagon's real 
wars." Deciding who gets what, and 
then making that decision stick, may 
be the Secretary's most formidable 
challenge. The Beyond Goldwater- 
Nichols team approach to achieving 
improvements in this area reflects the 
guiding principle that resources should 
be organized, managed, and budgeted 
along service lines. Adhering to this 
principle necessitates an elaborate 
structure to ensure that the services 
follow the Secretary's policy directives 
and build a collective defense program 
that balances resources across the larg- 
est organization in the world. In addi- 
tion, the Constitution grants Congress 
a fundamental role in allocation with 
respect to defense and other policy 
areas. Elaborate systems and meth- 
ods have evolved within DOD to help 
secure congressional funding. Given 

the most significant consolidation 
of staffs should occur at the level 
of the military departments 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 37 



■ beyond goldwater-nichols 

these strictures, any system for allocat- 
ing defense resources is bound to be 
complicated and sometimes inefficient. 

Nevertheless, DOD decisionmakers 
too often find it excessively difficult to 
make tough tradeoffs between services 
and across military functions. Budget- 
ing decisions remain dominated by fac- 
tors other than strategy and planning. 
Since the services prepare the budgets, 
their priorities rather than joint per- 
spectives typically dominate the pro- 
cess. Allocating resources that invari- 
ably fail to meet all demands requires 
Herculean efforts by all involved to 
avert the perennial "train wreck" while 
preparing the President's budget request 
to Congress. The entire process con- 
sumes so much time and resources that 
DOD leaders can pay little attention to 
strategic decisionmaking, policy imple- 
mentation, and program execution. 

The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 
team appreciates the substantial effort 

current DOD leaders have made to 
strengthen strategic direction and build 
joint capabilities in the resource alloca- 
tion process. The changes already intro- 
duced show considerable promise, but 
additional steps are necessary. In par- 
ticular, the team recommends strength- 
ening the capacities of the combatant 
commands so that they secure greater 
influence. The commanders should 
play an essential part in defining their 
short-term capability gaps as well as 
their proposed solutions. In addition, 
the combatant commands with global 
functional responsibilities should enjoy 
a larger role in addressing longer-term 
capability requirements. Special Opera- 
tions Command, Transportation Com- 
mand, Strategic Command, and Joint 
Forces Command all have service-like 
responsibilities and should act as advo- 
cates for the capabilities their successors 
will need 10 to 15 years in the future. 
Determining the capabilities for a par- 

ticular mission requires experienced 
analysts. The combatant commanders 
need enhanced analytic staffs in their 
organic J-8s to compete in this arena, 
as well as enhanced representation in 
the Pentagon. 

The team further favors strength- 
ening the Office of Program Analysis 
and Evaluation. The office should be 
capable of providing independent anal- 
ysis to the Secretary on a wide range of 
strategic choices, thereby supplement- 
ing the options generated by the ser- 
vices and the Joint Staff. In particular, 
it should conduct an annual zero-based 
analysis of two to three joint capability 
areas, including rigorous risk assess- 
ments. The goal should be to identify 
shortfalls and develop decision alterna- 
tives for the Secretary. 

The Secretary also needs a mecha- 
nism for determining how well current 
policy is being implemented or current 
programs are being executed. Accord- 
ingly, he should create an independent, 
continuous policy implementation and 
execution review process under an of- 
fice linked directly to OSD. This office 
would assemble all the department's 
authoritative and directive guidance 
and provide a single, unified statement 
of its strategies, policies, and programs. 
This process would establish a clear 
standard to which all DOD compo- 
nents could be held accountable. 

Strengthening Civilian 
Defense Professionals 

Since the Cold War, DOD has had 
difficulty attracting and retaining tal- 
ented career civil servants. The prob- 
lem stems from private sector oppor- 
tunities that often offer superior pay 
and fewer bureaucratic frustrations, 
complex and rigid government hiring 
and security clearance procedures that 
can take months, perceptions that the 
Government is a plodding bureaucracy 
where young talent lies fallow, and 
a changing labor market where few 
workers stick with a single employer 
throughout their careers. Although 
September 11 and the war on terror 
have increased interest in public ser- 

38 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

Murdock and Weitz 

vice, Americans still confront a frustrat- 
ing government hiring process. Those 
who do become civil servants often 
complain of encrusted systems, need- 
less hierarchy, and few opportunities 
for advancement to senior positions. 

An explicit goal and notable suc- 
cess of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was 
to create incentives for the military's 
best and brightest to seek joint ser- 
vice, joint training, and joint educa- 
tion. Unfortunately, no parallel set of 
incentives or requirements exists to 
encourage professional development 
for DOD civilians or to broaden their 
experience base and skill set through 
education, training, or interdepart- 
mental and interagency rotations. 
Whereas the military personnel system 
strategically marshals, manages, and 
maintains quality officers because it 
views its people as assets whose value 
can be enhanced through investment, 
the civilian human resources systems 
of the national security agencies do 
not follow this precept. They seem to 

lack an appreciation of the deep exper- 
tise, institutional memory, continuity 
across administrations, and seasoned 
perspectives on policies and programs 
their civilian professionals provide. 

In the face of the coming retire- 
ment bow wave and current poor 
retention rates for young profession- 
als, DOD leaders need to rethink and 
reform how the department manages 
its career civilians. Congress's enact- 
ment of the National Security Person- 
nel System gives the Secretary signifi- 
cantly broader latitude to reshape the 
civilian workforce. He should use these 
powers, but he must take additional 
measures to attract, retain, motivate, 
and reward people. 

The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 
team recommends that Congress es- 
tablish a new Defense Professional 
Corps to attract the best and brightest 

civilians to DOD and to expand op- 
portunities for professional develop- 
ment and career advancement. Like 
the Foreign Service, the Corps would 
have a competitive entry process de- 
signed to identify and entice talented 
people considering government ser- 
vice. Although most would join the 
Corps at the entry level, the system 
should allow mid-career professionals 
with valuable skills and experience out- 
side government to join. Requirements 
for advancement should be designed to 
develop civilian leaders capable of oper- 
ating effectively not only within DOD 
but also in the interagency context. 
Training, education, and interagency 
rotations for senior-level civil servants 
should become centerpieces of the new 
personnel system. 

Like their military counterparts, 
DOD career civilians should receive the 
resources to enable them to undertake 
a sustained program of professional 
development. Congress allows the 
military services 10 to 15 percent addi- 
tional end strength 
to create a person- 
nel "float” that 
provides officers 
with opportunities 
for training, edu- 
cation, and joint rotations. A similar 
approach is needed for civilian person- 
nel in OSD and the defense agencies to 
enable them to meet the professional 
development requirements of the new 
Defense Professional Corps. Congress 
should also reassess overly restrictive 
ethics rules to make it easier for de- 
fense professionals to move in and out 
of government. The Beyond Goldwa- 
ter-Nichols team also advocates limit- 
ing the number of political appointees 
in DOD to enhance the incentives as- 
sociated with career service. 

Improving Interagency 
and Coalition Operations 

The past decade of U.S. experi- 
ence in complex contingency opera- 
tions, from Somalia to Iraq, has dem- 
onstrated that success requires unity of 
effort not only from the Armed Forces 

but also from across the Government 
and its foreign partners. In most cases, 
however, such unity has proven elu- 
sive, sometimes with disastrous results. 
The United States and its international 
partners have repeatedly failed to in- 
tegrate fully the political, military, 
economic, humanitarian, and other 
dimensions of a given operation into a 
coherent strategy. 

Goldwater-Nichols did not ad- 
dress the organization and functions of 
the National Security Council (NSC). 
The council needs to play a greater 
role in coordinating policy planning 
and overseeing policy execution with 
regard to regional crises. An enhanced 
role would help counter agency paro- 
chialism, identify potential disconnects 
and synergies, and elevate contentious 
issues to the deputies and principals 
for decision. The President should as- 
sign the NSC Deputy Assistant to the 
President lead responsibility for inte- 
grating agency strategies and plans and 
for ensuring greater unity of execution 
among agencies. He should also estab- 
lish a new NSC office to review and in- 
tegrate agency plans for complex oper- 
ations, help close gaps between them, 
and monitor their implementation. 

Shortly after assuming office, 
moreover, each President should re- 
view the guidance establishing stan- 
dard operating procedures for planning 
complex operations. This guidance 
should articulate an interagency di- 
vision of labor by specifying which 
agencies should lead or support others 
with various tasks, define the mecha- 
nisms and processes used to integrate 
interagency planning, and provide a 
standard planning paradigm. Each ad- 
ministration should build on the les- 
sons learned and best practices of its 

Weaknesses in other Federal agen- 
cies have forced DOD to bear the main 
burden of nationbuilding. Enhancing 
civilian capacities for conducting com- 
plex contingency operations is impera- 
tive. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 
team recommends that all agencies 
likely to become involved in complex 

enactment of the National Security Personnel 
System gives the Secretary broader latitude 
to reshape the civilian workforce 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 39 



■ beyond goldwater-nichols 

operations abroad (for example, State, 
Treasury, Commerce, and Justice) estab- 
lish small offices to lead development 
of agency plans and participate in the 
interagency planning process. For each 
contingency operation, the President 
should designate one senior official to 
take charge of and be accountable for 
integrating U.S. interagency operations 
on the ground. 

Congress should establish a new 
Agency for Stability Operations, with 
a Civilian Stability Operations Corps 
and Reserve, that would prepare for 
stability operations; organize, train, 
and equip civilian capabilities for such 
operations; and have the capacity to 
rapidly deploy civilian specialists to the 
field. The team further recommends 
creating a new Training Center for In- 
teragency and Coalition Operations 
that would be run jointly by DOD's 
National Defense University and the 
State Department's National Foreign 
Affairs Training Center. 

The team urges Congress to in- 
crease funding for programs that ex- 
pand opportunities for civilian plan- 
ners and operators to work with their 
foreign counterparts. Such contacts and 
exchanges provide critical insights into 
partner approaches and capacities re- 

garding complex operations. They also 
help develop standard operating pro- 
cedures for international contingency 
planning and coordination. Congress 
should also provide additional resources 
for programs that enhance the opera- 
tional capabilities of allies and partners 
regarding complex operations. Ameri- 
cans benefit from improvements in the 
ability of allies and potential coalition 
partners to contribute to operations, 
especially in areas where the United 
States does not have a comparative ad- 
vantage or lacks essential resources. 

Congressional Oversight 

Defense reform will occur only 
if members of the executive branch 
and Congress can agree on a set of rec- 
ommendations and work together to 
achieve them. Unfortunately, congres- 
sional oversight of the defense estab- 
lishment is languishing. Members of 
Congress engage in too few debates on 
major national security challenges and 
spend too much time on minor and 
parochial issues. The defense authoriz- 
ing committees today have less stature 
and influence than at any time in re- 
cent memory. This decline in congres- 
sional oversight has contributed to de- 
teriorating relations between Congress 
and OSD. It also deprives DOD leaders 
of the considerable benefits they would 
receive from a serious questioning of 
their plans, policies, and programs by 
members and their staffs. 

The team offers the following pro- 
posals as suggestions, not recommen- 
dations, because only Congress can 
reform itself. The study team believes 
that congressional oversight would 
improve if the Armed Services com- 
mittees focused more on "macro" strat- 
egy, policy, and organizational issues. 
Reducing the size of these authorizing 
committees and limiting claims 
of jurisdiction from other com- 
mittees should also be consid- 
ered. Also, it could prove prof- 
itable to experiment again with 
a 2-year authorization bill. Fi- 
nally, members might consider follow- 
ing a procedure similar to that used 
for the base realignment and closure 
process and establish an independent 
group (perhaps of former congressional 
leaders from both Houses and parties) 
to recommend changes in committee 
memberships, structures, and jurisdic- 
tions that would enhance oversight. 

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, 
Phase 2 

CSIS formally launched its Phase 
2 effort in early May 2004 when the 
administrative arrangements for access- 
ing its congressional funding were com- 

the defense authorizing committees 
have less stature and influence than 
at any time in recent memory 

pleted. To address the broader agenda 
of issues, CSIS expanded its Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols study team to incor- 
porate additional expertise and formed 
seven working groups of former offi- 
cials. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 
working groups held scoping sessions 
in June and July 2004 to review how 
the study team defined the problem 
and its work plans for addressing them. 

The first three working groups are 
closely interrelated. Working Group 

1 identified the U.S. Government ca- 
pabilities needed for its most pressing 
21 st -century missions: homeland secu- 
rity, stability operations, counterterror- 
ism, and counterproliferation/WMD 
elimination. Once these national ca- 
pabilities were determined, CSIS made 
recommendations on assigning roles 
and responsibilities. Working Group 

2 addressed unified command plan is- 
sues (for example, the role of regional 
combatant commanders in an era of 
global missions and global force man- 
agements), as well as the interface be- 
tween the military command structure 
and the Federal Government approach 
to conducting foreign and domestic 
operations. This latter issue is closely 
linked to the agenda of Working Group 
3, which focused on improving the 
ability of the NSC structure and pro- 
cesses to plan and conduct interagency 

During vetting of the Phase 1 draft 
recommendations, the most common 
reaction to those pertaining to the in- 
teragency process was, "Good recom- 
mendations, but you need to do more." 
Working Group 3 built on the Phase 1 
work, including a more unconstrained 
look at the structure established by the 
1947 National Security Act. The recom- 
mendations emerging from Groups 2 
and 3, in turn, were assessed for how 
they affect the ability of the Govern- 
ment to perform the missions being 
examined in Group 1. Because of the 
close interplay among these three work- 
ing groups, participants were invited to 
all meetings. 

In the belief that decades of ac- 
quisition reform have failed to build a 

40 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

Murdock and Weitz 

responsive, efficient acquisition process, 
Working Group 4 attempted to design a 
new process. Group 5 provided a zero- 
based assessment of five commercial- 
like defense agencies (for example, the 
Defense Logistics Agency). Although 
subject to internal controls, the defense 
agencies, unlike OSD, the Joint Staff, or 
the military services, are rarely subject 
to external review. In response to strong 
congressional interest, Working Group 
6 assessed the implementation of the 
Goldwater-Nichols provisions on joint 
officer management and joint profes- 
sional military education. It also took 
a "blue sky" look at more fundamental 
issues such as the role of education in 
an era when jointness is being pushed 
down to the tactical level. Finally, Work- 
ing Group 7 addressed whether DOD is 
appropriately organized for operations 
in the domain of space and cyberspace. 


Annual Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Strategy 
Essay Competition 

or nearly a quarter of a century, the Chairman has challenged students 
at the Nation's professional military education institutions to think 
and write creatively about national security issues. The best from across 
the military services and Federal Government spectrum compete for 
recognition of their efforts in The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Essay Competition. 

The 24 th competition was conducted by NDU Press with generous support 
by NDU Foundation on May 18-19 at the National Defense University in 
Washington, DC. 

Even as CSIS launched its Phase 2 
effort, it closely monitored the imple- 
mentation of its Phase 1 recommenda- 
tions. The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 
study team was pleased with the atten- 
tion being paid to defense reform by 
the senior leadership of the Pentagon. 
Despite an extremely crowded policy 
agenda, senior civilian and military 
leaders, including the Secretary and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chair- 
man and Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs them- 
selves, and the Service Secretaries made 
time to review CSIS findings and pro- 
vide feedback. Both OSD and the Joint 
Staff are actively considering which 
recommendations the Secretary and 
Chairman could implement together 
and which the Secretary could imple- 
ment on his own authority. The study 
team believes that the senior leadership 
in DOD, both civilian and military, is 
clearly receptive to defense reform and 
is deeply grateful for the opportunity to 
serve in that cause. JFQ 

The report on Beyond Goldwater-Nichols 
Phase 2 was scheduled to be available 
through the CSIS Web page: http:// in mid-2005. 

Judges from participating senior-level schools selected the "best of the 
best" to meet the security challenges of the 21 st century. The winning 
essays will be featured in the upcoming issue of Joint Force Quarterly, 
issue 39, 4 th Quarter 2005. 

Be Part of the Silver Anniversary 

The 2005-2006 academic year is approaching. It is not too early to begin 
preparing for the 25 th anniversary of the CJCS Strategy Essay Competition 
in Spring 2006. Look for updates on rules, eligibility, and awards for this 
special event on the pages of Joint Force Quarterly or visit the NDU Press 
Web site: 

Al Qaeda as Insurgency 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Morris, USMC 
U.S. Army War College 

A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government: 
Institutionalizing the Interagency Process 

Martin J. Gorman, Defense Intelligence Agency, 
and Commander Alexander Krongard, USN 
National War College 

Guantanamo Bay: 

Undermining the Global War on Terror 

Colonel Gerard P. Fogarty, Australian Army 
U.S. Army War College 

America's Strategic Imperative: 

A National Energy Policy Manhattan Project 

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Amidon, USAF 
Air War College 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 41 


And when people are entering upon a war they do things the wrong way around. 
Action comes first, and it is only when they have already suffered that they 
begin to think. 

— Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 

The Military Utility 
of Understanding 
Adversary Culture 


C ultural knowledge and war- 
fare are inextricably bound. 
Knowledge of one's adver- 
sary as a means to improve 
military prowess has been sought since 

Herodotus studied his opponents' con- 
duct during the Persian Wars (490-479 
BC). T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Ara- 
bia) embarked on a similar quest after 
the 1916 Arab rebellion against the 

Ottoman Empire, immersing himself 
deeply in local culture: "Geography, 
tribal structure, religion, social cus- 
toms, language, appetites, standards 
were at my finger-ends. The enemy I 
knew almost like my own side. I risked 
myself among them many times, to 
learn.'' 1 Since then, countless soldiers 
have memorized Sun Tzu's dictum: "If 
you know the enemy and know your- 
self, you need not fear the result of a 
hundred battles." 

Although "know thy enemy" is 
one of the first principles of warfare, 
our military operations and national 
security decisionmaking have consis- 
tently suffered due to lack of knowl- 
edge of foreign cultures. As former Sec- 
retary of Defense Robert McNamara 
noted, "I had never visited Indochina, 
nor did I understand or appreciate its 
history, language, culture, or values. 
When it came to Vietnam, we found 
ourselves setting policy for a region that 
was terra incognita." 2 Our ethnocen- 
trism, biased assumptions, and mirror- 
imaging have had negative outcomes 

Montgomery McFate is a cultural anthropologist and a defense policy fellow at the 
Office of Naval Research working on an initiative to promote social science research 
in the national security area. 

42 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

U.S. Marine Corps (Ryan B. Busse) 


during the North Vietnamese offen- 
sives of 1968 and 1975, the Soviet-Af- 
ghan war (1979-1989), India's nuclear 
tests (1998), the Iraqi invasion of Ku- 
wait (1990), and the Shi'ite transforma- 
tion of Iran (1979). 

Despite the fact that cultural 
knowledge has not traditionally been 
a priority within the Department of 
Defense (DOD), the ongoing insur- 
gency in Iraq has served as a wake- 
up call to the military that adversary 
culture matters. Soldiers and Marines 
on the ground thoroughly understand 
that. As a returning commander from 

the ongoing insurgency in Iraq 
served as a wake-up call to the 
that adversary culture matters 

3 d Infantry Division observed: "I had 
perfect situational awareness. What I 
lacked was cultural awareness. I knew 
where every enemy tank was dug in 
on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem 
was, my soldiers had to fight fanatics 
charging on foot or in pickups and fir- 
ing AK-47s and RPGs [rocket-propelled 
grenades]. Great technical intelligence. 
Wrong enemy." 3 As this commander's 
observation indicates, understanding 
one's enemy requires more than a sat- 
ellite photo of an arms dump. Rather, 
it requires an understanding of their 
interests, habits, intentions, beliefs, 
social organizations, and political sym- 
bols — in other words, their culture. 4 

This article argues that new adver- 
saries and operational environments 
necessitate a sharper focus on cultural 
knowledge of the enemy. A lack of 
this knowledge can have grave conse- 
quences. Conversely, understanding 
adversary culture can make a positive 
difference strategically, operationally, 
and tactically. Although success in fu- 
ture operations will depend on cultural 
knowledge, the Department of Defense 
currently lacks the programs, systems, 
models, personnel, and organizations 
to deal with either the existing threat 
or the changing environment. A Fed- 
eral initiative is urgently needed to 

incorporate cultural and social knowl- 
edge of adversaries into training, ed- 
ucation, planning, intelligence, and 
operations. Across the board, the na- 
tional security structure needs to be 
infused with anthropology, a discipline 
invented to support warfighting in the 
tribal zone. 

Changing Adversaries and 
Operational Environments 

Cultural knowledge of adversar- 
ies should be considered a national 
security priority. An immediate trans- 
formation in the military conceptual 
paradigm is necessary 
has for two reasons: first, the 

military nature °f the enemy has 
changed since the end of 
the Cold War, and second, 
the current operational en- 
vironment has evolved fundamentally 
within the past 20 years as a result 
of globalization, failed states, and the 
proliferation of both complex and light 

Although the United States armed 
and trained for 50 years to defeat a 
Cold War adversary, Soviet tanks will 
never roll through the Fulda Gap. The 
foe the United States faces today — and 
is likely to face for years to come — is 
non-Western in orientation, transna- 
tional in scope, non-hierarchical in 
structure, and clandestine in approach; 
and it operates outside of the context 
of the nation-state. Neither al Qaeda 
nor insurgents in Iraq are fighting a 
Clausewitzian war, where armed con- 
flict is a rational extension of politics 
by other means. These adversaries nei- 
ther think nor act like nation-states. 
Rather, their form of warfare, organi- 
zational structure, and motivations are 
determined by the society and the cul- 
ture from which they come. 

Attacks on coalition troops in the 
Sunni triangle, for example, follow 
predictable patterns of tribal warfare: 
avenging the blood of a relative (al 
tha'r ); demonstrating manly courage 
in battle ( al-muruwwah ); and uphold- 
ing manly honor ( al-sliaraf ). 5 Similarly, 
al Qaeda and its affiliated groups are 

replicating the Prophet Mohammed's 
7 th -century process of political con- 
solidation through jihad, including 
opportunistic use of territories lacking 
political rulers as a base, formation of 
a corps of believers as a precursor to 
mass recruiting, and an evolution in 
targeting from specific, local targets 
(such as pagan caravans) to distant 
powerful adversaries (for instance, the 
Byzantine Empire). To confront an 
enemy so deeply moored in history 
and theology, the U.S. Armed Forces 
must adopt an ethnographer's view of 
the world: it is not nation-states but 
cultures that provide the underlying 
structures of political life. 

Not only our adversaries have 
changed. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review predicted that smaller-scale 
contingencies — military operations 
of smaller scale and intensity than 
major theater or regional wars, such 
as humanitarian, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, noncombatant evacu- 
ation operations, and combating ter- 
rorism — will characterize the future 
operational environment. The use of 
the military for humanitarian disaster 
relief, peacekeeping, and counterterror- 
ism operations means that the military 
will be increasingly forward-deployed 
in hostile, non-Western environments 
"disconnected from the global econ- 
omy." 6 According to Andy Hoehn, for- 
mer Deputy Assistant Secretary of De- 
fense for Strategy, "The unprecedented 
destructive power of terrorists — and 
the recognition that you will have to 
deal with them before they deal with 
you — means that we will have to be 
out acting in the world in places that 
are very unfamiliar to us. We will have 
to make them familiar." 7 

Culture Matters Operationally 
and Strategically 

Cidture has become something of a 
DOD buzzword, but does it really mat- 
ter? The examples below demonstrate 
three points: misunderstanding culture 
at a strategic level can produce policies 
that exacerbate an insurgency; a lack 
of cultural knowledge at an operational 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 43 


level can lead to negative public opin- 
ion; and ignorance of the culture at a 
tactical level endangers both civilians 
and troops. There is no doubt that the 
lack of adversary cultural knowledge 
can have grave consequences strategi- 
cally, operationally, and tactically. 

At a strategic level, certain poli- 
cymakers within the Bush adminis- 
tration apparently misunderstood the 
tribal nature of Iraqi culture and so- 
ciety. They assumed that the civilian 
apparatus of the government would 
remain intact after the regime was 
decapitated by an aerial strike, an in- 

ternal coup, or a military defeat. In 
fact, when the United States cut off the 
hydra's Ba'thist head, power reverted 
to its most basic and stable form — the 
tribe. As a tribal leader observed, "We 
follow the central government. . . . But 
of course if communications are cut 
between us and the center, all author- 
ity will revert to our sheik." 8 Tribes are 
the basic organizing social fact of life in 

Iraq, and the inner circle of the Ba'th 
Party itself was the purview of one 
tribe, the A1 Bu Nasir. Once the Sunni 
Ba'thists lost their prestigious jobs, were 
humiliated in the conflict, and got fro- 
zen out through de-Ba'thification, the 
tribal network became the backbone of 
the insurgency. 9 The tribal insurgency 
is a direct result of our misunderstand- 
ing the Iraqi culture. 

At the operational level, the 
military misunderstood the system 
of information transmission in Iraqi 
society and consequently lost oppor- 
tunities to influence public opinion. 

One Marine back from 
Iraq noted, "We were 
focused on broadcast 
media and metrics. But 
this had no impact be- 
cause Iraqis spread in- 
formation through rumor. Instead of 
tapping into their networks, we should 
have visited their coffee shops." Unfor- 
tunately, the emphasis on force protec- 
tion prevented Soldiers from visiting 
coffee shops and buying items on the 
economy. Soldiers and Marines were 
unable to establish one-to-one relation- 
ships with Iraqis, which are key to both 
intelligence collection and winning 

hearts and minds. A related issue is our 
squelching of Iraqi freedom of speech. 
Many members of the Coalition Provi- 
sional Authority (CPA) and Combined 
Joint Task Force 7 felt that anticoali- 
tion and anti-American rhetoric was a 
threat to security and sought to stop 
its spread. 10 Closing Muqtada al Sadr's 
Al Hawza newspaper contributed to 
an Iraqi perception that Americans do 
not really support freedom of speech 
despite their claims to the contrary, 
reinforcing their view of Americans as 

Failure to understand adversary 
culture can endanger both troops and 
civilians at a tactical level. Although 
it may not seem like a priority when 
bullets are flying, cultural ignorance 
can kill. Earlier this year, the Office of 
Naval Research conducted a number 
of focus groups with Marines returning 
from Iraq. The Marines were quick to 
acknowledge their misunderstanding 
of Iraqi culture, particularly pertaining 
to physical culture and local symbols, 
and to point out the consequences of 
inadequate training. Most alarming 
were the Iraqis' use of vehement hand 
gestures, their tendency to move in 
one's peripheral vision, and their toler- 
ance for physical closeness. One Marine 
noted, "We had to train ourselves that 
this was not threatening. But we had 
our fingers on the trigger all the time 
because they were yelling." A lack of 
familiarity with local cultural symbols 
also created problems. For example, in 
the Western European tradition, a white 
flag means surrender. Many Marines as- 
sumed a black flag was the opposite of 
surrender — "a big sign that said shoot 
here!" as one officer pointed out. As 
a result, many Shia who traditionally 
fly black flags from their homes as a 
religious symbol were identified as the 
enemy and shot at unnecessarily. There 
were also problems at roadblocks. The 
American gesture for stop (arm straight, 
palm out) means welcome in Iraq, while 
the gesture for go means stop to Iraqis 
(arm straight, palm down). This and 
similar misunderstandings have had 
deadly consequences. 

when the United States cut off the 
hydra's Ba'thist head, power reverted to 
its most basic and stable form — the tribe 

44 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


On the other hand, understanding 
adversary culture can make a positive 
difference strategically, operationally, 
and tactically. The examples below il- 
luminate three key points: using preex- 
isting indigenous systems creates legiti- 
macy for the actions of the occupying 
power, indigenous social organization 

(including tribal and kinship relation- 
ships) determines the structure of the 
insurgency, and avoiding the imposi- 
tion of foreign norms will generate 
public cooperation. 

Recognizing and utilizing pre- 
existing social structures are the key 
to political stabilization in Iraq. While 
U.S. policymakers often seemed per- 
plexed by the sub rosa tribal structure 
in Iraq, the British understood the in- 
digenous system and used it to their 
advantage. Brigadier Andrew Kennett, 
commander of the British battlegroup 

based in Basra, identified a core lesson 
learned during their history of empire: 
the importance of adjusting to local 
cultures and of not imposing alien so- 
lutions. 11 In Iraq, the most important 
element of local culture is the tribe 
and the associated patronage system. 
The majority of the population be- 
long to one of the 
150 major tribes, the 
largest containing 
more than a million 
members and the 
smallest a few thou- 
sand. 12 Tribes are invariably patron- 
age systems in which powerful sheiks 
dispense riches and rewards to sub- 
sheiks, who in turn distribute resources 
to the tribal community. Sheiks always 
need money to generate loyalty from 
sub-sheiks. There is a saying in Iraq: 
you cannot buy a tribe, but you can 
certainly hire one. 13 In Amara, the Brit- 
ish did just that. They appointed tribal 
leaders to local councils and gave the 
councils large sums to distribute, rein- 
forcing the sheiks' political standing. 
As one officer noted, "We deal with 

postconflict reconstruction is most effective 
when the rebuilt institutions do not impose 
external concepts of social organization 

what exists. In the five months we've 
been here, we're not going to change 
the culture of Iraq. We have to work 
with what there is." 14 

The structure of any insurgency 
will reflect the indigenous social orga- 
nization of the geographical region. 
Thus, charting the Iraqi tribal and 
kinship system allowed 4 th Infantry 
Division to capture Saddam Hussein. 
Although most U.S. forces were preoc- 
cupied with locating the 55 high-value 
targets on the Bush administration's 
list, Major General Raymond Odierno, 
USA, understood that relationships of 
blood and tribe were the key to finding 
Saddam Hussein. 15 Two total novices, 
Lieutenant Angela Santana and Corpo- 
ral Harold Engstrom of 104 th Military 
Intelligence Battalion, were assigned to 
build a chart to help 4 th Infantry Divi- 
sion figure out who was hiding Sad- 
dam. According to Santana, a former 
executive secretary, their first thought 
was "Is he joking? This is impos- 
sible. We can't even pronounce these 
names." Despite the challenges, they 
created a huge chart called "Mongo 
Link" depicting key figures with their 
interrelationships, social status, and 
last-known locations. Eventually, pat- 
terns emerged showing the extensive 
tribal and family ties to the six main 
tribes of the Sunni triangle: the Hus- 
seins, al-Douris, Hadouthis, Masliyats, 
Hassans, and Harimyths, which led 
directly to Saddam Hussein. 16 

Postconflict reconstruction is most 
effective when the rebuilt institutions 
reflect local interests and do not im- 
pose external concepts of social orga- 
nization. For example, Iraqis tend to 
think of the central government as the 
enemy. The longstanding disconnect 
between the center and the periphery 
meant that Baghdad did not commu- 
nicate down and city councils could 
not communicate up. The CPA mis- 
understood the relationship between 
Baghdad and the rest of the coun- 
try and imposed a U.S. model based 
on central government control. Yet 
many Marine Corps units intuitively 
had the right approach and began po- 

issne thirty-eight / JFQ 45 



■ understanding adversary culture 

litical development at the local level. 
A Marine captain was assigned to build 
a judicial system from the ground up. 
He refurbished the courthouse, ap- 
pointed judges, and found the 1950 
Iraqi constitution on the Internet. Be- 
cause he used their system and their 
law, the Iraqis perceived the court as 
legitimate. Unfortunately, he was in- 
structed to stop employing Ba'thists. 
It appears that we are often our own 
worst enemy. 

An Inadequate System 

Countering insurgency and com- 
bating terrorism in the current opera- 
tional environment demand timely 
cultural and social knowledge of the 
adversary. As Andy Marshall, Director 
of the Office of Net Assessment, has 
noted, future operations will require 
an "anthropology-level knowledge of 
a wide range of cultures." Currently, 
however, DOD lacks the right pro- 
grams, systems, models, personnel, 
and organizations to deal with either 
the existing threat or the changing 

Socio-cultural analysis shops, such 
as the Strategic Studies Detachment 
of 4 th Psychological Operations Group 
and the Behavioral Influences Analysis 
Division of the National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center, are underfunded, 
marginalized, and dispersed. Because 
they lack resources, their information 
base is often out of date. Task Force 
121, for example, was using 19 th -cen- 
tury British anthropology to prepare for 
Afghanistan. With no central resource 
for cultural analysis, military and policy 
players who need the information most 
are left to their own devices. Accord- 
ing to a Special Forces colonel assigned 
to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence, "We literally don't know 
where to go for information on what 
makes other societies tick, so we use 
Google to make policy." 

Although the Army Intelligence 
Center at Fort Huachuca, 82 d Airborne 
Division, Joint Readiness Training Cen- 
ter, Naval Postgraduate School, and 
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School 

all offer some form of predeployment 
cultural training, their programs are 
generally rushed, oversimplified, or 
unavailable to all Soldiers and Marines 
who need them. Much so-called cul- 
tural awareness training focuses on do's 
and don'ts and language basics and 
tends to be geared toward Baghdad. 
As one Army colonel noted, "In West- 
ern Iraq, it's like it was six centuries 
ago with the Bedouins in their goat 
hair tents. It's useless to get cultural 
briefings on Baghdad." Troops rely on 
personal reading to make up for the 
lack of formal training. Inadequate 
training leads to misperceptions that 
can complicate operations. For exam- 
ple, Marines who were instructed that 
Muslims were highly pious and prayed 
five times a day lost respect for Iraqis 
when they found a brewery in Baghdad 
and men with mistresses. In actuality, 
Iraq has been a secular society for six 

decades, and there were relatively few 
pious Muslims. 

Even though all services now have 
a foreign area officer (FAO) program, 
the military still lacks advisers who can 
provide local knowledge to command- 
ers on the ground. The FAO program 
is intended to develop officers with a 
combination of regional expertise, po- 
litical-military awareness, and language 
qualification to act as a cross-cultural 
linkage among foreign and U.S. politi- 
cal and military organizations. Because 
few FAOs are ever subjected to deep 
cultural immersion totally outside the 
military structure, most do not develop 
real cultural and social expertise. Fur- 
thermore, most do not work as cultural 
advisers to commanders on the ground 
but serve as military attaches, security 
assistance officers, or instructors. The 
result is that commanders must fend 
for themselves. One Marine general 

46 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


explained that his unit had no local 
experts when it deployed to Afghani- 
stan. The Pastoo-speaking cook on the 
ship, who happened to be born in Af- 
ghanistan, became the "most valuable 
player" of the mission. 

The current intelligence system is 
also not up to the task of providing the 
required level of cultural intelligence. 
Retired Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, USN, 

Director of the Office of Force Transfor- 
mation, noted that "the value of mili- 
tary intelligence is exceeded by that of 
social and cultural intelligence. We need 
the ability to look, understand, and op- 
erate deeply into the fault lines of so- 
cieties where, increasingly, we find the 
frontiers of national security." 17 Rather 
than a geopolitical perspective, threat 
analysis must be much more concrete 
and specific. According to Lieutenant 
General James Clapper, Jr., USAF, the 
former director of the Defense Intel- 
ligence Agency, "Of course we still pro- 
vide in-depth orders of battle, targeting 
data, and traditional military capabili- 
ties analysis. But we must also provide 
the commanders on the ground with 
detailed information regarding local 
customs, ethnicity, biographic data, 
military geography, and infectious dis- 
eases." Producing intelligence on these 
factors can be challenging. As Clapper 
noted, "We provided detailed analysis 
on more than 40 clans and subclans 
operating in Somalia — far more difficult 
than counting tanks and planes." 18 

Back to the Future 

A Federal effort is needed to infuse 
the national security structure with 
anthropology across the board. While 
this idea may seem novel, anthropol- 
ogy was developed largely to support 
the military enterprise. 

Frequently called "the hand- 
maiden of colonialism," anthro- 
pological knowledge contributed to 

the expansion and consolidation of 
British power during the era of em- 
pire. In the United States, the Depart- 
ment of Defense and its predecessors 
first recognized culture as a factor in 
warfare during the Indian Wars of 
1865-1885, resulting in the formation 
of the Bureau of American Ethnol- 
ogy under Major John Wesley Powell. 
During World War II, anthropologists 
such as Gregory Bateson 
served the war effort 
directly, first conduct- 
ing intelligence opera- 
tions in Burma for the 
Office of Strategic Ser- 
vices, and later advising on how to 
generate political instability in target 
countries through a process known as 
schizmogenesis. American anthropolo- 
gists produced ethnographies on the 
Axis powers that facilitated behavioral 
prediction based on national charac- 
ter. While Ruth Benedict's 1946 study 
of Japanese national character, The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, is the 
best known, studies such as Ladislas 
Farago's German Psychological Warfare 
(1942) collect dust on library shelves. 
Their predictions were often highly 
accurate: following recommendations 
from anthropologists at the Office of 
War Information, President Franklin 
Roosevelt left the Japanese emperor 
out of conditions of surrender. 19 

The legacy of World War II an- 
thropology survives in the form of the 
Human Relation Area Files at Yale Uni- 
versity. Established by the Carnegie 
Foundation, the Office of Naval Re- 
search, and the Rockefeller Foundation, 
this database provided information on 
Japanese-occupied former German ter- 
ritories of Micronesia. Although the da- 
tabase was maintained for decades after 
the war with Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and Central Intelligence Agency funds, 
U.S. Government agencies seeking "an 
anthropological-level of knowledge" 
have sadly now forgotten its existence. 

During the Vietnam era, the de- 
fense community recognized that 
familiarity with indigenous, non- 
Western cultures was vital for counter- 

insurgency operations. The Director of 
the Defense Department's Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, R.L. Sproul, 
testified before Congress in 1965 that 
"remote area warfare is controlled in 
a major way by the environment in 
which the warfare occurs, by the so- 
ciological and anthropological charac- 
teristics of the people involved in the 
war, and by the nature of the conflict 
itself." To win hearts and minds, coun- 
terinsurgency forces must understand 
and employ local culture as part of a 
larger political solution. As General Sir 
Gerald Templer explained during the 
Malayan Emergency, "The answer lies 
not with putting more boots into the 
jungle, but in winning the hearts and 
minds of the Malayan people.” Thus, 
the U.S. defense community deter- 
mined that it must recruit cultural and 
social experts. Seymour Deitchman, 
DOD Special Assistant for Counterin- 
surgency, explained to a congressional 
subcommittee in 1965: 

The Defense Department has . . . recog- 
nized that part of its research and develop- 
ment efforts to support counterinsurgency 
operations must be oriented toward the 
people . . . involved in this type of war; 
and the DOD has called on the types of 
scientists — anthropologists, psychologists, 
sociologists, political scientists, econo- 
mists — whose professional orientation to 
human behavior would enable them to 
make useful contributions in this area. 20 

During the Vietnam era, the spe- 
cial warfare community understood 
that success in unconventional war- 
fare depended on understanding in- 
digenous, non-Western societies, and 
they turned to anthropologists. U.S. 
Special Operations Command's Special 
Operations in Peace and War defines un- 
conventional warfare as "military and 
paramilitary operations conducted by 
indigenous or surrogate forces who 
are organized, trained, equipped, 
and directed by an external source." 
To conduct operations "by, with, and 
through," Special Forces units must 
have the support of the local popula- 
tion, which can be decidedly difficult 
to secure. While he was acting as an 

during the Vietnam era, anthropologists 
excelled at bridging the gap between 
the military and tribes 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 47 



■ understanding adversary culture 

adviser to U.S. troops in Vietnam in 
1965, British expert Sir Robert Thomp- 
son suggested that anthropologists be 
used to recruit aboriginal tribesmen 
as partisans. Indeed, anthropologists 
excelled at bridging the gap between 
the military and tribes. Special Forces 
in Vietnam, for example, were assisted 
by Gerald Hickey in working with the 

So where are the anthropologists 
now that the Government needs them? 
Although the discipline's roots are 
deeply entwined with the military, few 
anthropologists are interested in na- 
tional security. Their suspicion of mili- 
tary activity stems from a question of 
ethics: if professional anthropologists 
are morally obliged to protect those 
they study, does their cooperation with 
military and intelligence operations 
violate the prime directive? They be- 
lieve it does. This conclusion was based 
on a number of defense projects that 
sought to use anthropological tools in 
potentially harmful ways. In 1964, the 
Army launched Project Camelot, a mul- 
tinational social science research proj- 
ect, to predict and influence politically 
significant aspects of social change that 
would either stabilize or destabilize de- 
veloping countries. The effort was can- 
celed in July 1965 after international 
protests erupted in target countries. 
Critics called Camelot an egregious case 
of "sociological snooping." 21 

While anthropological knowledge 
is now necessary to national security, 
the ethics of anthropologists must be 
taken into account. In addition to di- 
rect discussion and debate on using 
ethnographic information, policymak- 
ers and military personnel must be 
trained to apply anthropological and 
social knowledge effectively, appropri- 
ately, and ethically. 

The changing nature of warfare 
requires a deeper understanding of ad- 
versary culture. The more unconven- 
tional the adversary, and the further 
from Western cultural norms, the more 
we need to understand the society and 
underlying cultural dynamics. To de- 
feat non-Western opponents who are 

transnational in scope, nonhierarchical 
in structure, clandestine in approach, 
and who operate outside the context of 
nation-states, we need to improve our 
capacity to understand foreign cultures. 

The danger is that we assume that 
technical solutions are sufficient and 
that we therefore fail to delve deeply 
enough into the complexity of other 
societies. As Robert Tilman pointed out 
in a seminal article in Military Review 
in 1966, British counterinsurgency in 
Malaya succeeded because it took ac- 
count of tribal and ethnic distinctions, 
while similar U.S. efforts in Vietnam 
were bound to fail because they lacked 
anthropological finesse. 22 JFQ 


1 T.E. Lawrence, quoted in B.H. Liddell 
Hart, Lawrence of Arabia (New York: DeCapo, 
1989), 399. 

2 Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect 
(New York: Random House, 1995), 32. 

3 Steve Israel and Robert Scales, "Iraq 
Proves It: Military Needs Better Intel,” New 
York Daily News, January 7, 2004. 

4 Culture is "those norms, values, in- 
stitutions and modes of thinking in a given 
society that survive change and remain 
meaningful to successive generations." Adda 
Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft 
(New York: Brassey's, 1992), 57. 

5 Amatzia Baram, "Victory in Iraq, One 
Tribe at a Time," The New York Times, Octo- 
ber 28, 2003. 

6 Greg Jaffe, "Pentagon Prepares 
to Scatter Soldiers in Remote Corners," 
The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2003, 1. 

7 Ibid., 1. 

8 Baram. 

9 Ibid. 

10 Christopher Varhola, "The U.S. 
Military in Iraq: Are We Our Own Worst 
Enemy?" Practicing Anthropology 26, no. 4 
(2004), 40. 

11 John F. Burns, "The Reach of War: 
The Occupation," The New York Times, Oc- 
tober 17, 2004. 

12 Neil MacFarquhar, "In Iraq's Tribes, 
U.S. Faces a Wild Card," The New York Times, 
January 7, 2003. 

13 Baram. 

14 Charles Clover, "Amid Tribal Feuds, 
Fear of Ambush and the Traces of the Colo- 
nial Past, UK Troops Face up to Basra's Frus- 
trations," Financial Times (UK), September 
6, 2004, 11. 

15 Vernon Loeb, "Clan, Family Ties 
Called Key to Army's Capture of Hussein," 
The Washington Post, December 16, 2003. 

16 Farnaz Fassihi, "Charting the Capture 
of Saddam," The Wall Street Journal, Decem- 
ber 23, 2003. 

17 Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of 
Force Transformation, Office of the Secre- 
tary of Defense, statement before the Sub- 
committee on Terrorism, Unconventional 
Treats, and Capabilities, Armed Services 
Committee, United States House of Repre- 
sentatives, February 26, 2004. 

18 Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, 
Jr., "The Worldwide Threat to the United 
States and Its Interests Abroad," statement 
to the Senate Committee on Armed Ser- 
vices, January 17, 1995: <http://www.totse. 
f ighters/ wrldthrt . html> . 

19 David Price, "Lessons from Second 
World War Anthropology," Anthropology 
Today 18, no. 3 (June 2002), 19. 

20 Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., The Rise 
and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Re- 
lationship Between Social Science and Practical 
Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967). 

21 Ibid., 47-49, 232-236. 

22 Robert O. Tilman, "The Nonlessons 
of the Malayan Emergency," Military Review 
46 (December 1966), 62. 

Be a Part of the 

Chairman's Journal 

Joint Force Quarterly is seeking contributions for future issues. 

• JFQ issue 40, 1 st Quarter 2006, submission deadline August 2005 

• JFQ issue 41, 2 d Quarter 2006, submission deadline November 2005 

• JFQ issue 42, 3 d Quarter 2006, submission deadline February 2006 

See the last page of JFQ for information on submitting articles. To contact the journal, e-mail the 
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48 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 







Military Diplomacy 


S ince the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and concur- 
rent with the war on ter- 
ror, military attaches have 
been fully involved in a wide range of 
defense-related activities supporting 
national policymakers and combatant 
commanders. The political map has 
changed in the last decade, increas- 

ing the importance of soldier-diplo- 
mats serving abroad. Since 1945, the 
international system has expanded 
from 51 sovereign states to almost 
200 today. Ten years ago, the United 
States opened new Embassies in 14 
countries on the territory of the former 
Soviet Union. Each of these newly in- 
dependent Eurasian states has emerged 

Colonel Timothy C. Shea, USA, is associate director of the Senior Executive Seminar 
for the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall 
European Center for Security Studies. 

with congealing national and cultural 
identities, including a rediscovery of 
native languages long suppressed under 
Soviet policies. 

The fragmentation of Cold War- 
era nation-states and the growing 
number of failed governments chal- 
lenge U.S. diplomatic missions across 
the globe. Anti-Americanism and radi- 
cal movements directed against the 
United States are on the rise. Even 
some traditional allies are no longer 
reliable. The U.S. military footprint 
grows smaller in many regions, raising 
the importance of maintaining access 
points with countries that are receptive 
to U.S. policies before a crisis occurs. 
Combatant commanders rely heavily 
on the diplomatic work conducted by 
Embassy country teams. But a decade 
after the lifting of the Iron Curtain, 
the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
not adequately adjusted to the security 
challenges facing the attache corps and 
its military-diplomatic mission. This 
article outlines how transformation of 
the military attache corps will substan- 
tially improve capabilities. 

Supporting these diplomatic 
missions are Defense Attache Offices 
(DAOs), ranging in size from an estab- 
lished organization comprised of 14 
attaches under a general/flag officer in 
Moscow to fledging, one-deep opera- 
tions headed by Army majors in some 
Central Asian and Caucasus countries. 
The DAO is the permanent DOD office 
assigned to U.S. diplomatic missions. 
Headed by the Defense Attache (DATT), 
it has complex command relationships 
with the ambassador, the combatant 
commander, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the Joint Staff, and the De- 
fense Intelligence Agency. The ambas- 
sador's country team is a microcosm 
of the interagency with representation 
by most Federal agencies, all under 
the umbrella of the U.S. Embassy. The 
DATT represents all DOD organizations 
on the country team and manages com- 
plex command relationships with all 
these elements inside and outside the 
Embassy. In most cases, however, the 
attache does not have formal authority 

U.S. Defense Attache to Sierra Leone providing 
information for emergency evacuation of 
personnel in Liberia, July 2003 


■4£ U.S. AIR 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 49 



■ transforming military diplomacy 

over other elements but merely coor- 
dinates their activity. The combatant 
commander has no direct link to the 
country teams within his area of opera- 
tions. This flawed arrangement misses 
a tremendous opportunity to enhance 
interagency coordination. 

Other obstacles undermine the 
effectiveness of military diplomacy, 
such as the prevailing view that an 

attache assignment does not enhance 
promotion prospects. Unlike many of- 
ficers who later became major military 
figures of the First and Second World 
Wars, few of today's general/flag of- 
ficers have served as military attaches. 
The relative absence of intelligence 
professionals with attache experience 
also inadvertently works to diminish 
the potential impact of its military-dip- 
lomatic mission. The situation is analo- 
gous to the Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) community before the value of 
its unique capabilities, professional so- 
phistication, and small numbers was 
appreciated by the mainstream military 
some 20 years ago. 

The transformed military attache 
corps consists of three components: a 
new attache headquarters at the com- 
batant command, a fully manned DAO 
that handles all DOD functions and 
missions in-country, and an enhanced 
operational role for military attaches. 
Too much coordination at present 
takes place well forward in the Embassy 
because the "interagency process" is 
crippled at the combatant com- 
mand level. It occurs primarily 
inside the Beltway or inside the 
Embassy. An attache headquar- 
ters at the combatant command 
in the form of a new directorate 
could better reconcile guidance and 
policy both internally and with other 
Federal agencies to direct more effec- 
tive operations in-country. 

Especially in light of the recent 
Unified Command Plan (UCP) change 
moving Russia to the European Com- 
mand area of responsibility, it makes 
good sense to reassign military attaches 
directly to combatant commands. Dur- 
ing the Cold War, large portions of the 
globe were not assigned to combatant 
commanders, necessitating a centralized 
headquarters for attaches. Other DOD 
stovepipe organizations with narrow 
responsibilities managing in-country se- 
curity assistance or arms control could 

the combatant commander has no 
direct link to the country teams 
within his area of operations 

be eliminated and consolidated with 
other duties performed by military at- 
taches. Reflagging these billets to more 
highly trained military attache posi- 
tions will improve efficiency without a 
net increase in overall DOD manpower. 
This realignment will better accom- 
modate the valuable operational role of 
DAOs, increase attache access to host 
nation counterparts, raise the level of 
bilateral cooperation, substantially reor- 
der skewed mission priorities, improve 
information operations, and streamline 
the synchronization of assets in-country 
for improved strategic agility. 

More than Protocol, 

Alcohol, and Cholesterol 

The term attache has a significant 
and precise meaning in diplomatic 
usage. A military officer simply sent 
abroad is not an attache; he must be 
accorded full diplomatic status and, as 
such, is afforded complete diplomatic 
immunity. From the beginning, the 
military attache was something of a 
hybrid in the world of international 
relations. He was part diplomat, part 
soldier, part scout, and perhaps, as 
Lord George Curzon suggested, not en- 
tirely welcome. Military attaches were 
the Nation's eyes and ears abroad in 
the days before satellite photography 
and sophisticated electronic collection 
techniques. For example, most of the 
information about Axis armed forces 
before December 1941 came from rou- 
tine, tedious, and often unappreciated 
peacetime observations by Army atta- 
ches. The services sought congressional 
approval in September 1888 to estab- 
lish a number of Army and Naval atta- 
che positions in Berlin, London, Paris, 
Rome, St. Petersburg, and Vienna. 
Regulations authorized wear of the ai- 
guillette, an item of military ornamen- 
tation and the international symbol of 
the military attache, in 1910. At the 
outbreak of war in 1914, Washington 
had 23 attaches assigned abroad, and 
they had become a regular feature of 
the majority of Embassies. 

During the Cold War, Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara designated 

50 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

DOD (Robert D. Ward) 


a senior military attache in each for- 
eign country — the DATT — to supervise 
and coordinate the work of all service 
attaches. While every military organi- 
zation requires someone in charge, the 
current system arbitrarily designates 
the DATT from the various services to 
particular countries. The Army and Air 

the primary attache function of reporting 
is often considered to conflict with 
nonintelligence activities 

Attaches are often the same rank, and 
even though one may be vastly more 
qualified to serve as the DATT, princi- 
ples of service equities take precedence 
over competence. Selecting the best- 
qualified officer would dramatically 
improve the effectiveness of military 
diplomacy and ultimately force all ser- 
vices to develop serious foreign area 
officer programs. 

The defense attache system struc- 
ture, mission, and manning have not 
evolved with the changes of the last de- 
cade that require increased levels of in- 
volvement in operational activity. The 
primary attache function of observing 
and reporting is often considered to 
be in direct conflict with time and en- 
ergy spent on other nonintelligence 
activities. Intelligence and military- 

diplomatic activity are not zero-sum 
competing requirements. Narrow spe- 
cialization by other DOD elements has 
undermined the overall effectiveness of 
the military attache by reducing access 
to the host nation military. DOD repre- 
sentation abroad should be the military 
attache. Security assistance and arms 
control would be better 
managed by trained at- 
taches with the requisite 
language skills, cultural 
knowledge, and regional 
expertise. This approach 
would eliminate parochialism, reduce 
overhead, streamline operations, and 
simplify bilateral coordination for the 
host nation military. 

Transformation of the military at- 
tache corps begins at the higher head- 
quarters. The nature and function of a 
headquarters influence the priorities of 
its subordinate elements. By eliminat- 
ing stovepipe organizations inside the 
U.S. Embassy in a consolidated DAO, 
the combatant command headquarters 
will need to establish a Politico-Mili- 
tary Directorate to manage, deconflict, 
and synchronize the activities of mili- 
tary attaches. This transformed organi- 
zation will integrate national require- 
ments for observing and reporting, 
supporting operational and exercise 
taskings, security assistance, and strat- 

egy and policy. More coherent policy 
and guidance will enable the military 
attaches to apply the informational in- 
strument of national power more effec- 
tively. Making the director of this new 
organization within each combatant 
command a general/flag officer with 
attache experience will brighten the 
promotion prospects for attache duty 
and attract higher quality officers. 

Realigned Mission Priorities 

Security cooperation and the war 
on terror have increased the strategic 
importance of military attaches serv- 
ing abroad. Considering the extensive 
actions to coordinate the deployment 
of U.S. forces against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and support the train-and- 
equip operation in Georgia, attaches 
provide a tremendous value to the 
combatant commanders as operators 
and reporters. Independent of transfor- 
mation, they have four main missions 
that seamlessly blend. 

Advising the Ambassador. Military 
attaches must know the host nation 
military and strategic environment and 
be intimate with the U.S. military's 
capabilities to support diplomatic and 
engagement measures. The DATT pro- 
vides advice on the full range of issues 
concerning regional security, to include 
the attitudes and intentions of the host 
nation and other nations engaged in 
regional activities. Finally, most DATTs 
also serve as the U.S. defense represen- 
tative charged with managing the coor- 
dination of administrative and security 
matters of all DOD personnel who fall 
under responsibility of the U.S. Ambas- 
sador. However, this command rela- 
tionship would be more effective with 
defense attaches assigned to the same 
higher headquarters as the other DOD 
elements — the combatant command. 

Representing DOD to the host nation. 
More than playing a ceremonial role, 
military attaches are a highly visible 
symbol of the Armed Forces. Especially 

DOD leaders and Defense Attache in Copenhagen 
host meeting with Danish Minister of Defense at 
Pentagon, August 9, 2004 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 51 



■ transforming military diplomacy 

critical in Eurasia where the Iron Cur- 
tain allowed for little interaction with 
Americans during the Cold War, they 
provide daily access to the host na- 

tion military regarding information, 
capabilities, and strategies. They are 
generally contacted before all others in 
a crisis. They serve a large public diplo- 
macy function as well. 

Reporting conditions in the host 
country. Attaches observe military con- 
ditions and developments. This is a 
continuous mission that must be in- 
tegrated into all their activities. To 
succeed in security cooperation, poli- 
cymakers and decisionmakers require 
actionable information. It is often at- 
tache input that makes for effective 
security cooperation programs. During 
periods of heightened tension and cri- 
sis, the attache supports the combatant 

commander by becoming his eyes and 
ears on the scene, responding quickly 
to time-sensitive information require- 
ments. Increasingly, military attaches 
serve as the conduit for 
sharing information, espe- 
cially in support of the war 
on terror. Lastly, corruption 
remains a huge problem 
in Eurasia, and military at- 
taches provide oversight to monitor 
whether U.S. resources and funds are 
used appropriately. 

Managing security cooperation 
programs. Worldwide, about half 
of all DAOs manage formal secu- 
rity assistance programs such as the 
International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) program and Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF). In activities 
unique to the former Soviet Union, 
the military attache already plays 
a substantial role in coordinating and 
executing the extensive military-to-mil- 
itary programs, exercises, and deploy- 
ments, which frequently dwarf IMET 
and FMF responsibilities. Even in coun- 

tries with security assistance offices, 
attaches still make recommendations 
on spending priorities and approve 
IMET candidates. 

Improved Manning Posture 

Many DATT positions in remote 
regions are occupied by hard-working 
but junior majors or senior first-time 
attaches with limited choices for their 
terminal assignment. Lack of experi- 
ence, language skills, rank, or maturity 
is not a recipe for success. Many coun- 
tries recognize the strategic importance 
of their military attaches and send only 
their best abroad. Because of the sym- 
bolic and ceremonial importance of 
f rank, and the requirement for experi- 
^ ence and maturity, DATT billets should 
1 be filled by colonels (or Navy captains) 
^ and represented by the service that 
1 logically corresponds to that which 
| dominates in the host country. Most 
3 importantly, DAOs must have sufficient 
1 depth to permit attaches to operate in 


? multiple geographical locations. 

To what degree is the United States 
able to resort to military power with- 
out dependence on foreign govern- 
ments? The military attache manages 
the day-to-day bilateral relations for 
national policymakers and combatant 
commanders. Transforming the atta- 
che corps will substantially improve 
the steady state military diplomacy 
that must be conducted prior to any 
crisis. Changing the status quo will 
improve interagency coordination and 
provide the combatant commander 
the representation he needs within 
his area of responsibility. The military 
attache corps must adapt to the new 
strategic environment, which demands 
skillful military diplomacy and knowl- 
edgeable professionals. Like the Special 
Operations Soldiers who achieved fame 
in Afghanistan by demonstrating their 
strategic value, military attaches have 
the potential to provide significant 
returns in the area of military diplo- 
macy, while at the same time provid- 
ing better reporting on a wider range 
of important issues. JPQ 

many countries recognize the strategic 
importance of their attaches and send 
only their best abroad 

52 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

31 * Communications Squadron (Bethann Caporaletti) 

The joint force, because of its flexibility and responsiveness, will remain the key to operational success in the future. The integration of 
core competencies provided by the individual services is essential to the joint team. . . . To build the most effective force for 2020, we 
must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically. 

— Joint Vision 2020, 2000 

Expert Knowledge in a Joint 
Task Force Headquarters 


O fficers receive service-specific educa- 
tion and undergo experiences within 
their components that provide the 
expert knowledge that enables them 
to operate in their respective military depart- 
ments. Given the Department of Defense (DOD) 
emphasis on service interoperability, what addi- 

Captain Joseph C. Geraci, USA, is the assistant chief of operations, G-3, 
U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, and served as a Joint Task 
Force Liberia battle captain at the JTF Main. 

tional expert knowledge, if any, is necessary for an 
officer to operate effectively in a joint task force 
(JTF) headquarters? This article contends that of- 
ficers in the grades of 0-3 and 0-4 (captains 
and majors, or lieutenants and lieutenant com- 
manders in sea services) do not require additional 
formal expert knowledge because they receive an 
adequate amount during their service component 
education. Instead, it argues that informal expert 
knowledge in the form of true integration is es- 
sential to operate in a JTF headquarters. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 53 

■ expert knowledge in a jtf headquarters 

Officers in the grades of 0-3 and 0-4 gener- 
ally receive little accredited formal joint educa- 
tion and have limited joint experience prior to 
operating in a JTF headquarters. Those in the 
grade of 0-3 typically do not receive additional 
joint education outside of their service-specific 
primary schooling and usually do not have the 
experience of operating in a JTF headquarters 
or serving in a joint position identified in the 
approximately 9,000 billets on the joint duty as- 
signment list. Even though many 0-4s receive 
their first phase of accredited joint professional 
military education (JPME), most do not have pre- 
vious JTF headquarters experience. 

This article uses JTF Liberia as a case study to 
examine the issue of additional expert knowledge. 
This task force is especially interesting because its 
joint manning roster consisted of 101 officers, 
with 32 percent being 0-3s and 31 percent 0-4s. 
These percentages were the highest of any grades 
serving in the JTF headquarters. Therefore, these 

grades made up the majority of officers, and they 
successfully performed their duties, with most 
utilizing only the knowledge and experience de- 
veloped through their respective service compo- 
nent duties and education systems. 

JTF Liberia was activated on July 25, 2003, 
and was operational until October 9, 2003. Its 
mission was to mitigate a humanitarian crisis in 
Liberia resulting from civil strife. The headquar- 
ters for U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, 
stationed in Vicenza, Italy, served as the core for 
the headquarters and received augmentation from 
all of the service components. At the height of 
operations, 5,000 members from the headquarters 
in Italy were spread throughout 9 West African 
countries or were afloat on USS Iwo Jima in the 
joint operations area off the coast of Liberia. The 
task force played a crucial role in coordinating the 
efforts of a 3,500-member force from 8 member 
states of the Economic Community of West Afri- 
can States (ECOWAS). To accomplish its mission, 


JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

U.S. Air Force (Justin D. Pyle) 

G e r a c i 

the JTF headquarters also interacted closely with 
the United Nations, humanitarian organizations, 
the State Department, and an array of U.S Embas- 
sies. In recognition of the accomplishments of 
the headquarters during JTF Liberia, the Chair- 
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented it the 
Joint Meritorious Unit Award. 

Expert Knowledge of 
the Professional Officer 

Armies and navies have existed for thou- 
sands of years but did not organize into the pro- 
fessional institutions recognizable today until 
the mid- to late 1800s. After the experiences of 
the U.S. Civil War, mili- 
tary leaders recognized 
the need to establish the 
officer corps as a profes- 
sion in order to provide 
a dependable Army. Wil- 
liam Tecumseh Sherman, 
Commanding General of the Army from 1869 to 
1883, sparked a professional reform movement by 
emphasizing education and training as a method 
of creating an officer corps that was "a truly pro- 
fessional body." 

Social scientists began identifying the military 
officer corps as a profession in the mid-20 th cen- 
tury. Pioneer studies by Samuel Huntington ( The 
Soldier and the State, 1957) and Morris Janowitz 
(The Professional Soldier, 1960) both defined the 
officer corps as a profession whose members pos- 
sessed expert knowledge. Huntington provided the 
basis for the theoretical model by which this article 
will analyze the JTF Liberia case study as it pertains 
to the acquisition and use of expert knowledge. 

Huntington states, "The modern officer corps 
is a professional body and the modern military 
officer a professional man." They are profession- 
als because they possess the distinguishing char- 
acteristics of professionals — expertise (or expert 
knowledge), responsibility (to protect a defense- 
less society), and corporateness (self-policing with 
a regulative code of ethics). An officer's expertise 
is in the field of "management of violence" and 
provides him a competence that is common to 
all officers — land, sea, and air. The expert knowl- 
edge is acquired through prolonged education 
and experience. 

This article builds on Huntington's model by 
further defining expertise as consisting of both 
formal and informal expert knowledge. Formal 
expert knowledge, acquired through educational 
institutions, provides officers a minimum founda- 

after the U.S. Civil War, leaders 
recognized the need to establish 
the officer corps as a profession 
to provide a dependable Army 

tion to enter into their respective military fields. 
It consists of instruction in the form of doctrine, 
strategy, and tactics. Officers receive formal expert 
knowledge through two phases, according to Hun- 
tington: "a broad, liberal cultural background and 
specialized skills of knowledge of the profession." 

Informal expert knowledge is more experien- 
tial and builds on the foundation of formal expert 
knowledge. It assimilates officers into specific or- 
ganizations and enables them to operate effec- 
tively in their assigned positions. It is acquired 
through an indoctrination and integration pro- 
cess that consists of an orientation to the specific 
operating systems, procedures, and idiosyncrasies 
of the duty position and organization. Both forms 
of knowledge are imperative for an officer to op- 
erate in a specific environment. The formal type 
provides the foundation, and the informal type 
enables officers to apply this knowledge as they 
execute their specific duties. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 55 

52 d Communications Squadron (Karen Z. Silcott) 

■ expert knowledge in a jtf headquarters 

Development of the Professional Officer 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) has continued the legacy of cultivating 
officer professionalism initiated by General Sher- 
man by developing the educational requirements 
for membership in the officer corps. Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 
1800. 01A, "The Officer Professional Military 
Education," structures 
the development of the 
professional officer and 
provides common edu- 
cational standards and 
joint learning objectives 
for all professional mili- 
tary education (PME) institutions. The instruction 
identifies areas of emphasis at five military educa- 
tion levels: precommissioning, primary, interme- 
diate, senior, and general/flag officer. By provid- 
ing the educational standards and joint learning 
objectives for each level, CJCS has identified the 
formal expert knowledge necessary for officers to 
begin in their respective fields. This formal expert 

with effective integration into 
a JTF headquarters, officers can 
operate in a joint position with 
limited joint experience 

knowledge is sufficient for junior officers to enter 
a JTF headquarters. 

CJCSI 1800. 01A provides educational stan- 
dards at each officer developmental stage. Only 
the first three phases will be discussed here since 
they deal directly with the targeted 0-3 and 
0-4 grades. For the precommissioning education 
level (service academies, Reserve Officer Train- 
ing Corps, and officer training and candidate 
schools), PME requires that institutions — as Hun- 
tington suggests — provide a broad, liberal arts 
education for military professionals while also 
orienting officer candidates/cadets to an educa- 
tion in basic U.S. defense structure, roles and 
missions of other military services, the combatant 
command structure, and the nature of American 
military power and joint warfare. 

During the next education level for officers, 
the primary level (for 0-3s), PME institutions are 
required to impart specialized skills of technical 
knowledge to provide newly commissioned and 
junior officers with the formal expert knowledge 
for service in their respective branch, warfare, 


JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

or staff specialties. As part of the primary educa- 
tion level, service component PME institutions 
provide education covering the following joint 
learning objectives: 

■ fundamentals of joint warfare, JTF organizations, 
and the combatant command structure 

■ characteristics of a joint campaign 

■ national and joint systems support of tactical- 
level operations 

■ capabilities of the systems of other services. 

The third level is the intermediate educa- 
tional level (primarily for 0-4s), consisting of the 
service intermediate-level PME institutions, Joint 
and Combined Staff Officer School, and service- 
recognized equivalent fellowship and interna- 
tional military colleges. The institutions at this 
level focus on warfighting within the context of 
operational art and expand student understand- 
ing of joint force employment. During training 
at this level, officers in the grade of 0-4 receive 
their first accredited joint educational instruction 
in the form of JPME phase I. The joint learning 
objectives are national military capabilities and 
command structure; joint doctrine; joint and 
multinational forces at the operational level of 
war; joint planning and execution processes; and 
information operations and command, control, 
communications, and computers. 

By providing education to meet the stan- 
dards and joint training objectives outlined in 
CJCSI 1800. 01A, PME institutions provide officers 
with sufficient formal expert knowledge to enter 
a JTF headquarters. This education provides 0-3s 
and 0-4s with a joint foundation. With the addi- 
tion of informal expert knowledge in the form of 
an effective integration into a JTF headquarters, 
these officers can operate in a joint position even 
with limited joint experience. 

Effective Integration 

Effective integration enables officers in the 
grades of 0-3 and 0-4 to operate competently in 
the joint arena as part of a JTF headquarters. It is 
also critical to the joint reception, staging, and on- 
ward movement of units that can meet the com- 
batant commander's operational requirements. 
Moreover, a deliberate integration process provides 
officers with the informal expert knowledge to as- 
similate augmentees into the staff quickly. 

During JTF Liberia, most 0-3s and 0-4s per- 
formed their duties using only the knowledge and 
experience developed through their respective 
service component duties and education. No offi- 
cer in the grade of 0-3 came to the headquarters 

with any accredited joint education instruction, 
and only 3 percent of those had previous JTF 
headquarters experience. No 0-4 who served in 
the JTF Liberia headquarters completed any joint 
education instruction beyond JPME phase I, and 
only 1 6 percent of those officers had previous JTF 
headquarters experience. 

After these officers were integrated into the 
headquarters, they were able to perform effec- 
tively while filling essential positions on the joint 
manning roster. Key examples were J— 1, Chief of 
Strength Management Division (filled by an 0-3); 
J-2, Assistant Joint Intelligence Support Element 
Chief (filled by an 0-3); and J-3, Joint Opera- 
tions Center officer-in-charge (filled by an 0-4). 
The officers who filled 0-3 and 0-4 positions 
performed duties that proved absolutely vital to 
JTF Liberia. That was possible because they came 
to the headquarters with sufficient formal joint 
expert knowledge and were then integrated. 

So what is effective integration and how is 
it accomplished? The integration process should 
contain an orientation in at least four elements: 

■ the current operating situation 

■ JTF headquarters joint standard operating pro- 
cedures QSOP) 

■ command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C 4 ISR) 
systems — battlespace management 

■ capabilities of each service component involved 
in the operation. 

During the orientation to the current operat- 
ing situation, a designated agent from each staff 
element should provide an overview from the 
element's perspective. This orientation should 
cover current and previous disposition of friendly 
and enemy forces and significant activities and 
present the published orders from both the JTF 
headquarters and the higher headquarters. It 
should also cover the command relationships 
with higher and subordinate units. This orienta- 
tion would bring new officers up to date on the 
current situation and help them understand the 
commander's intent, critical information require- 
ments, and the concept of operations. The end- 
state for the orientation should be that new of- 
ficers have the same operating picture as the JTF 
commander and the subordinate components. 
The integration process should next focus on the 
JSOP for the JTF headquarters. 

The JSOP provides guidelines and standard 
procedures to help new officers perform their 
duties in the joint headquarters. It enables them 
to understand how their position relates to other 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 57 

■ expert knowledge in a jtf headquarters 

personnel and the specific day-to-day duties ex- 
pected of them. Such activities may include the 
time and format for the battle update briefings; 
boards, centers, cells, and working group meet- 
ings; shift procedures; maintenance of situation 
awareness through periodic staff huddles; and 
staff drills for actions ranging from mission plan- 
ning and orders production to joint operations 
center actions during battle drills. Knowledge of 
the JSOP is important because it also shows how 
the JTF staff plans, disseminates information, and 
communicates with subordinate units and higher 

With the advanced technology used in the 
JTF headquarters, an orientation to the battlespace 
management systems is an important part of in- 
tegration. New augmentees must know how to 
apply the capabilities of the systems in order to 
plan, execute, and communicate with subordinate 
units, different staff elements in the headquarters, 
and higher headquarters. JTF Liberia possessed 
a suite of compatible information management 
tools that enabled it to maintain situational aware- 
ness, conduct parallel planning, and widely dis- 
seminate information. 
The C 4 ISR systems fa- 
cilitated all elements 
of the task force to 
share a near-real-time 
and commonly shared 
understanding of op- 
erations. While contractors and technical support 
were available to establish and troubleshoot the 
battlespace management systems used by JTF Li- 
beria, training was required during integration to 
enable augmentees to operate and gain maximum 
benefit from the systems. The following overview 
of the C 4 ISR systems used by the task force high- 
lights the importance of JTF headquarters having 
an orientation to battlespace management systems 
as part of the integration process. 

■ JTF Liberia Web page. The JTF Web page 
provided a globally accessible and secure means 
for users to gain and maintain situational aware- 
ness. It also enabled the joint task force to dis- 
tribute information widely. Members of the Army 
and joint staffs frequently accessed the Web page 
for timely information. Each JTF headquarters 
staff section was responsible for updating its own 
link. The headquarters conducted update brief- 
ings to the JTF commander using the Web page 
platform in conjunction with secure video tele- 
conferencing, which enabled a widely distrib- 

with the advanced technology 
in the JTF headquarters, an 
orientation to the C 4 ISR systems is 
an important part of integration 

uted audience to maintain a shared and current 
understanding of the situation and the evolving 
commander's guidance. 

■ Defense collaborative tool suite (DOTS). 
For collaborative parallel planning, JTF Liberia 
used the DCTS routinely. For example, during the 
daily commander's conference call, the headquar- 
ters utilized it to tie in Special Operations compo- 
nents in Europe, Air Force components in Africa, 
a JTF liaison officer team to ECOWAS, the JTF 
Main in Europe, and the JTF Forward. One Marine 
commander used it to conduct a backbrief for his 
plan for noncombatant evacuation contingency 
operations to the JTF Liberia commander and 
supporting components. The real-time capability 
of DCTS provided a common understanding 
of the mission and the commander's guidance 

■ Global broadcasting system. This system en- 
abled the JTF headquarters to transfer high-band- 
width files, link the JTF with national and theater 
systems, and access real-time feeds — for example, 
from unmanned aerial vehicles. It also provided 
access to U.S. and international news media. 

■ Global Command and Control System-Army 
(GCCS-A). The command and control personal 
computer (C Z PC), a system of GCCS-A, is what JTF 
Liberia primarily used to display deployed forces in 
near-real time. C 2 PC displayed forces in a standard 
format on any type of map data available from 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency from 
1:5 million scale down to 1-meter imagery. This 
system gave headquarters a common operating 
picture 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 

The next recommended element of the in- 
tegration process is an orientation to the service 
components. Even though officers receive a basic 
orientation through PME institutions, they need 
a more detailed familiarization with the specific 
services involved in the JTF headquarters. A rep- 
resentative from each service should provide an 
orientation ranging from ranks and service-spe- 
cific vernacular, to the details of the systems and 
units the service has dedicated to the headquar- 
ters. This explanation echoes Joint Publication 1 
in that "all members of the Armed Forces must 
understand their fellow services to the extent 
required for effective operations." An orienta- 
tion to the vernacular is important because the 
services daily use the same words with different 
meanings. For example, the Navy uses casualty 
for a maintenance shortfall on a vessel, while the 
Army uses it to describe a Soldier injured, killed, 


JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

Airman directs members of Fleet 
Anti-Terrorism Security Marines 
from C-130 in Monrovia, Liberia, 

or missing under hostile fire. Also, new officers 
in the headquarters must know the capabilities of 
the assets committed by each service component. 

The joint task force successfully used an in- 
tegration process that resembled this proposed 
model. As an example of its effectiveness, during 
the JTF Liberia experience, a joint planning group 
consisting of an 0-3 from each service compo- 
nent developed a detailed plan to deploy the JTF 

Liberia Forward 

new officers in the headquarters must personnel and 
know the capabilities of the assets equipment from 
committed by each service component Jima before it en 

tered the joint 
operations area. This was one of the first times a 
JTF headquarters was established aboard a Navy 
vessel that was committed to another operation 
(Iraqi Freedom in the Persian Gulf). The deploy- 
ment entailed the JTF Forward leaving Italy on 
Air Force C-130s, Air Force personnel in Africa 
transloading the JTF Forward from the aircraft 
via contracted material handling equipment, and 
then Marine Corps CH-46s and CH-53s trans- 
porting the personnel and equipment to the ves- 
sel just before it steamed into the region. Without 
providing junior officers with the informal expert 
knowledge in the form of an effective integration, 
this complex and detailed plan could not have 

been executed as effectively. 

Professional military education institutions 
provide officers with formal expert knowledge. 
Adding informal expert knowledge in the form of 
an effective integration brings to fruition Samuel 
Huntington's statement that an officer's expertise 
provides him with a competence that is common 
to all officers — land, sea, and air. Professional mil- 
itary educational institutions provide officers in 
the grades of 0-3 and 0-4 with sufficient formal 
expert knowledge to enter the JTF headquarters. 
Of critical importance is the ability of a headquar- 
ters to receive the officers and provide them the 
informal expert knowledge to be integrated into 
the staff. The proposed model contained herein 
suggested covering four elements for the integra- 
tion to succeed: orientation to the current operat- 
ing situation, the JSOP, battlespace management 
systems, and service-component capabilities. As 
demonstrated by JTF Liberia, it is absolutely nec- 
essary to assimilate these officers fully by provid- 
ing informal expert knowledge in the form of an 
effective headquarters integration process. JFQ 

Do you have another point of view? Consider JFQ as 
an outlet. See for 

information on submitting articles and letters to the editor. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 59 


A Deployable Joint 
Headquarters for the 
NATO Response Force 


A t the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion (NATO) summit held in Prague 
in November 2002, the central topic 
was how to deal with threats from 
international terrorism, hostile regimes, and 
rogue states. Recognizing the need for a military 
force capable of responding quickly to crises out- 
side NATO's traditional area of operations, the 
nations voted unanimously to create a standing, 
deployable joint task force. 

Colonel Michael L. McGinnis, USA, is director of the Systems Engineering 
Department at the United States Military Academy. 

In October 2003, the North Atlantic Council 
stood up the NATO Response Force (NRF), which 
will consist of 22,000 to 24,000 soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and special operations personnel when 
fully operational in the fall of 2006. The NRF will 
provide a credible joint task force capable of de- 
ploying within 5 days of a North Atlantic Council 
decision to commit forces and conducting "stand- 
alone" operations for 30 days. NRF experimenta- 
tion through certification in 2006 serves as a cata- 
lyst for transforming NATO into agile forces for 
new missions ranging from humanitarian relief to 
forced entry into a hostile environment. 

60 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


This article focuses on two major aspects 
related to standing up a new headquarters for the 
NRF: transforming a traditional joint staff (J-staff) 
into a deployable, flexible organization capable of 
planning and assessing effects-based operations 
(EBO); and bridging the gap between EBO con- 
cepts and putting them into practice. 

Command and Control 

Command and control of the NRF will 
be accomplished through a small, deployable 
joint task force (DJTF) headquarters, commanded 
by a one- or two-star 
officer, and capable of 
planning and coordinating 
a relatively new applica- 
tion concept for conduct- 
ing military operations 
called effects-based opera- 
tions. Command will rotate yearly among three 
static parent headquarters: Joint Force Command 
(JFC) Brunssum, Netherlands; JFC Naples, Italy; 
and a new three-star Joint Headquarters near 
Fisbon, Portugal. 

The DJTF headquarters (HQS) will serve as 
the joint force commander's forward command 
post. The headquarters must meet the same de- 
ployment and sustainment standards as the NRF 
forces and cover the core J-staff functions (J— 1 
through J— 9) of the parent headquarters. A ge- 
neric NRF command structure illustrates how the 
parent headquarters is supported by a three-star 
advisory staff representing each service compo- 
nent — land, sea, and air — and the liaison rela- 
tionships between the three-star advisory staffs 
and two-star component commands. The forces 
are generated from the two-star land component 
command, maritime component command, and 
air component command. 

Operation Stavanger 

Preliminary work to establish a deployable 
joint headquarters at JFC Naples involved weeks 
of home station planning that produced a draft 
document of staff responsibilities and standing 
operating procedures. This phase culminated 
with Brigadier General Rick Fynch, USA, Assistant 
Chief of Staff for Operations, and his staff plan- 
ning a 7-day deployment exercise to build the 
headquarters team and conduct vignette-driven, 
effects-based staff training. 

Key assumptions and operational factors 
important to DJTF HQS design were obtained 
from NATO documents and guidance from NATO 

the deployable joint task force 
headquarters will serve as 
the joint force commander's 
forward command post 

leaders such as General James F. Jones, Jr., USMC, 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Admi- 
ral Gregory G. Johnson, USN, combatant com- 
mander, Joint Force Command Naples. 

■ The NRF was to demonstrate initial op- 
erational capability by October 2004 and reach full 
capacity by October 2006. 

■ The DJTF headquarters is limited to about 90 
personnel assigned to JFC Naples. Operational capa- 
bilities include deploying within 5 days of a decision by 
the North Atlantic Council; conducting self-sustained, 
24-hour operations for 30 days; and covering the J-l 
through J-9 staff functions of the parent headquarters. 

On February 1, 2004, over 90 military per- 
sonnel from 11 nations assigned to Joint Force 
Command Headquarters Naples, designated as 
NATO's first deployable joint task force headquar- 
ters, departed from Naples to Stavanger, Norway, 
under the command of General Fynch. The lo- 
cation for the deployment exercise was NATO's 
new Joint Warfare Center (JWC) at Ulsnes, out- 
side Stavanger. According to British Army Major 
General James Short, JWC Chief of Staff, the JFC 
Naples contingent was the first group to use the 
training facility, which was recently converted 
from a Norwegian naval station. Modernization 
will continue to network and digitize the center 
for NATO staff training. In addition to training 
headquarters personnel, the exercise was intended 
to build team cohesion among headquarters per- 
sonnel and engage the JFC Naples staff respon- 
sible for providing reach-back. 

Challenges to Standing Up 

NATO is in the midst of shifting the focus of 
its forces from symmetric warfare against the for- 
mer Warsaw Pact countries to deployable response 
to asymmetric threats across a much broader 
range of missions outside Alliance boundaries. 
Change is hard under any circumstances but es- 
pecially in a joint, multinational environment for 
a variety of reasons: 

Varying language skills. Although English is 
NATO's official language, many individuals as- 
signed to multinational staffs have limited Eng- 
lish skills. Fanguage differences present serious 
communication barriers to transformation and 
operational effectiveness. 

Disparity in military experience. Each nation 
in the Alliance has a unique leadership develop- 
ment program. In a multinational headquarters, 
rank alone is no guarantee that an individual 
assigned to a position has the requisite education 
and experience. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 61 

■ deployable joint headquarters 

National caveats. NATO operations require 
significant consensus building. All 26 member na- 
tions must be in general agreement on the scope 
of operations before the North Atlantic Council 

will issue an ac- 

ongoing operations have exposed 
serious gaps with traditional J-staff 
processes for planning and conducting 
operations against asymmetric threats 

tivation order to 
take military ac- 
tion. Even after 
such an order is 
issued, nations 
may decline to 
conduct specific operations, invoking national 
caveats. Claiming these or other restrictions, indi- 
viduals assigned to a multinational headquarters 
may forego exercises or deployments. 

Intelligence sharing, computers, and informa- 
tion systems. Successful operations depend on 
shared intelligence, clear communications, and 
interoperability of computer and information 
systems across echelons and headquarters and 
with multinational, international, and private 
nongovernmental organizations. NATO has not 
yet resourced a full suite of interoperable com- 
munications, information systems, and support 
infrastructure for conducting such operations. 

Deployability constraints. North Atlantic 
Council consent is required to plan contingency 
operations and to take preliminary actions such 
as coordinating logistics, lines of communica- 
tions, sea- and airlift, and host nation support. 
Council restrictions will constrain rapid deploy- 
ment of the DJTF headquarters. 

Stovepiped headquarters. Ongoing operations 
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have 
exposed serious gaps with traditional J-staff pro- 
cesses for planning and conducting military op- 
erations against asymmetric threats. Pursuing a 
broader range of lethal and nonlethal effects will 
drive changes to military headquarters, especially 
at the joint operational level. 

Time-driven planning process. The DJTF head- 
quarters is required to deploy within 5 days of 
alert. Time horizons mandated for headquarters 
planning are: current operations, 0 to 72 hours; 
future operations, 3 to 10 days; and future plans, 
11 to 30 days. Time-driven planning over a roll- 
ing horizon presents unique challenges that de- 
mand proficiency, speed, agility, and flexibility 
across all aspects of headquarters operations. 

These challenges, mandated operational re- 
quirements, and past experience with headquar- 
ters design led General Lynch to break with a 
traditional stovepiped organization and adopt a 
flexible, modular, matrix architecture composed 

of loosely coupled cells able to work collabora- 
tively to produce joint, operational-level fragmen- 
tary orders (FRAGOs). 

Applying Effects-Based Operations 

After 15 years of dynamic changes to the 
global geographical-political-military landscape, 
a new set of threats to peace and stability has 
emerged in the form of asymmetric drug cartels, 
crime syndicates, and terrorist groups that are 
often either harbored or sponsored by rogue states. 
Asymmetric threats operate outside societal norms 
to destabilize, undermine, or compromise legiti- 
mate governments through terror, violence, bru- 
tality, and intimidation. In operating against these 
elements, military forces have relearned the lesson 
that an elusive, less sophisticated adversary can 
function effectively, even when outnumbered and 
overmatched, by circumventing and neutralizing 
the size and technological advantages of modern 
forces. Effects-based operations are one approach 
to countering asymmetric threats that takes a ho- 
listic system-of-systems view of the battlespace. 

Effects-based operations is not a new theory 
of warfare; its principles have been practiced for 
centuries. In the era of modern warfare, how- 
ever, EBO represents a new application concept 
that pursues a higher order of effects beyond the 
physical results achieved from applying military 
means to military objectives. It offers planners a 
way to anticipate, trace, and exploit both physical 
and psychological effects of military and nonmili- 
tary actions on all systems that make up the bat- 
tlespace. However, complex relationships among 
societal groups, key persons, systems, decisions, 
actions, and means make it difficult to predict ef- 
fects and outcomes. 

The driving premise behind EBO is to control 
or influence the state of the battlespace through 
actions that control or influence the systems, 
key individuals, and societal groups inside and 
outside the battlespace. Its actions are intended 
either to maintain the current state of a nation or 
its social systems, or to change their state. Desir- 
able states typically reflect conditions such as 
stability and security while undesirable states are 
characterized by disorder and insecurity. Undesir- 
able states generally result from deliberate actions 
by a nation, rogue state, or group to destabilize a 
nation or society, or from gross neglect, abuse of 
power, incompetence, poor governance, or a lack 
of stewardship by leaders. Effects-based opera- 
tions seek either to restore the desirable state or, 
in event of a conflict, to dictate conditions such 


JFQ / issue thirty-eight 



M W 

Y ' 

■ . *-■ 

H , l . S , V !*• 1 

Turkish troops rappeling as the tempo of operations, thereby denying ad- 
from helicopter, Exercise versary forces the means, will, and opportunity to 
Allied Response 2003 carry out coordinated and effective actions. 

A review of the literature yields a substantial 
body of research on the theory of effects-based 
operations. However, with the exception of ef- 
fects-based joint targeting by the Air Force, there 
is little discussion of practical aspects of applying 
EBO or reorganizing a military headquarters for 
effects-based planning at the operational level. 
Insights into applying EBO within the DJTF head- 
quarters came primarily from four sources: 

■ discussions with military strategists, analysts, 
and personnel who either were researching EBO or had 
recent experience in warfighting headquarters at the 
joint, operational level 

■ lessons learned from recent warfighting experi- 
ments such as Millennium Challenge '02 and NATO 
Multinational Exercise '04 

■ personal experience with headquarters design 

■ General Lynch's experiences operating against 
asymmetric threats at JFC Naples and as the Assistant 
Chief of Staff, Kosovo Force Main, Kosovo. 

Given past professional experiences and fun- 
damental principles of effects-based operations 
distilled from background research, the authors 
developed an iterative three-phase methodology 
for applying EBO within the deployable, joint, 
operational-level headquarters. Phase I decom- 
poses the battlespace into a system-of-systems in 
a way that broadens the scope of how military 
planners see and understand it. Phase II lays out 
how to plan and apply EBO across the full spec- 
trum of battlespace systems, using military and 
nonmilitary means to achieve higher order effects 
beyond those of military means alone. Phase III 
focuses on the assessment of effects-based actions 
to ensure that operations progress toward the 
desired endstate. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 63 


■ deployable joint headquarters 

NATO Response Force 
change of command, 
June 2004 

as the exercise progressed, 
the product-focused cell 
structure forced the staff to 
work outside their previous 

Maturing the DJTF Headquarters 

Operation Stavanger was carried out in four 
phases: alert and predeployment preparation; 
deployment; battle staff training and after action 
review, including senior mentor feedback; and 
redeployment. Different aspects of headquarters 
functionality were evaluated during each phase. 

Metrics for evaluating prog- 
ress and success of the de- 
ployment are listed below. 

Deployment assessment. 
Verifying that personnel as- 
signed to the DJTF HQS have 

headquarters staff experience 12 months remaining at jfc 

Naples to be stabilized on 
the DJTF team; manifesting and processing head- 
quarters personnel for deployment via military 
airlift from Naples to Stavanger with no discrep- 
ancies; and conducting movement of the team to 
JWC Ulsnes without incident. 

DJTF HQS staff training assessment. Assessing 
English-speaking skills of assigned personnel; 
through exercise events, stimulating the staff to 
work at least four of seven NRF missions; putting 

effects-based concepts into practice by conducting 
effects-based planning and assessment; measuring 
the time required to complete a crisis action cycle 
from crisis event to issuance of military orders; 
and publishing a draft DJTF HQS staff standing 
operating procedure by the end of the exercise. 

Redeployment assessment. Redeploying the 
team from JWC Ulsnes without incident. 

During the training phase, a series of three 
vignettes drove evolution of the headquarters 
design, forced maturation of staff processes, 
and exercised reach-back with JFC Naples. 
These vignettes also gave the headquarters op- 
portunities to exercise interoperability, command 
and control, communications, and information 
systems. In response to each vignette, the DJTF 
HQS staff planned contingency operations and 
issued FRAGOs based on the commander's guid- 
ance while tracking the commander's critical in- 
formation requirements, conducting crisis action 
responses, developing operational-level decisive 
points, and planning stability and support opera- 
tions, counterterrorism operations, and demilitar- 
ization of local paramilitary groups. 

64 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


Between vignettes, the cells refined routine 
and crisis action procedures, and the entire head- 
quarters conducted after action reviews led jointly 
by Generals Lynch and Short. Feedback guided 
changes to headquarters design and helped refine 
standing operating procedures and information 
and workflow models. During the first few days of 
the exercise, the staff tended to work exclusively 
within assigned cells as they struggled through 
the vignettes. As the exercise progressed, the 
product-focused cell structure forced the staff to 
work outside their comfort zone of previous head- 
quarters staff experience. By the final vignette, 
the staff was observed working collaboratively 
across cells to develop an integrated, synchro- 
nized plan for applying military and nonmilitary 
means to achieve the commander's intended ef- 
fects. The organization evolved from a stovepiped 
headquarters to a matrix, information-centric 
structure of loosely coupled cells. 

USS Mclnerney departing 
Rendsburg, Germany, 
en route to joining 
NATO Response Force, 
February 15, 2005 

Overview of Headquarters 
Cells and Liaisons 

The command group supports the com- 
mander, manages DJTF staff operations, and en- 
sures that the intent and guidance from both the 
joint task force and DJTF headquarters command- 
ers are clearly communicated and understood. 
Command group members include the chief of 
staff, information operations officer, political 
adviser, legal adviser, public information officer, 
and medical adviser. 

The Combined Joint Operations Center 
(CJOC) serves as the central point of communica- 
tions and information management while sub- 
mitting and responding to requests for informa- 
tion. Other members include the psychological 
operations officer, civil and military cooperation 
officer, nuclear, biological, and chemical officer, 
and component command liaisons. 

The Operations and Intelligence Cell com- 
bines J-3 operations and J-2 intelligence func- 
tions. It manages the battlespace by synchroniz- 
ing all military and nonmilitary means, develops 
situational awareness, coordinates effects-based 
operations with JFC and component commands, 
and analyzes friendly and enemy capabilities, 
risks, and vulnerabilities. 

The Effects Cell develops and analyzes ef- 
fects-based plans and coordinates and assesses 
effects-based operations. Other responsibilities 
include identifying effects and subeffects, recom- 
mending metrics for measuring progress and 
success, and analyzing and recommending op- 
erational-level means (diplomatic, political, in- 
formation, military, and economic) for achieving 
intended effects and the desired endstate. 

The Sustainment Cell coordinates and sched- 
ules J-4 operations and host nation support. Other 
responsibilities include personnel (J-l), computer 
and technical support (J-6), resources and con- 
tracting (J-8), medical, terrain, and weather analy- 
sis, and determination of sustainment risks for 
movement control and protection of main supply 
routes and air- and seaports of debarkation. 

The Crisis Action Team (CAT) and Joint Plan- 
ning Team (JPT) give the headquarters a way to 
react rapidly to unanticipated crises that cause a 
breakdown in the DJTF headquarters normal battle 
rhythm. The ad hoc teams form when the CJOC 
transmits a net call to deal with a specific crisis. 
The CAT scopes out and bounds the problem, 
briefs the commander, and recommends whether 
all or part of the crisis should be handled by the 
DJTF headquarters and NRF or passed to the par- 
ent headquarters. Based on commander's guid- 
ance, the Crisis Action Team disbands and a Joint 
Planning Team works through the EBO process to 
bring the crisis to an acceptable end state. Once 
the JPT produces a FRAGO that lays out effects, 
metrics, and means, in the form of a course of 
action approved by the DJTF headquarters com- 
mander, the team stands down. 

The Observation, Liaison, and Reconnais- 
sance Team provides initial information gather- 
ing, situational awareness, and intelligence and 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 65 

■ deployable joint headquarters 

establishes liaison and conducts initial coordina- 
tion of support with the host nation, nongovern- 
mental organizations, and private volunteer orga- 
nizations prior to arrival of the DJTF headquarters. 

Component command liaisons communi- 
cate and coordinate orders, actions, and effects 
with their respective headquarters. Other key 
responsibilities include representing component 
force commanders and providing advice and ex- 
pertise on standing operating procedures, tactics, 
and processes. 

The small operational footprint of the for- 
ward deployed DJTF FfQS simplifies force pro- 
tection and life support requirements for the 
headquarters, but also limits capabilities and 
functionality to what is mission essential. There- 
fore, parent headquarters provide support via 
reach-back, including supplying paper and digital 
maps, providing operations analysis, preparing 
higher-level orders and plans, developing priori- 
tized joint target lists, identifying infrastructure 
(power, roads, water, sewer), preparing country- 
specific studies and profiles of key leaders, and 
coordinating and communicating through high- 
level diplomatic, political, and military channels. 

Accomplishments of the DJTF Team 

The initial effort to stand up a deployable 
NATO headquarters during Operation Stavanger 
simultaneously transformed the headquarters into 
a flat, efficient team organized for 24/7 opera- 
tions. Conventional staff processes for generating 
decisions and orders were reengineered around 
the flow of information, making it possible for the 
headquarters to prepare decision briefings quickly 
and efficiently and produce joint, operational- 
level orders. The combination of strong leadership 
by senior members of the DJTF team, an aggres- 
sive training agenda, and feedback from the JWC 
observers/trainers took headquarters proficiency 
beyond what was initially anticipated. The head- 
quarters also bridged the gap between EBO theory 
and application. The deployment to Stavanger, 
Norway, also resulted in several NATO firsts: 

■ first major training exercise to be conducted at 
NATO's new Joint Warfare Center 

■ first deployable NATO headquarters to be stood 
up capable of deploying within 5 days of alert and 
conducting self-sustained 24-hour-a-day operations for 
30 days 

■ first NATO headquarters to be reorganized from a 
traditional J-staff military headquarters into a cell-based 
organization for effects-based operations. 

Perhaps the most important accomplish- 
ment of Operation Stavanger, however, was the 
high cohesion the DJTF achieved in the first 48 
hours. On arriving at Stavanger, General Lynch 
immediately set the tone for the week by delay- 
ing the start of training so he could clearly com- 
municate the goals of the exercise to all DJTF 
members and JWC observers/trainers. He also set 
aside time the first evening for the team to social- 
ize. Training was again delayed the next morning 
for a group meeting where all 90 members of the 
DJTF team from 11 nations stood up in front of 
the group and, in English, introduced themselves 
and gave their military backgrounds. The intro- 
ductions were the first time many had spoken 
before a large body, and they later said it made 
them feel more "connected." The socialization 
and introductions were the beginning of trust re- 
lationships. By the end of the week, the team had 
become a highly cohesive unit. The camaraderie 
and enthusiasm were never more evident than at 
the end of the flight back from Stavanger, when 
General Lynch stood at the bottom of the stairs 
and shook hands with everyone who deplaned. 
The enthusiastic, backslapping goodbyes on the 
tarmac demonstrated the collective spirit. And 
observations and lessons learned were plentiful. 

Information bottlenecks not eliminated. Al- 
though the headquarters made only modest prog- 
ress at reducing information queues and technol- 
ogy related bottlenecks, the flat, modular cell 
structure demonstrated superb agility throughout 
the exercise in responding to both routine and 
crisis actions. 

Improved information flow. Restructuring the 
headquarters cell structure around the flow of 
information improved that flow, which improved 
decisionmaking. By the end of the exercise, deci- 
sion cycle time from crisis to communication of 
orders was improved by over 25 percent, reducing 
the time from 12 to between 8 and 10 hours. 

Transformation takes time. Maturing staff pro- 
cesses and liaisons with parent and component 
commands will require time and training. A sig- 
nificant breakthrough in efficiency will call for 
headquarters at all levels to fully integrate mod- 
ern information, computer, and communications 
technologies and to adopt an enterprise approach 
to information and workflow processes. 

Value-added products and services. As an inter- 
mediate headquarters, the DJTF HQS adds value by 
delivering timely, useful products and services to 
component commands. Examples include analysis 
that connects the dots by providing insights into, 

66 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


and anticipation of, enemy intents, capabilities, 
and vulnerabilities; developing a complete and ac- 
curate effects-based picture of the battlespace; and 
producing orders that coordinate and synchronize 
the efficient, effective use of joint assets to accom- 
plish effects-based operations. 

Selecting the right people and stabilizing the 
team. Progress made during Operation Stavanger 
confirms that creating a deployable, multina- 
tional joint task force headquarters is an attain- 
able goal. However, sustaining the headquarters 
will be a challenge. NATO nations must acknowl- 
edge that NRF missions place unique demands 
on the DJTF team and assign personnel to the 
headquarters with the knowledge, experience, 
and communication skills to: 

■ conduct effects-based operations 

■ conduct regular training to develop and main- 
tain the expertise required of a combined, joint, opera- 
tional-level headquarters 

■ synchronize assignments with operational re- 
quirements, stabilizing personnel for a full tour so that 
once trained, the team remains together throughout the 
operational phase. 

Operation Stavanger helped transform the 
DJTF team into an adaptive, innovative learning 
organization. NATO must develop new strategies 
for educating and for developing and conducting 
the individual and collective staff training neces- 
sary to continue this mission. 

Headquarters staff at all levels must become 
technically competent at using information tech- 
nologies, data management mining techniques, 
computer simulation models, and communica- 
tions technologies to support planning, analyzing, 
and assessing effects-based operations. 

The DJTF headquarters is by no means fully 
trained at effects-based operations, nor is it yet 
able to plan the full range of EBO. Nevertheless, 
in the exercise the headquarters clearly estab- 
lished a baseline capability for EBO. The team 
will refine information and product flow as well 
as staff responsibilities and battle rhythm. Les- 
sons learned from Operation Stavanger will be in- 
corporated into future DJTF headquarters designs 
and will help Allied Command Transformation in 
Norfolk, Virginia, to develop new NRF doctrine. 

Dynamic Action '04 in March 2004 at JFC 
Naples focused on refining standing operating 
procedures, exercising reach-back with the parent 
headquarters, and maturing liaison with compo- 
nent commands. In April, the deployable joint 
task force headquarters conducted a no-notice 

deployment exercise to an undisclosed location 
to test deployment procedures and verify deploy- 
ability of personnel assigned to the headquar- 
ters. Allied Action '04 in late May and early June 
forward deployed the headquarters to Persona, 
Italy, to conduct a major exercise leading to ini- 
tial operating capability in October. Building on 
progress made thus far will ensure that NATO 
fields a capable operational force for meeting its 
broader goals of fostering military cooperation 
among member nations and strengthening joint, 
international planning for the common defense 
of the Alliance. JFQ 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 67 


E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS), an airborne battle management and command 
and control platform that conducts ground surveillance 

The value of information exists in time since information most often describes fleeting conditions. 
Most information grows stale with time, valuable one moment but irrelevant or even misleading 
the next. 

— Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 6 

Expeditionary Airborne 
Battlespace Command 
and Control 


Paul Dolson is developing command and control architecture concepts in Lincoln Laboratories at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

68 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

D o I s o n 

T hroughout history, combatants have 
sought an advantage over their adver- 
saries in large part by achieving some 
degree of information superiority. 
They have sought greater knowledge of enemy 
troop dispositions, preparedness, intentions, and 
weapons, all the while concealing similar infor- 
mation about themselves. Always, the advantage 
such knowledge afforded was ephemeral; com- 
manders had to act rapidly, while the informa- 
tion was still relevant and the advantage still 
existed. Always, speed of command and action 
has been critical to a military's ability to seize and 
maintain the advantage. And always, exploiting 
such an advantage has required a force capable of 
moving with enough speed, agility, surprise, and 
lethality to create a rapidly deteriorating situation 
with which an adversary could not cope — the es- 
sence of maneuver warfare. 

Today, the U.S. military enjoys a tremendous 
advantage in terms of rapid and reliable commu- 
nications technology as well as in advanced intel- 
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

capabilities. Yet unlike many of the technological 
developments exploited in past wars, developed 
largely by or for the military, today's advances are 
predominantly the result of commercial enter- 
prise and are available to virtually anyone with 
the resources to purchase them and the where- 
withal to use them. As a result, the advantage af- 
forded U.S. forces by information superiority will 
become even more fleeting. That fact, particularly 
in light of the quicker, lighter, more mobile, 
and more lethal forces envisioned by Joint Vision 
2020 and the vision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
for joint operational concepts, leaves little doubt 
that speed of command will become increasingly 
important in future conflicts. 

This article suggests that within its com- 
mand and control (C z ) doctrinal precepts and 
architecture, both current and proposed, the Air 
Force will find it difficult to integrate seamlessly 
within and become an indigenous part of a trans- 
formed future dominant maneuver force. Further- 
more, it suggests that forward air control — com- 
manding from the front rather than the rear — is 
an enduring principle of airpower. The airborne 
battlefield command and control center (ABCCC) 
was more than a flying radio relay platform or a 
long loiter forward air controller (FAC); it was a 
g forward air command element engaging in ma- 
lt neuver warfare. 





As they get further and further away from a war they 
have taken part in, all men have a tendency to make 
it more as they wish it had been rather than how it 
really was. 

— Ernest Hemingway 

The ABCCC was originally developed in the 
1960s during the Southeast Asia conflict. The re- 
quirement for such a capability resulted from the 
unique characteristics of the counterinsurgency 
and unconventional warfare operations encoun- 
tered in Southeast Asia. According to one declas- 
sified report, "Control of ground areas fluctuated; 
clear-cut battle lines were usually nonexistent; 
[andj air operations were not conducted solely 
in South Vietnam." Flexibility and the ability 
to make quick command decisions to respond 
to rapidly changing tactical situations were key 
elements of the ABCCC concept of operations. 
Continued the report, "The heart and soul of the 
air effort in Laos and the reason for any success 
achieved was largely attributable to the forward 
air control team consisting of an ABCCC and 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 69 

■ airborne command and control 

F-16s testing interoperability upgrades 
with NATO Airborne Warning and 
Control System aircraft 

FAC." The Vietnam experience demonstrated the 
value added by the ABCCC's ability to provide 
more responsive and reliable close air support 
(CAS) to ground forces. More importantly, it also 
demonstrated how greater speed of command can 
contribute to the efficacy of airpower by identify- 
ing and exploiting fleeting opportunities when 
they appear on the battlefield. 

The ABCCC was a vital link in the battlespace 
C z chain during Operation Desert Storm. From 

January 16 to February 

the airborne battlefield command 
and control center was a forward 
air command element engaging 
in maneuver warfare 

28, 1991, the EC-130E 
flew 201 sorties, provid- 
ing an almost constant 
command and control 
presence. Because the 
ABCCC was airborne, 
it was able to communicate with and manage 
tactical forces operating beyond the normal com- 
munications coverage of other tactical air con- 
trol system elements, such as the Air Support 

Operations Center and the Control and Report- 
ing Center. "The mobility and communications 
advantage inherent in the Airborne Battlefield 
Command and Control Center platform enabled 
it to stay abreast of the current ground and air 
situation within its assigned area of responsibil- 
ity." Among the conclusions and lessons learned 
from a command and control perspective was 
that "ABCCC battlestaff could indeed serve as 
the joint force commander's on-the-scene, air-to- 
ground battle managers, allocating CAS to the 
most lucrative targets." 

During operations in Kosovo, the ABCCC 
once again provided a key command and control 
link helping North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) air commanders to manage air support 
for Operation Allied Force. Kosovo illustrated 
the tremendous complexity of managing the 
battlespace and performing real-time targeting 
in urban environments. Even in the absence of 
significant ground forces and the resultant low 

70 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

U.S. Air Force (Tom Reynolds) 

D o I s o n 

CAS requirements, Kosovo demonstrated that 
the combined forces air component commander 
needed an on-the-scene command presence. The 
elusiveness of the Serbian forces further compli- 
cated an already daunting NATO targeting pro- 
cess. Finding and striking them proved difficult 
and was exacerbated by the distances involved 
for the strike aircraft, which resulted in shorter 
target area loiter times and less time to locate and 
strike targets. Had the United States not possessed 
an ABCCC, the targeting information the strik- 
ers and FACs had to work with would have been 
only as good as the location information they 
had when they took off. The ABCCC was able to 
relay critical targeting information in real time 
between the Combined Air Operations Center 
(CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy, and the airborne FACs 
and strike aircraft in the Balkans, providing an 
increased combat effectiveness that otherwise 
would not have existed. 

In the two most recent operations involving 
U.S. forces, the EC-130E ABCCC platform was 
not available. The Air Force had retired it in 2002 
on the premise that the CAOC would have suffi- 
cient communications resources to exercise com- 
mand and control over vast distances in a widely 
distributed battlespace. In the absence of an 
ABCCC, the airborne warning and control system 
(AWACS) and joint surveillance and target attack 
radar system (JSTARS) had to fulfill the battlefield 
In the cockpit of management role. This led to problems, both real 

upgraded U-2 and perceived, in providing air support to ground 

reconnaissance plane forces in a widely distributed battlespace. 

For example, Afghanistan presented a num- 
ber of problems to commanders during Opera- 
tion Enduring Freedom, a truly distributed series 
of combat operations. The air war was run from 
the CAOC at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Ara- 
bia; the ground operations were controlled from 
Kandahar, Afghanistan; and supporting aircraft 
came predominantly from 479 th Air Expedition- 
ary Wing at A1 Udeid Air Base in Qatar, joined 
occasionally by aircraft participating in Opera- 
tions Northern and Southern Watch. These distrib- 
uted operations led to coordination problems 
between air and ground forces that were exacer- 
bated by the absence of an ABCCC. Because of 
the tremendous distances involved, the CAOC 
could neither communicate directly with, nor 
provide command and control to, many aircraft 
in the Afghanistan theater. As a result, AWACS 
crews pulled double duty, providing deconfliction 
and radar control to aircraft transiting the air- 
space while simultaneously responding to numer- 
ous requests for CAS. Providing command and 
control and establishing communications with 
battlespace participants proved difficult. There 
were instances of preplanned strike aircraft flying 
through the formation of aircraft attempting to 
support ground forces. 

During Operation Anaconda, crews flying in 
AWACS were overwhelmed by requests for CAS. 
According to one account, "Without ABCCC to 
sort through the CAS requests and prioritize the 
missions of strike aircraft . . . officers flying in E-3 
AWACS aircraft and working from the CAOC strug- 
gled to sort out dozens of urgent requests from 
troops under fire." The incident at Tarnak Farms, 
in which an F-16 inadvertently attacked Canadian 
forces while they were conducting a live-fire exer- 
cise, demonstrated the potential for tragedy in a 
dynamic and widely distributed theater. 

The resounding success of Iraqi Freedom 
might lead one to believe the military is right 
where it needs to be in terms of command and 
control; however, air support to the rapidly mov- 
ing and widely distributed ground forces again 
proved problematic. In its after-action report, 3 d 
Infantry Division complained of inadequate co- 
ordination between air support and their ground 
operations. Because of the tremendous speed of 
its movement and the lack of both responsive 
"on the scene" air command and control and a 
reliable means of relaying radio communications, 
there were cases of airstrikes in the 3 d Infantry Di- 
vision area of control. In one instance, an F-15E 
mistook a multiple launch rocket system for a 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 71 

■ airborne command and control 

surface-to-air missile battery, killing three and 
wounding six Soldiers. The Marines also encoun- 
tered problems coordinating ground support in 
the absence of the ABCCC. Their solution was to 
reconfigure several of their KC-130s to be used as 
airborne Direct Air Support Centers. 

Although AWACS and JSTARS performed 
admirably in their respective design roles, as an 

ad hoc ABCCC 

in the Afghanistan theater, there were 
instances of preplanned strike aircraft 
flying through the formation of aircraft 
attempting to support ground forces 

they were not 
as effective as 
the Air Force 
hoped. While 
both did well 
with kill boxes, 

each had difficulty responding rapidly to changes 
and opportunities in the battlespace, and CAS op- 
erations quickly overwhelmed them. Their ability 
to control kill boxes, however, did not demon- 
strate their ability to fulfill the ABCCC role. In 
fact, kill boxes represent a compromise, in terms 
of fire support coordination measures, between 
what the ground forces need to support an agile 
and fluid scheme of maneuver and what the Air 
Force can provide in real time. While kill boxes 
can be useful emergency or back-up fire support 
coordination measures, routine reliance on them 
acknowledges the continuing difficulty the Air 
Force has integrating into a rapidly moving joint 
maneuver force and with providing proactive 
real-time command and control of airborne the- 

ater attack assets. The problems experienced were 
by no means a result of poor performance on the 
part of AWACS or JSTARS but rather a reflection of 
their disparate primary missions with respect to 
that of the ABCCC. JSTARS is predominantly an 
ISR platform, and when conflicts arose between 
its primary function and secondary functions — in 
this case coordinating CAS — the primary role won 
out. In the permissive air environment of Iraq, 
AWACS had only to deconflict airspace, not track 
air threats. However, had there been an air threat, 
it too would have had to prioritize its primary 
mission over assisting with CAS. In addition to 
not having a real battlefield C 2 capability, neither 
aircraft had an ideal communications relay capa- 
bility to support rapidly changing situations on 
the ground. 

Defining the Problem 

In his later years Pablo Picasso was not allowed to 
roam an art gallery unattended, for he had previously 
been discovered in the act of trying to improve on one 
of his old masterpieces. 

— Unknown 

Although much of the discussion in the af- 
termath of Afghanistan and Iraq has focused on 
problems with CAS, those problems are actually a 
symptom of a much larger issue — command and 
control — and what was really missing was the on- 
scene eyes and inherent flexibility of command 
and control that the ABCCC brought to the fight. 
In a College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and 
Education report, Robyn Read uses the operations 
in Afghanistan to illustrate the shortfalls of CAS 
in a "non-linear attack mode" within the context 
of "small wars." Although much of his discussion 
deals primarily with the shortcomings of CAS 
operations, these shortcomings are a symptom of 
a larger problem: the inability of airpower, within 
the current doctrinal precepts and C z architecture, 
to integrate effectively within an agile, fast-mov- 
ing, nonlinear, joint force scheme of maneuver. 
In any event, one would certainly have to agree 
with his assertion that: 

air battle command and control were critical elements 
for CAS in the past but fell out of favor and into rela- 
tive disuse for a variety of institutional reasons. In a 
sort of "back to the future" logic, we need to dig into 
the CAS problem and reenergize the "old" parts that 
worked and update those teclmologies and doctrine that 
are insufficient or inadequately tailored to this mission. 

72 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

D o I s o n 

U.S. Air Force (Robert J. Horstman) 

Ground crew moving 
NKC-135 equipped 
with infrared signature 

While technology has provided the military 
with dramatically improved warfighting capa- 
bilities, fully realizing and exploiting these capa- 
bilities requires that future forces become more 
inherently joint. They must be born joint. They 
must be network-centric and capable of seamlessly 
integrating to form a combined-arms, dominant- 
maneuver force that thinks and acts as one. Future 
operations will be characterized by light, mobile, 
networked forces moving rapidly and simulta- 
neously from several different axes in a widely 
distributed theater of operations; lethal attacks on 
selectively engaged targets with high probability of 
success; fewer casualties and less collateral damage; 
and a better-informed force able to prosecute war 
at higher levels of effectiveness and lower levels of 
violence. With the technologies available today, as 
well as those on the near horizon, the net-centric, 
dominant-maneuver forces envisioned in Joint 
Vision 2020 are within reach. These technologies 

will enable the military to act with greater speed, 
agility, and a more measured and precise lethality; 
however, they will also dramatically complicate 
battlespace command and control. 

The fundamental challenges facing the com- 
mand and control of a net-centric, dominant- 
maneuver force are related to two broad areas: 
communications technology and C z doctrine or 
philosophy. First, a net-centric force would re- 
quire a fast, reliable network that is secure and 
accessible to all participants in the battlespace. 
Second, the C 2 architecture and procedures used 
by these net-centric forces must be rapidly re- 
sponsive to changes and fleeting opportunities 
within the battlespace. Ultimately, to obtain and 
sustain information superiority, and to achieve 
dominant maneuver, the myriad activities and 
communications taking place within the modern 
battlespace must be constantly integrated and 
acted on in real time. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 73 

■ airborne command and control 

E-8C JSTARS aircraft arrives 
at Robins Air Force Base 

A good deal of effort is being directed toward 
the technological challenges of net-centric warfare, 
such as the DOD Global Information Grid (GIG), 
the Air Force C z Constellation, and the Army's 

digital battlefield 

future operations will be characterized concept. The 

by light, mobile, networked forces GIG 1S a 8 loball y 

. interconnected 

moving rapidly and simultaneously end-to-end set 

from several different axes of information 

capabilities, as- 
sociated processes, and personnel for collecting, 
processing, storing, disseminating, and managing 
information on demand to warfighters, policy- 
makers, and support personnel. The C z Constel- 
lation is a network of systems that will tie into 
the GIG and create a battlespace information 
and data sharing network. The Army program is 
intended to network forces in the field and push 
information and C z responsibilities down to the 
brigade and lower levels to create a more dynamic 
and agile maneuver and assault capability. 

In terms of C z philosophy, the Army is mov- 
ing toward greater information sharing and au- 
tonomy at the operational and tactical levels. The 
Army interpretation of power to the edge includes 
not only making necessary data and information 
accessible at the brigade and lower levels but 
also providing greater autonomy for field com- 
manders. The Air Force, on the other hand, views 
power to the edge as more of a technical, infor- 

mation-sharing issue, such as data transfer capa- 
bility from sensor to shooter, or even sensor to 
weapon, using machine-to-machine communica- 
tions while retaining and executing C z functions 
from a central, geographically separated CAOC, 
perhaps even from the continental United States. 
At the strategic level and for real-time command 
and control of a Global Strike Task Force, this 
approach makes tremendous sense. At the the- 
ater operational and tactical levels, however, it is 
impractical. Although the CAOC can maintain 
general situational awareness through a globally 
networked C Z ISR architecture, it cannot commu- 
nicate directly with battlespace participants, nor 
can it direct theater aircraft that will be acting as 
an integral element of a fluid and agile dominant 
maneuver force — moving and operating in com- 
plete concert with ground forces. 

Expeditionary Airborne 
Command and Control 

Commanders who do not empower the staff to act on 
their behalf will become prisoners in their own head- 
quarters, out of touch with reality and limited in their 
ability to influence events. 

— Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 6 

Since the Air Force will usually fight as part of 
a joint combined arms team, it should reexamine 
the concept of forward, decentralized airborne 
command and control and investigate the pos- 

74 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

U.S. Air Force 

D o I s o n 

sibilities of an Expeditionary Airborne Battlespace 
Command and Control Center (EABCCC). While 
it is essential that the Air Force exploit technol- 
ogy to save money and resources and reduce its 
forward footprint, the footprint cannot be entirely 
eliminated. As Robyn Read suggested, the Air 

Force should reen- 
ergize the ABCCC 
concept. It should 
abandon the ele- 
ments that are no 
longer relevant, but 
it shouldn't "throw 
the baby out with 
the bath water." It must address the challenges of 
speed of command within a nonlinear, fast-paced 
modern battlespace. It should update the tech- 
nology and doctrine that are inadequate for the 
modern battlespace and develop new interoper- 
able technologies and C z doctrine that will better 
integrate airpower within a combined arms, domi- 
nant-maneuver force at the tactical level. 

In addition to providing a forward senior air 
command presence, an EABCCC may also require 
a self-contained "roll-off” communications ca- 
pability (capsule) to serve as a secure and stable 
means to tie into the GIG. Today, commercial 
carriers provide 95 percent of all transmission 
services and infrastructure for the GIG. Unfor- 
tunately, they tend to view network security as 
business, which is not always the same as security 
for military operations. Net-centric forces that 
rely on smooth and continuous push-pull infor- 
mation sharing cannot afford to be disconnected 
by an asymmetric computer network attack on 
some link in the grid. Having their own mobile 
hub could provide greater isolation and ensure 
forward commanders have uninterrupted, secure 
connectivity with their forces as well as reliable 
reach-back to rear area headquarters elements and 
associated joint collaborative planning and com- 
munications resources. A mobile capsule could 
act as the hub of a battlespace-wide area network. 

Once the capsule has been offloaded, 
the EABCCC aircraft could then act as the air- 
borne beyond-line-of-sight trunk completing the 
battlespace-wide area network and would need 
the capability to fuse data from theater and na- 
tional ISR assets, as well as ground force-devel- 
oped information, to develop and promulgate a 
common relevant battlespace picture to all par- 
ticipants to include blue and red force tracking. 
In this capacity, an EABCCC would be a critical 
component of a commander's ability to maintain 

net-centric forces that rely on 
smooth and continuous push-pull 
information sharing cannot afford 
to be disconnected by an asymmetric 
computer network attack 

constant battlespace awareness and to exploit 
fleeting opportunities through the rapid applica- 
tion of airpower. 

Remaining Questions 

Whoever can make and implement his decisions con- 
sistently faster gains a tremendous, often decisive ad- 
vantage. Decision making thus becomes a time-com- 
petitive process, and timeliness of decisions becomes 
essential to generating tempo. 

— Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 

The problems experienced in recent opera- 
tions, which were at least in part attributable 
to the absence of an ABCCC, were overcome in 
many instances by ingenuity and, in some cases, 
luck. Nevertheless, the consensus among the ser- 
vices is that future operations will require some 
sort of ABCCC capability. Should an EABCCC 
include a forward air operations control team 
to provide tactical and operational level C z , or 
should it just be an airborne line-of-sight commu- 
nications relay and beyond-line-of-sight gateway? 
Should it include a mobile capsule to serve as a 
battlespace-wide area network trunk and hub for 
reliable GIG connectivity? Should the Air Force 
move a senior command element forward to lead 
joint maneuver forces in conjunction with the 
forward senior ground commander? These are 
just some questions that should be addressed in 
coming years. Which of these concepts or tech- 
nologies will prevail remains to be seen. 

Despite their apparent differences, there is 
one sustaining idea within the Army and Air 
Force programs and philosophy of decentralized 
C z — the need for a reliable gateway to link the 
various elements of the network via line-of-sight 
communications and to act as the bridge and 
wideband beyond-line-of-sight trunk to the GIG. 
By separating the doctrinal differences of C z from 
the technical, the Department of Defense can 
move forward to find the solutions necessary to 
support a transformed warfighting philosophy. 
Through joint experimentation, it can employ a 
"try it before you buy it” strategy to explore not 
only potential technology solutions, but doctrinal 
employment solutions as well. One thing seems 
certain: as the military transforms to a lighter, 
more mobile expeditionary force, the need for a 
more agile and responsive theater air C z structure 
will increase. JTQ 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 75 

U.S. Navy (Nathanael T. Miller) 

Chinese and American 
Network Warfare 


C hina published a fourth version of its 
white paper on national defense in De- 
cember 2002. 1 The document received 
positive comments from U.S. analysts 
for its greater sophistication than previous ver- 
sions and mild criticism for its continued lack of 
detail. Subjects addressed included China's secu- 
rity situation, defense policy, armed forces, inter- 
national security cooperation, and arms control 
and disarmament. But there was a noticeable lack 
of attention to information warfare (IW) and infor- 
mation operations (IO), subjects to which the con- 
gressionally mandated DOD study, "The Military 
Power of the People's Republic of China," paid 

Timothy L. Thomas is assigned to the Foreign Military Studies Office 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

particular attention in 2002. 2 In addition, China's 
2004 white paper failed to address IW but focused 
on the revolution in military affairs and the topic 
of informationalization, which was mentioned 
more than 20 times. 

This 2002 white paper, however, did note that 
information technologies (IT) have helped stretch 
the battlefield into "multidimensional space, 
which includes the land, sea, air, outer space, and 
electron.” The last term, in U.S. documents, usu- 
ally refers to the information sphere. The form of 
war, the paper added, is becoming information 
oriented. High technology was listed as an acquisi- 
tion priority, and 20,000 kilometers of fiber optic 
cable was laid in western China, while in October 
2000 the General Staff organized a computer net- 
working and electronic countermeasure exercise 

76 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


around Beijing. Finally, the paper noted that 
in 2001, many People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
studies and exercises explored the features and 
patterns of an integrated network-electronic war- 
fare (INEW) concept. Thus, while not specifically 
highlighting IW or IO, information-related topics 
were mentioned. 

INEW is worthy of further note. Earlier in 
2002, in the journal China Military Science, Major 
General Dai Qingmin, head of the 4 th Department 
of the General Staff, explained the concept, which 
he had first mentioned in the August 2000 issue 
of that journal. Parts of Dai's 2002 article contra- 
dicted the white paper. For example, he stated 

that the concept 

many People's Liberation Army studies placed more em- 

and exercises explored an integrated p * asis on active 

offense, whereas 

network-electronic warfare concept t p e pa p e r em- 
phasized a tradi- 
tional active defense focus. Dai equated INEW 
with IO, which the white paper did not, noting 
that it "serves as information operations theory 
with Chinese characteristics." It is strange that the 
2002 Pentagon report on China did not mention 
this concept, a theory that appears to be a half 
cousin to the wildly popular Pentagon transforma- 
tion concept of network-centric warfare (NCW). 

This article compares General Dai's INEW 
concept with the U.S. network-centric warfare 
concept and highlights their strengths and weak- 
nesses. Many issues arise. For example, both con- 
cepts evade the fog and friction of war, assuming 
perfect information and ignoring those problems 
at their own peril. Further, both are bathed in their 
own cultural environments. The United States 
used a business metaphor when discussing NCW. 
Dai, on the other hand, noted that INEW refers 
to an overall concept, method, and strategy for 
guiding IO, not a set of hardware and software or 
a single system, and puts "the wings of network 
warfare on traditional electronic warfare." Clearly, 
moving from kinetic to network-based warfare will 
be an interesting transformation as different na- 
tions look at new developments in their own ways. 

Integrated Network-Electronic Warfare 

Dai's 2002 article, "On Integrating Network 
Warfare and Electronic Warfare," noted several 
topics of interest: 

■ IO contradictions 

■ IO centers of gravity 

■ network weaknesses 

■ importance of IT training 

■ achieving information superiority 

■ definitions of information war and other 
terms, all with Chinese characteristics. 3 

Dai argues that information warfare is com- 
posed of six "forms": operational security, mili- 
tary deception, psychological war, electronic war 
(EW), computer network war, and physical de- 
struction. He made only one further reference to 
psychological operations in the article and never 
again mentioned operational security, military 
deception, and physical destruction. Electronic 
warfare and computer network warfare thus cap- 
tured most of his attention. 

INEW, according to Dai, refers to a series of 
combat operations that use the integration of 
electronic warfare and computer network war- 
fare measures to disrupt the normal operation 
of enemy battlefield information systems while 
protecting one's own, with the objective of seizing 
information superiority — similar to the U.S. defini- 
tion of IO. While network war disrupts processing 
and use of information, EW disrupts acquisition 
and forwarding of information. The core of com- 
puter network warfare is to "disrupt the layers in 
which information is processed, with the objec- 
tive of seizing and maintaining control of network 
space." EW is targeted at networked information 
systems and informationalized weapons in order 
to increase combat effectiveness. INEW is essential 
for the system-versus-system confrontation on the 
informationalized battlefield. 

Dai did not use the term network centric, al- 
though there seem to be similarities between his 
and American concepts. For example, a subtitle 
on the cover of a U.S. publication, Network Centric 
Warfare, states that the concept is for "devel- 
oping and leveraging information superiority." 
The INEW objective, according to Dai, is not to 
develop and leverage but simply to seize informa- 
tion superiority. 

INEW emphasizes integrating combat op- 
erations by merging command, forces, objec- 
tives, and actions. Command integration is its 
unified planning, organization, coordination, 
and control. Forces integration is its use in a com- 
plementary manner. Objective integration is its 
simultaneous use against enemy command, con- 
trol, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C 4 ISR), while 
action integration is its coordination to produce 
combined power. Dai listed the characteristics of 
INEW as its comprehensive nature, its integrated 
methods and expansive nature ("battlespace"), 
and the integrated nature of its "effectiveness." 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 77 


Launching AsiaSat-6 communication 
satellite aboard Chinese-made Long March 
3B rocket from Xichang, April 12, 2005 

Forces integration implies the synthesis of plat- 
forms with networks. 

The concept has a comprehensive effect on 
the enemy when it destroys C 4 ISR, according to 
Dai, thereby constraining decisionmaking and 
strategic planning. C 4 ISR systems are integrators 

and force multipliers, 

information operations revolve the focal point of io. 
around destroying enemy systems Dai dld not address 

, . „ what would happen if 

and protecting friendly ones INEW only damaged 

or disrupted systems, 
but one can imagine that the effects would be 
severe if not disabling. Integrated INEW methods 
can be developed into a unified plan and orga- 
nization for action, and the expansive nature of 
battlespace (Dai implies an informationalized bat- 

tlefield replete with information-based systems) 
allows for noncontact and nonlinear operations 
as well as full-depth integrated attacks. Finally, 
the main targets are enemy military, political, 
economic, and social information systems, mak- 
ing the potential effectiveness greater than any 
traditional combat operation form. 

Information operations revolve around de- 
stroying enemy systems and protecting friendly 
ones. Acquiring and forwarding information re- 
lies on electronic warfare, while processing and 
using the information relies on computer net- 
works. INEW provides the means to participate in 
the system-versus-system confrontation and for 
attaining information superiority since systems 
are centers of gravity for combat forces. People 
and weapons become insignificant when not 
structured within a system. This concept appears 
similar to the U.S. idea of systems integration ex- 
cept for its emphasis on ideology and philosophy. 
Ffowever, nowhere does Dai entertain fog and 
friction in the information age; he presents his 
argument as if there were no such problems. 

The Chinese see the main combat contra- 
diction as being between starting and stopping 
the flow of information in both the electromag- 
netic sphere and the space occupied by networks. 
An example of a successful operation would be 
disrupting information processing and obtain- 
ing control over network space, thereby disrupt- 
ing the enemy knowledge system and prevent- 
ing commanders from obtaining information 
required to make decisions. The struggle for infor- 
mation superiority is vital since it is a precondi- 
tion for seizing sea, air, and space superiority. 

When discussing China's "two transforma- 
tions," Dai again emphasized the active offense. 
Fie noted that the first transformation means 
changing from just EW to several forms and 
methods, such as INEW. The second transfor- 
mation is to emphasize both defense and of- 
fense, with the "priority being the development 
of offensive information operations equipment." 
Again, this goal directly contradicts the empha- 
sis in the white paper on the active defense. It 
is not clear whether the Chinese deliberately 
downplayed offensive operations in the informa- 
tion age or it was a rebuff to Dai's article. With 
regard to strategy, Dai noted that China must 
make breakthroughs at weak points, seize the 
commanding high ground, leap out of dead ends, 
coordinate development, and grasp key junctures. 

Finally, Dai noted that implementing INEW 
required an "information warfare personnel de- 

78 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


velopment plan." Information operations com- 
mand personnel who understand technology and 
can manage as well as staff personnel and trainers 
are needed to teach and carry out ideological 
work. Combat personnel are needed to study, re- 
search, train, and fight. Finally, it is necessary to 
develop competencies for merging networks and 
electronics. Academies must develop specialized 
courses, deepen reforms, and send large numbers 
of multitalented IO personnel to units. 

Putting the INEW plan into action will re- 
quire the use of theoretical achievements and 
modeling the battlefield deployment and other 
situational aspects of an enemy force. Perhaps 
this is being accomplished via computer network 
brigades or reserve IW units serving as opposition 
forces against the PLA. In China, theory guides 
training, and rules and regulations are produced 
from evaluating the training. 

Most likely, Dai's article was condensed from 
his earlier work. One critique of that work stated 
that the concept of INEW demonstrated that 

China no longer 

traditional strategic theories are only learns from 

being rethought, new strategies foreign militaries 

, . , , . .. but has developed 

mapped out, and new confrontation . 4 _. v . 

innovative theories 

strategies advanced with special Chinese 

military features. 
Further, the critique reiterated (as did Dai's 2002 
article) that systems represent the center of grav- 
ity of combat forces and that systems integration 
uses information as a control mechanism to form 
a combat capability greater than the sum of its 
parts. To American IO theorists, however, the Chi- 
nese approach does not appear to have as many 
special "Chinese characteristics" as it purports. 
INEW sounds similar to American theory of a few 
years ago, when system-of-systems research was 
more fashionable. 

In fact, not only Chinese but also some U.S. 
commanders highly regard electronic warfare, 
even at the expense of computer network attack. 
For example, General Fial Fiornburg, USAF, Chief 
of Air Combat Command, noted that IO should 
be separated into three areas: manipulation of 
public perception, computer network attack, and 
electronic warfare. Only the latter should be as- 
signed to the warfighter. 4 

In the 2000 article Dai stated that the means 
of integrated application of information fighting 
will initially be the integrated application of net- 
works and electronics and that the key to gaining 
the initiative in IO lies in the establishment of an 

"active offensive." Dai also noted that an IO is a 
series of operations with an information environ- 
ment as the basic battlefield condition, with mili- 
tary information and an information system as 
the direct operational targets, and with EW and a 
computer network war as the principal forms. 5 

Dai further noted that information opera- 
tions are both confrontations focusing on forces 
and arms and, more importantly, trials of strength 
focusing on knowledge and strategies, meaning 
the emphasis should be on strategies. As technol- 
ogy has reinforced human initiative, it has also 
highlighted the role played by a confrontation of 
strategies. Now traditional strategic theories are 
being rethought, new strategies mapped out, and 
new confrontation strategies advanced. 

Network-Centric Warfare 

In 1998, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, 
USN (Ret.), the director for space, information 
warfare, and command and control (N-6), and 
John Garstka, the scientific and technical advi- 
sor for the directorate for C 4 systems on the Joint 
Staff (J— 6), wrote an article focused on business 
adaptations to the information age: 6 

■ The power of network-centric computing comes 
from information-intensive interactions between large 
numbers of heterogeneous computational nodes in the 

■ Competitive advantages come from the 
co-evolvement of organizations and processes to exploit 
information technology, employing network-centric 
operational architectures consisting of a high-powered 
information grid, a sensor grid, and a transaction grid. 

■ The key to market dominance lies in making 
strategic choices appropriate to changing ecosystems. 

The authors then noted that network-cen- 
tric operations offered the same dynamics to the 
military. Strategically, that meant understanding 
all the elements of battlespace and battle time; op- 
erationally, it meant mirroring business ecosystem 
linkages among units and the operating environ- 
ment; tactically, it meant speed of operations; and 
structurally, it meant that network-centric warfare 
required sensor and transaction grids and an infor- 
mation grid supported by command and control 
processes needing automation for speed. Network- 
centric warfare reportedly enabled a shift from 
attrition warfare. Speed enabled a force to have 
more battlespace awareness, mass effects instead 
of forces, and foreclose enemy courses of action. It 
also offset disadvantages in numbers, technology, 
or position and was capable of locking out alterna- 
tive enemy strategies and locking in success. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 79 


This list is significantly different from Dai's, 
with its focus on contradictions, ideology, and 
centers of gravity. This is not surprising since 
different cultures will interpret the interaction of 
systems in different ways. Of concern, however, is 
once again the notable absence of focus and dis- 
cussion on the fog and friction of technology in a 
real-time battlespace. The U.S. concept appears to 
rely on speed to overcome all obstacles. The con- 
cept seems to focus on "the content, quality, and 
timeliness of information moving between nodes 
on the network” and dismisses misinformation or 
deception. Loren Thompson, chief operating offi- 
cer of the Lexington Institute, commented about 
overreliance on business strategies while critiqu- 
ing a 2002 article by Admiral Cebrowski on NCW: 

Let me conclude by answering Cebrowski's question 
as to why commercial development cycles are so much 
shorter than military ones. The reason is that it's 
harder to get to geocentric orbit than the grocery store, 
that no one is shooting at the Coca Cola Company, 
and that private-sector executives don't rewrite their 
business plans every time a consultant comes up with 
a new idea. 7 

reliance on interoperability 
is not given the place it 
deserves by U.S. theorists 

There also appear to be built-in contradic- 
tions in the concept. For example, the authors 
note that NCW strength is designed to "offset a 
disadvantage in numbers, technology, or posi- 
tion." Further, "We must change how we train, 
organize, and allocate resources 
if the United States decides to 
fight on an NCW rather than 
a platform-centric basis." 8 Yet 
the authors twice note that a 
sensor or engagement grid must 
be coupled in time to shooters, and the DOD 
report to Congress on NCW stated, "Battlefield 
entities (platforms, units, sensors, shooters) must 
be designed 'net ready.'" 9 This reliance on in- 
teroperability is not given the place it deserves by 
U.S. theorists. This interoperability resembles the 
integration process the Chinese stress. 

Cebrowski and Garstka underscored that 
NCW made the whole greater than the sum of 
its parts, which the Chinese INEW concept also 
noted, with the latter perhaps mimicking the 
American authors. In contrast to the Chinese, 
Cebrowski and Garstka used the term system spar- 
ingly; however, systems remain important to the 
U.S. concept. 

David Alberts, John Garstka, and Frederick 
Stein wrote Network Centric Warfare in 1999. The 

book defines NCW as: an information superior- 
ity-enabled concept of operations that generates 
increased combat power by networking sensors, 
decisionmakers, and shooters to achieve shared 
awareness, increased speed of command, higher 
tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased 
survivability, and a degree of self-synchroniza- 
tion. 10 The authors imply integration of platforms 
and networks by including sensors and shooters 
in their definition. Again, however, fog and fric- 
tion are ignored. 

In October 2002, Cebrowski wrote that any 
weapons system must be on the net to remain 
viable — the concept of a net-ready platform. 
If such interoperability is not available, the pro- 
gram is subject to cancellation. Risk is managed 
by increasing the breadth of capabilities to cover 
gaps. 11 Can simply increasing capabilities reduce 
fog and friction? Don't surprise or disruption 
mean anything for theory? Cebrowski also noted 
that aircraft and other joint capabilities in Af- 
ghanistan were empowered by high-speed NCW 
principles. However, problems remained, such as 
minimal information filtering and decision aids 
for field commanders. 

The DOD report to Congress about NCW 
stressed many of these points. 12 It noted that 
interoperability must not be abandoned ("a criti- 
cal mass of connectivity and interoperability is 
necessary to both encourage and support new 
ways of doing business”) and that impediments 
to the program must be overcome. However, the 
report does assert that "NCW is to warfare what 
e-business is to business" and "no single platform 
or sensor is the heart of the system." The first 
statement again overemphasizes the business- 
military comparison, and the latter implies that 
platforms remain vital to the NCW concept. We 
are not moving from platform to NCW, but from 
platform to an integrated or interoperable form of 
platforms and nets. 

Chinese IW expert Wang Baocun, writing in 
China Military Science, discussed the U.S. concept 
of network-centric warfare from a Chinese per- 
spective. He did not compare NCW with INEW, 
although he noted that China must study the 
theoretical and practical aspects of other coun- 
tries' efforts to develop an information-based 
military in order for China to do the same. He 
further stated that China must develop a com- 
prehensive electronic information system and 
that such systems should be integrated. 13 To that 
degree, Wang appears to echo Dai. 

80 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


Comparing NCW and INEW 

The two explanations above represent the 
basic views of Chinese and U.S. specialists on 
network-related concepts. Clearly these are ideas 
for the present and immediate future and will 
form the basis of both countries' transformations. 
However, the terms should be examined against 
other paradigms as well. Admiral Cebrowski is a 
proponent of alternate or even multiple concepts. 

He stressed that "one best way” should not be 
pursued, as there may not be one architecture or 
standard. Rather, competing concepts should be 
debated. And interestingly enough, the view from 
a "bottom-up" perspective is different from the 
view at the top. Those at the bottom have other 
points for the authors to consider. 

First, it is unfortunate that the authors who 
proposed these concepts did not venture into 
detailed definitions, for this lack has confused 
readers. For example, Cebrowski and Garstka used 
the terms network-centric computing, network-centric 
operations, and network-centric war in their seminal 
article without defining them. Readers were left I 


with the impression that they are interchange- g, 
able sound bites for an idea. A citation at the 1 


end regarding NCW came closest to a definition, f 
noting that it is "applicable to all levels of warfare -g 
and contributes to the coalescence of strategy, op- 1 
erations, and tactics. NCW is transparent to mis- 
sion, force size and composition, and geography." 
This description was updated in Network Centric 
Warfare, by Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, which 
Cebrowski reviewed. Their definition is better but 
still needs specification, such as an explanation of 
what a network "war" means. Would confrontation 
or struggle work better, for example? Do networks 
really war with one another? 

The terminology problem is important be- 
cause if we are attempting to sell a concept, we 
need a thorough understanding of what we are 
selling. The authors appeared to be describing 
warfare enabled by speed of awareness and shared 
knowledge to bring effects to bear on targets in 
a timely and accurate manner. Thus, NCW is an 
enabler much like other developments in the 
mechanized age, albeit a quantum leap, to act as a 
combat facilitator, especially of battlefield aware- 
ness. Communications have always acted as en- 
ablers, facilitators, and coordinators of battlespace 
awareness, just not to the same degree as sensors 
and satellites. Terms such as network-assisted plat- 
form operations, network-coordinating engagement op- 
erations, or simply network-centric operations appear 
as appropriate as network-centric warfare. The 

INEW concept suffers from the same imprecision. 
In many ways it sounds like an updated version of 
NCW except for its EW and stratagem links. 

Second, many NCW authors describe a move- 
ment away from platforms to networks in their 
discussion of theory, then use an integrated or 
interoperable model of platforms and networks 
to describe their concept, which again shows lack 
of precision. Further discussion of the move from 
kinetic to combined kinetic, electronic, and net- 
work-based warfare would have assisted under- 
standing. NCW does not occur in isolation. If it 
did, no one could use it because it would not con- 
trol or be connected to anything; it would just be a 
grouping of sensors and nodes joined to a network 
that produces information. Rather, the concept 
implies that sensors are part of systems integrated 
into platforms. Weapons, weapons systems, and 
platforms are plugged into the sensor, informa- 
tion, and transaction grids that comprise NCW 
at the moment, and they will be with us for some 
time. Platforms launch weapons and have nodes 
where network information is integrated into the 
targeting and protection mechanisms of the plat- 
form. Predators are platforms that use networks. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 81 


Space Control Center in 
Beijing monitoring return 
of China’s first astronaut, 
October 16, 2003 

the American metaphor is 
that if it works for business, 
it will work for the military 

The INEW concept used the word integrated while 
NCW theorists used interoperable for KC-135 aerial 
refuelers that possess routers, antennas, and other 
equipment so the aircraft can transmit battlespace 
information among units. 

Third, the NWC discussion suggests that the 
concept alone is sufficient to make a nation great 
and modern. The American metaphor is that if it 
works for business, it will work for the military. 
The difference is that in the military, people plan 
on destroying the networks through high-tech 
weapons, making the systems useless. Or they 
try to deceive sensors and satellites, which does 
not happen often in business 
because it runs on information 
in a more perfect form. The 
military does not possess per- 
fect information to the degree 
the market does; therefore, eco- 
nomic superiority may not translate into military 
superiority. Most important, there is no discus- 
sion of what might happen if such a system meets 
a like system or if there is even partial disruption. 
Kosovo, Somalia, and Bosnia were not confron- 
tations between modern systems, but rather of 
modern against antiquated systems. So there is 
little consideration of the impact of the fog and 
friction of war on NCW and INEW. And there 

remain problems of available bandwidth, mission 
priorities and access to networked platforms, and 
the number of combat systems that must be coor- 
dinated — over 400 by some accounts. 

Fourth, the network-centric concept is tech- 
nology-focused, while INEW possesses a strong 
stratagem element. This difference is important. 
It is how INEW plans to "defeat the superior with 
the inferior." The Chinese have noted that Asian 
analysts think in terms of stratagems and Western 
planners in terms of technology. Western strate- 
gists should be aware of this perspective. 

Alfred Kaufman, a study director at the U.S. 
Institute for Defense Analyses, agrees that tech- 
nology has too prominent a place in our military 
thinking, so much so that it dictates military 
strategy. He wrote that NCW theory has resulted 
in "the virtual collapse of the intellectual struc- 
ture that was erected to control the development 
of Western military technology." He believes that 
the Pentagon hopes that commercial innovation 
will bring to war and to national security the 
same benefits it brings to commercial enterprises. 
In his view, NCW is flawed because it: 

■ overestimates man's capacity to deal with con- 
tradictory information 

■ ignores the true nature of the enemy and drives 
him to asymmetric strategies 

■ ignores the dynamic nature of combat and bu- 
reaucratizes war 

■ assumes that military victory is an end in itself . 14 

Fifth, consideration is given to the human 
in the loop, yet one wonders if a proper paral- 
lel should be drawn between NCW/INEW and 
human network attacks (HNA). NCW and INEW 
discuss the importance of training and educat- 
ing personnel to conduct themselves as well as 
to run a network-oriented staff. U.S. theory now 
includes discussions of effects-based operations 
to demonstrate how NCW can be used to affect 
humans and objectives in a sequenced manner. 
Addressing the human as a network might be the 
next logical thinking. HNA refers to the ability 
of weapons, including nonlethals, to shut down 
the operating systems of people, who have their 
electric circuitry in the form of neurons. Properly 
targeted, this type of attack can make it difficult 
for humans to enter the decisionmaking cycle to 
assist in processing and selecting targets, the fail- 
safe aspect to NCW and INEW. 

Sixth, the United States needs to study for- 
eign IO and NCW related concepts if it is to 
understand how to work with or against the 
cyber age systems of other countries. It is clear 


JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


that China studies Pentagon thinking. At Chinese 
book stores there are hundreds of U.S. books 
translated from English, especially in the IO area. 
No such bounty on Chinese thinking can be 
found in American book stores. 

Finally and most importantly, Dai noted that 
INEW is an offensive strategy based on acquiring 
both defensive and offensive information op- 
erations equipment, "with the priority being the 
development of offensive information operations 
equipment." Further, it is "important to take the 
initiative and effectively destroy the enemy's elec- 
tronic information systems ." 15 The focus on the 
active offense is lacking in NCW discussions, as is 
the Chinese focus on applying strategies to offset 
inferiorities in technology and equipment. The 
latter focus is really on the decisionmaker's mind, 
with strategies being the means and perception 
management the ends. 

The good news is that the initial discussion 
of NCW is over, and the concept has received 
feedback from both private and public sources. 
This has provided substance to Admiral Cebrows- 
ki's foresight that more than one idea should be 
pursued. China is lacking in that area. The INEW 
topic has not been publicly critiqued. Perhaps the 
dialectic of point and counterpoint works better 
in Western culture based on its willingness to 
confront ideas with counters or better ideas. In 
many ways, China merely mirrors what happens 
in the West in the network-centric arena, but the 
West must be acutely aware of the Chinese nu- 
ances and mirror imaging. 

U.S. decisionmakers, many with business 
backgrounds, must not apply their business expe- 
rience to the military arena. The concept worked 
well, but in an environment totally divorced from 
the battlefield. China, on the other hand, will 
continue to load its INEW concept with Chinese 
characteristics, or so they say. Their metaphor will 
be shaped by the words of famous strategists and 
consider the use of deception and surprise while 
the United States focuses on speed of response 
and efficiency. One important distinction in the 
Chinese approach, however, is that INEW would 
be used to attack economic, political, societal, 
and military networks. 

Does U.S. strategy risk overdependence on 
speed and prowess at the expense of other factors, 
while China tries to defeat the superior with the 
inferior, using good but not outstanding technol- 
ogy combined with stratagems? Both concepts 
lack ways to block failure in an age of continued 

fog and friction. We are uncertain what happens 
if our risk-taking fails. No one wants to talk about 
that. And, as the conflict in Iraq extends and di- 
verts funding from the transformation effort, we 
may be closer than we think to confronting the 
risks discussed here. JFQ 


1 China's National Defense in 2002, white paper 
(Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China, December 2002), available 
at < 

2 See Annual Report on the Military Power of the 
People's Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department 
of Defense, July 2002). 

3 Dai Qingmin, "On Integrating Network Warfare 
and Electronic Warfare,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue ( China 
Military Science) (February 2002), 112-117, as translated 
and downloaded by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS) Web site. 

4 David Fulghum, "USAF Redefining Boundaries of 
Computer Attack,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 
158, no. 9 (March 3, 2003), 33. 

5 "Introduction to Integrated Network-Electronic 
Warfare," Jiefangjun Bao (February 26, 2002), 6, accessed 
at <>. 

6 Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Net- 
work-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings 124, no. 1 (January 1998), 28-35. 

7 Loren Thompson, "Dot-Com Mania," Defense 
News, October 28-November 3, 2002, 12. 

8 Cebrowski and Garstka. 

9 Art Money, Report on Network Centric Warfare: 
Sense of the Report, March 2001, accessed at <http://www. 

10 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick 
P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare (Washington, DC: Na- 
tional Defense University Press, 1999), 2. 

11 Arthur K. Cebrowski, "New Rules, New Era: Pen- 
tagon Must Embrace Information Age," Defense News, 
October 21-27, 2002, 28. 

12 Annual Report. 

13 Wang Baocun, "The Future Warfare for Which 
the U.S. Military Is Making Preparations: Network- 
Centric Warfare," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue ( China Military 
Science) (October 2002), 133-143, as translated and 
downloaded by FBIS. 

14 Alfred Kaufman, "Caught in the Network," 
Armed Forces Journal (February 2005), 20-22. 

15 Dai Qingmin. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 


U.S. Navy (Brandan Schulze) 

Transforming the 
"Retention Sector" 


T he U.S. Armed Forces will likely face a 
retention problem in 2005. Not only 
will this impede America's ability 
to execute foreign policy, but also the 
Pentagon will require massive budget outlays 
to recruit and train replacements at a time 
when some argue that it should be doubling 
personnel strength. 

The wars against terrorism and in Iraq are 
not the specific causes of the retention problem. 

Meredith Leyva is founder of, cofounder of Operation 
Homefront, and author of Married to the Military. 

Rather, it stems from the military's shortcomings 
in transitioning to an all-volunteer force and the 
continuing treatment of wartime personnel as 
draftees. The key to keeping troops is recognizing 
that they are professionals with personal com- 
mitments who are concerned with the care their 
families receive. 

What Does Not Affect Retention 

Many argued that the Department of De- 
fense (DOD) was facing a junior officer reten- 
tion problem before September 11. In attempting 
to address key retention factors, policymakers 

84 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


debated whether to increase military pay, which 
28 percent of separating servicemembers indi- 
cated as the primary reason for leaving. 1 

Research by the RAND Corporation confirms 
that "if a wide pay gap is allowed to develop, re- 
cruiting and retention problems will follow." 2 The 
2004 Defense Authorization Bill brought military 
pay much closer to civilian pay. Because RAND 
found that pay growth over a career decreases 

for military profes- 

quantitative data and anecdotal sionais compared to 

evidence show a strong connection clvllians < policymak- 
ers increased senior 

between spouses and retention enlisted pay at higher 

rates. These efforts 
alone are not likely to solve the problem, how- 
ever, because current servicemembers also cited 
pay and benefits as the top reasons for staying. 
Clearly, pay is a factor in retention, but perhaps 
in a different way than commonly assumed. 

A sense of purpose, credit for accomplish- 
ments, promotion opportunities, and respect are 
ranked as equally or more important than pay. On 
quality of life surveys, a majority of service per- 
sonnel consistently indicate high satisfaction with 
these factors but moderate dissatisfaction with the 
pace of promotions, unit morale, and a perception 
of zero tolerance for mistakes. 3 Overall, however, 
these factors do not appear to harm retention. 

Current level of deployments, live combat, 
training, and relocation are also frequently cited 
for poor retention. However, servicemembers in- 
dicate that deployments are part of the job; only 6 
percent of separating members said deployments 
were their primary reason for leaving. 4 Eighty 
percent of active-duty personnel felt very satisfied, 
satisfied, or neutral toward deployments and other 
duties that took them away from home. 5 RAND 
studies found that "rather than decreasing reen- 
listment, deployment generally served to increase 
it or leave it unchanged." 6 Servicemembers look 
forward to using their skills, and informal surveys 
indicate that spouses understand and generally 
support their partners' passion for their jobs and 
have incorporated deployments into their lives. 

Similarly, fear of live combat may not be 
a substantial factor in retention. Servicemem- 
bers appreciate receiving the associated honors 
and awards and perceive opportunities for faster 
promotions. Perhaps more important, combat 
in Afghanistan and Iraq has created a sense 
of purpose among service personnel and their 
spouses, given their strong support for the mis- 
sion to fight terrorism. 

Finally, relocation is probably not a signifi- 
cant factor in retention; service personnel report 
51 percent satisfaction, with 32 percent "nei- 
ther satisfied nor dissatisfied" with the frequency 
of relocation. 7 

Real Factors in Retention 

While pay, deployments, and combat alone 
are not major retention factors, they are linked to 
the real reason for separating. Analysis of quanti- 
tative data and anecdotal evidence show a strong 
connection between spouses and retention. Al- 
though the majority of servicemembers indicated 
a willingness to stay in the military as long as 20 
years, most of them do not. By contrast, nearly 
33 percent of servicemembers with companions 
or spouses indicated that their significant other 
wanted them to leave, while 15 percent said their 
significant other had no opinion. 8 In other words, 
nearly 50 percent of spouses and companions ei- 
ther dislike or are ambivalent about the military 
lifestyle. Only one RAND study shows a direct 
connection: If spouses have "very unfavorable" 
attitudes toward military life, then 63 percent of 
nonmobilized Reservists said they would separate 
from their service. 9 

Thus, although servicemembers cite pay 
and deployments as their reasons for separating, 
spouse dissatisfaction may be the real factor. 
Spouses supply an array of logistic and personal 
support services that allow servicemembers to do 
their jobs. They provide meals, care for children, 
manage finances, and maintain careers that often 
pay more than the servicemember receives. When 
personnel deploy, spouses must assume the role 
of single parents, perform tasks their partners 
once did, and make family decisions alone. 

If a spouse is frustrated with any aspect of 
the military lifestyle, the servicemember feels 
the impact both logistically and emotionally. For 
example, disruption of a spouse's career because 
of relocation or deployment hurts financially. A 
spouse's casual comments about a civilian neigh- 
bor's higher pay may lead a servicemember to 
conclude that civilian life would be better for the 
family. This may explain personnel citing low pay 
rather than lack of family support as a primary 
reason for separating. 

This complex dynamic may also explain 
the seemingly contradictory data regarding the 
impact of deployments on reenlistment. RAND 
studies found that a standard deployment actu- 
ally increased the likelihood of reenlistment. But 
"an additional tour of duty atop the first — such as 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 85 


another three months away from home — reduces 
the likelihood of reenlistment, especially in the 
Army and Marine Corps. The negative effect of 
the extra tour is strongest when it involves hos- 
tilities." 10 The issue is both the length of the tour 
and the uncertainty of the servicemember's re- 
turn, which may reflect the spouse's need for pre- 
dictability. Spouses accept deployments because 

they support their 

access to some basic services is 

essentially denied to spouses because 
of bureaucratic rules and attitudes 

careers, but when 
additional tours 
are ordered, fam- 
ily life becomes 
unstable and the spouse and servicemember may 
feel as though their loyalty is being abused. 

A direct survey of Army wives confirms their 
opinions. While 64 percent of wives felt a 3- to 
6-month deployment posed no problem, and 
43 percent were unconcerned about a 7-month 
absence, the number reversed dramatically when 
the deployment increased; 48 percent felt a de- 
ployment of more than 1 year posed a serious or 
very serious problem, while 58 percent felt the 
same about a mission of undetermined length. 11 

Insufficient research has been conducted 
to substantiate the link between spouse satisfac- 
tion and retention and to determine spouses' 
needs. The lack of data has partly to do with the 
employer-employee relationship and the mu- 
tual need for some distance between the mili- 
tary establishment and families. Moreover, some 
military leaders perceive spouses as impediments 
to that relationship, and the high divorce rate 
discourages them from involvement in families' 
lives. This approach should be reconsidered, not 
because spouses deserve special treatment, but 
because DOD must retain its best people. 

Who Spouses Are and What They Want 

Two common stereotypes of military spouses 
are as World War II-era wives pining away at 
home and as "trouble-making trailer trash.” De- 
mographic data presents a very different image. 
Ninety-four percent of military spouses are 
women, and the remaining 6 percent are primar- 
ily older, prior-service husbands who need less 
assistance than a 23-year-old woman new to mili- 
tary life. Nearly 85 percent of military wives work 
outside the home. They are better educated than 
the average American, with only 5 percent of 
junior enlisted wives failing to finish high school 
and 67 percent working toward or having a post- 
secondary degree. 

Given these characteristics, wives obviously 
need support during disruptions to their careers 
and home life caused by the military. Equally im- 
portant, they need some degree of predictability 
within reason of military logistics and security. 
They want to return to the firmer homecoming 
dates of past deployments, so they can establish 
some stability in their professional and family 
lives. The tempo of deployments more than 
tripled in some services before September 11 
and has increased with missions to Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Ongoing deployments to the Middle 
East and the DOD transformation plans for last- 
minute battlegroup formations could further re- 
duce predictability and correspondingly heighten 
spousal desire for separation. 

Inadequacy of Support Services 

Current support services include various of- 
ficial, semiofficial, and unofficial organizations. 
The fact that unofficial organizations are more 
likely to handle the more complex problems 
reflects both the employer's fear of entanglement 
in family life and the failure to recognize a direct 
correlation between spouses and retention. 

Access to some of the most basic services pro- 
vided by official military support for families, such 
as relocation and housing, is essentially denied to 
spouses because of bureaucratic rules and attitudes. 
For example, spouses may not receive services and 
counseling from most relocation and housing 
offices without a unique power of attorney from 
their servicemembers specifically authorizing it. 
Traffic Management Office (TMO) officials have 
explained that some spouses have tricked them 
into relocating household goods to a different 
place than indicated on the orders, enabling the 
spouse to leave her husband at the military's ex- 
pense. The TMO approach is to deal directly with 
the servicemember, regardless of whether he is 
currently deployed or occupied at work. 

Another example is the fact that the military 
will not ship a second vehicle during a reloca- 
tion within the United States. Without a car, a 
spouse might not be able to work. Military fami- 
lies must either relocate using two cars or pay to 
ship a spouse's car to a new location. Thus, 
this policy can cause tremendous financial and 
emotional strain. 

The secondary source of official support is the 
family support center (FSC), which provides coun- 
selors on relocation logistics, financial manage- 
ment, domestic violence, and career assistance for 
spouses. A RAND analysis of the 1992 Quality of 


JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


General Myers swears in 
Soldiers at reenlistment 
ceremony at Camp 
Victory, Iraq, March 2005 

Life Survey reveals that FSC programs for spouse 
career assistance, spouse and child abuse, and 
housing were rated well below satisfactory — even 
though they are perhaps the most important 
functions of FSCs for spouses. 12 Additionally, only 
23 percent of survey participants had used the 
centers in the last 2 years, and the majority were 
overseas. A reason for the lack of use is found in 
the 2001 Morale and Quality of Life Study, which 
includes a policy goal of responding to changing 
family demographics: 

The family support system has not kept pace with the 
changing family structure. Nor has it kept pace with 
the higher aspirations and expectations of an increas- 
ingly better educated workforce and their families. 
Critical enhancements include childcare; opportunities 
for military spouses to find employment and programs 
to develop careers and enhance education; education 
for military children; and family support networks. 13 

A 1997 survey of junior enlisted spouses 
concluded that: 

Very few spouses used any EAP [employment assis- 
tance program] service. Accordingly, very few spouses 
found their jobs through the EAP. . . . There is also a 
need to determine why almost one third of those who 
did use the EAP were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied 
with the program. 1 * 

RAND analysis indicates that DOD founded 
the FSCs believing that family morale and reten- 
tion are strongly linked. 15 However, the report crit- 
icizes DOD for failing to confirm that link, track 
progress, and set goals. The FSC system is divided 
into service "silos" that do not share best practices, 
and a survey indicates that families fear being seen 
at an FSC lest they be labeled as troubled. 

DOD has not invested sufficiently in FSCs 
since their establishment. Offices typically are 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 87 

1 st Combat Camera Squadron (D. Myles Cullen) 


Loadmaster oversees 
spouse orientation flight 
of C— 17 at Charleston 
Air Force Base 

open from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., hours when 
most spouses work. Additionally, some centers are 
reluctant to coordinate actively with semiofficial 
or unofficial support organizations, namely out 
of privacy concerns, even though coordination 
could provide more effective services. Also, a 
lack of funding impedes services. Because many 
counselors do not have telephones or voice mail, 
families must try repeatedly to reach them. RAND 
points out that personnel programs are a non- 
wage benefit equivalent to just $700 per Soldier. 

The services and the Pentagon have at- 
tempted to provide information and services on 

the Internet, most recently with the launch of 
Military OneSource. This site is significantly bet- 
ter than the service sites such as Navy LifeLines, 
in part because a person can always be reached 
on its around-the-clock hotline, but families still 
cannot conduct business or receive counseling 
services over the Internet. 

Nonprofit organizations are another form of 
official support in the sense that they often act 
as an arm of the FSCs. Army Emergency Relief 
and the Air Force Aid Society both receive Federal 
funds, while the Navy-Marine Corps Relief Soci- 
ety is fully funded by donations. These organiza- 
tions often provide excellent financial counseling 
and relief services, but they are hampered by 
restrictive policies and procedures of the military 
agencies with whom they work. For example, 
they cannot extend office hours to help working 
wives because base accounting and personnel 
offices, which provide key information, typically 
close at 4:00 p.m. or earlier. Other nonprofit 
organizations such as the United Services Orga- 
nization and Armed Forces YMCA often do not 
market their programs to wives sufficiently. 

The Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) 
office conducts recreational activities and events 
to support family morale. However, it has been 
pressed into profit generation, so events and 
services are underutilized because families can- 
not afford them. The funds go toward supporting 
family programs such as counseling. DOD schools 
and the Exceptional Family Member Program are 
generally well regarded but are no better than 
what would be expected in a civilian community. 

Semiofficial Support Organizations 

Leading the semiofficial support organiza- 
tions are the family support groups (FSGs) and 
family readiness groups (FRGs). They are a major 
support source for spouses during deployments 
and relocation but are only as good as the volun- 
teers who lead them. FSGs used to be led by the 
wives of commanding officers, but now junior 
wives are increasingly taking over even if they 
lack experience. 

The issues of infrastructure, continuity, and 
institutional memory are major problems facing 
semiofficial organizations because of high turn- 
over among volunteers. For example, one elemen- 
tary school serving the junior enlisted population 
at Camp Pendleton had no Parent-Teacher Asso- 
ciation because the past-year association officers 
all relocated simultaneously. FSCs and commands 
are often unwilling to get involved because of 

88 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


Spouses Club members 
and their families sort 
messages to troops 

fear of entanglement and failure to recognize 
the importance of family morale on retention. 
FSCs may support semiofficial organizations by 
sharing office space, but volunteers overall have 
little interaction and coordination with the FSCs. 
Perhaps most important, there is no central guide 
to best practices for support group volunteers. 

Official and semiofficial organizations' fail- 
ure to meet the needs of military families has 
prompted the increase in unofficial organiza- 
tions, including large 

family support groups and family internet-based commu- 
readiness groups are only as good nities and local meet ' 

ing groups. Unofficial 

as the volunteers who lead them groups address spouses , 

need to be respected 
and not patronized, and to receive the unofficial 
"scoop" on topics the military establishment is 
unable or unwilling to address — including marital 
problems, financial difficulties, and living condi- 
tions in base housing — and do so with convenient 
meeting times and communication platforms. 

Military family support agencies cannot rec- 
ognize or cooperate with unofficial groups unless 
the groups apply for recognition on base, which 
is often not worth the effort of time-pressed vol- 

unteers. Thus, the agencies do almost no coor- 
dination with unofficial groups, even though a 
majority of wives turn to them for support. 

Perhaps more important, the increase in un- 
official organizations has reduced cohesion in the 
military community. For example, many wives 
relocate but refuse to meet other local military 
families because they prefer to chat online with 
wives elsewhere. This trend undermines the emo- 
tional and logistic support military families need 
in times of crisis. 

Staving Off a Retention 
Problem with Transformation 

DOD must apply the principles of transfor- 
mation to the "retention sector" and rethink its 
approach toward spouses, recognizing that their 
satisfaction is vital to retention. This is a purely 
business decision. DOD should protect its invest- 
ment in quality personnel and mitigate the cost 
of recruiting and training replacements by ad- 
dressing the less costly needs of spouses. 

The department should adopt wives as "per- 
sonal support command centers" (PSCCs) and 
change the minds and attitudes of officers, senior 
enlisted, and civil servants. This campaign must 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 89 

U.S. Navy (Johnny Bivera) 


Soldier returning from Operation 
Iraqi Freedom greeted by family at 
jmecoming ceremony in Plymouth, 
NewHampshire, March 2005 

commands and family support 
agencies must make their 
operations more accessible 

be led by senior Pentagon officials and, beyond 
the initial launch of the concept, be incorporated 
into nearly every discussion topic. 

With a mandate from the top, both com- 
mands and key agencies should be required 
to review and revise their operations to en- 
sure that spouses' needs 
are given appropriate 
consideration. First, com- 
mands should bring pre- 
dictability to deployments 
where possible. Defense 
planners must weigh the benefit of their new 
concepts for battlegroups that deploy almost 
randomly against new concepts of predictable 
"human maintenance" cycles that allow members 
genuine recuperation time. 

Under the PSCC concept, commands and 
agencies must view spouses as partners in pro- 
viding logistic support to uniformed personnel. 
Spouses should receive predeployment briefings 
alongside their servicemembers to prepare for per- 

sonal logistic and financial contingencies. Brief- 
ings should be held during nonworking hours, 
and childcare should be available. Similarly, relo- 
cation and housing offices should view spouses as 
the primary contacts during the relocation pro- 
cess, thereby easing the burden on service person- 
nel (and their commands). Bureaucratic obstacles 
such as power of attorney should be removed. 

DOD must also get serious about providing 
and adequately funding genuine support services 
for spouses. With a small investment in spouses' 
careers, DOD not only improves their morale 
but also increases members' income at minimal 
expense to taxpayers. Opportunities include hir- 
ing preferences for spouses in government jobs, 
incentives for defense contractors to hire military 
spouses, G.I. Bill portability, and access to mili- 
tary courses for spouses. 

Network Centric 

Commands and family support agencies 
must make their operations more accessible. 

90 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

157 th Air Refueling Wing (Dawn Finniss) 


Office hours and business approaches should be 
convenient to working spouses, and most busi- 
ness should be conducted over the phone or 
Internet. DOD Web sites should not be designed 
along service silos as lists of links to outside infor- 
mation; instead, families should receive genuine 
counseling and transact family business over 
one consolidated site. Job searches and financial 
management may be better handled by a central 
network than by individual FSCs. A network-cen- 
tric approach would also allow relocating spouses 
to fully access services at the new base, meaning 
they could find housing, child care, and jobs be- 
fore packing their bags. 

The consolidation of family support into a 
Pentagon-level joint command, possibly along 
with privatization at base offices, should be con- 
sidered. FSCs can more easily recruit staff as well 
as do a better job of sharing best practices across 
the services. Staff members must build relation- 
ships with semiofficial and unofficial organiza- 
tions even if it means spending several nights a 
week at FSC and spouse club meetings. Partly for 
this reason, it makes sense for FSCs to hire ac- 
tive-duty wives who are already involved in their 
community and understand their peers. An FSC 
should provide space, resources, and continuity 
for semiofficial support organizations instead of 
competing for attention. In that capacity, FSCs 
can also help direct and coordinate local civilian 
support for military families. 

Further, consideration should be given to 
merging FSCs and MWR organizations across ser- 
vices. Both organizations would benefit from lead- 
ership and representation at the Pentagon level, 
better tracking and methodological processes, 
economies of scale, and enhanced negotiating 
power in dealing with corporate sponsorships. 

The launch of the PSCC concept should ini- 
tiate critical research on the link between spouses 
and retention and ways to track the effectiveness 
of family programs. As these programs are devel- 
oped or revamped, methods must be developed 
to identify and share best practices and link them 
to retention and morale — the ultimate measure of 
return on investment. 

The keys to retention are to recognize that 
servicemembers are not draftees and to treat 
them as professionals with families and personal 
commitments. A relatively small investment in 
spouses could prevent a massive expenditure 
on bonuses to stave off a retention crisis, fol- 
lowed by an expensive campaign to recruit and 

train replacements. These transformation-based 
recommendations are only some of many excel- 
lent possibilities. Few require extra budget dollars, 
but all require an attitude adjustment toward 
spouses and an overarching strategy for genuinely 
addressing their needs. The military must be com- 
fortable dealing with spouses if it wishes to retain 
experienced, professional servicemembers and 
complete its mission. JFQ 


1 Norman J. Rabkin, "Preliminary Results of DOD's 
1999 Survey of Active Duty Members," testimony before 
the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee 
on Armed Services, House of Representatives (March 28, 
2000), 7. 

2 "Is There a Gap Between Military and Civilian 
Pay?" (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, Au- 
gust 18, 2000). 

3 Defense Manpower Data Center, "July 2002 Sta- 
tus of Forces Survey of Active-Duty Members," Report 
2002-021 duly 2002), 58-74, 94-96. 

4 Rabkin, 7. 

5 "July 2002 Status of Forces Survey," 118-121. 

6 "Perstempo: Does It Help or Hinder Reenlist- 
ment?" Research Brief RB-7532 (Santa Monica, CA: The 
RAND Corporation, 1999). 

7 "July 2002 Status of Forces Survey," 116. 

8 Ibid., 42-44, 56. 

9 Sheila Nataraj Kirby and Scott Naftel, "The Effect 
of Mobilization on Retention of Enlisted Reservists after 
ODS/S,” Report MR-943-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: The 
RAND Corporation, 1998), 29. 

10 James Hosek and Mark Totten, "Serving Away 
from Home: How Deployments Influence Reenlistment" 
(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2002). 

11 Morris Peterson, Army Personnel Survey Office, 
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and So- 
cial Sciences, "Survey of Army Families IV: Final Quick 
Summary" (January 2002), question 24. 

12 Richard Buddin, "Building a Personnel Support 
Agenda," Report MR-916-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: The 
RAND Corporation, 1998), 50-52. 

13 The RAND Corporation, "Defense Morale and 
Quality of Life Study" (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND 
Corporation, June 2001), 6-7. 

14 Rita Bureika et al., "Effective Strategies to Assist 
Spouses of Junior Enlisted Members with Employment: 
Analysis of the 1997 Survey of Spouses of Enlisted Per- 
sonnel," Defense Manpower Data Center (June 2000), 

15 Buddin, 7. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 91 

99 m Communications Squadron (Jeffrey Hall) 

Air defense platoon leader checking 
Patriot launcher coverage on range 
during Joint Red Flag 2005 

Here Today, Here to Stay 


T he Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
revamped joint officer management 
policies to improve the quality of of- 
ficers serving on joint staffs, the advice given to 
the Secretary of Defense, and the effectiveness of 
military operations. Joint officer management was 
one of the most contentious parts of that seminal 
legislation, but it established the educational, 
training, and operational basis for developing 
joint warfighting professionals who are adept at 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Coss, USA, is G-3 with 10 th Mountain 
Division and serves as CJ-3 with Combined Joint Task Force 76 in 
support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. 

leveraging the capabilities of the entire force to 
accomplish missions and tasks across the spec- 
trum of conflict. Indeed, the professional skills 
that emerged are largely responsible for recent 
military successes and portend continued excel- 
lence and vitality within the joint profession. 

Troops who fought together during Iraqi Free- 
dom are now training together to further enhance 
their joint capabilities at the point of the spear. 
The services are modularizing their forces, making 
them more dependent on the capabilities of the 
other services to create operational effects that 
directly contribute to achieving objectives. Also, 
combatant commands are reviewing strategic war 
plans, and the Joint Staff is revamping weapons 

92 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

C o s s 

procurement processes to improve strategic ca- 
pabilities. Joint operations are here to stay, and 
while the joint officer management system and 
joint organizations are not perfect, they do not 
require the major changes some have argued for. 

The Joint Profession 

It has taken nearly a generation to grow a 
cadre of joint officers and a body of joint knowl- 
edge, but managing this within a new joint war- 
fare profession as described 

while the joint officer by Don Snider would un- 

management system and joint dermme the progress made 

, thus far. Snider is correct in 

organizations are not perfect, identifying symptoms of the 
they do not require the major glacial pace of change, but 

changes some have argued for hls solutlons are question- 
able. He calls for legislation 
to create a new joint warfare 
profession, a new joint doctrine and education 
command, and a new joint personnel command. 1 

This article argues that we already have a 
joint profession and the processes to develop and 
manage the body of joint knowledge. It argues 
further that we do not need another joint bureau- 
cracy to manage the personnel system. Rather, we 
need to stay the course and continue to diffuse 
jointness broadly and to the lowest levels pos- 
sible. Only in this manner can we develop the 
largest, most competent set of joint professionals 
to wage modern war. From there we can develop 
and manage the associated knowledge and juris- 
dictions of the profession. Future conflicts will 
increasingly be characterized by decentralized op- 
erations, where interdependent joint capabilities 
and associated forces provide key advantages. 

A good definition for joint professionals would 
be those who are schooled in and practice the 
unique and expert competencies of joint warfare, 
and respond to its calling with moral service to 
the nation. 2 Joint warfare must also have "full au- 
thority over its own internal jurisdictions for the 
creation and adaptation of the profession's expert 
knowledge, and for the development and utiliza- 
tion of joint professionals." 3 

Current processes achieve this. An explicit 
process develops joint doctrine that provides 
and adapts the body of expert knowledge for this 
profession, and joint officer management policies 
and statutes provide for the development and 
utilization of the joint professionals themselves. 
And while these processes can be improved, they 
certainly meet the definitional characteristics 
required for a joint profession. 

Status of the Joint Profession 

Contemporary analysis of Operations Endur- 
ing Freedom and Iraqi Freedom suggests we are 
closer to realizing the joint warfight than ever 
before. Congressional testimony by Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and former Com- 
mander, U.S. Central Command, General Tommy 
Franks, USA, attributed operational success to 
the unprecedented jointness demonstrated by 
the entire force. At the tactical level, Soldiers and 
Airmen interoperated much better than in previ- 
ous conflicts, and General Franks developed an 
operational plan that relied on pushing jointness 
to increasingly lower levels. Additionally, recent 
testimony by both Commander, U.S. Joint Forces 
Command (JFCOM), who was in charge of col- 
lecting lessons learned, and Army War College 
historians and other analysts who conducted 
extensive research in theater also attributed the 
operational success to the unprecedented level of 
jointness exhibited during the operations. 

Conflicts require commanders who are 
skilled in their profession, are capable of com- 
manding and controlling their organizations and 
formations, and can exploit new technological ca- 
pabilities. During Iraqi Freedom, and increasingly 
since passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, 
success has depended on commanders who had 
joint expertise, commanded joint organizations, 
and had access to interoperable joint capabilities. 
In fact, modern warfare will continue to require a 
robust body of expert warfighters who are capable 
of using interoperable technologies networked 
across the joint force to achieve optimal solutions 
that apply all of the joint arms. 

Providing these expert warfighters requires 
the means to develop and manage the internal 
jurisdictions of the profession. These include the 
body of expert knowledge and the experts them- 
selves, but joint processes already capture the 
former by codifying the innovations with broad 
and enduring application into joint doctrine. 
And other joint processes, including the biannual 
review of the Unified Command Plan, implement 
changes to joint organizations and missions to 
better meet our global responsibilities. 

In a similar effort, JFCOM is reviewing the 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to explore 
doctrine and organizational changes, and parallel 
efforts are under way to strengthen the com- 
mand's role as the joint doctrine center for the 
entire force. The joint force is actively managing 
and adapting its internal jurisdictions over this 
body of expert knowledge. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 93 

■ jo 


Joint processes also provide adequate means 
to develop and manage the joint warfighting 
experts. These include education and training 
standards, joint assignment criteria, and quality 
controls that provide joint force commanders 
high caliber officers. Given these facts, a total re- 
vamping of the joint profession does not appear 
necessary as it was just prior to the passage of the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

Emerging Joint Culture 

The joint force has moved beyond the point 
where congressional action forced it to assign 
quality officers to joint billets. As a profession, 
the force has begun to manifest jointness in very 
principled ways. Joint culture shows how the at- 
titudes, values, and beliefs of the joint profession 
have evolved to mirror the evolution of joint war- 
fare. There have tradition- 
ally been four cultures — 
products of four services 
that tended to fight sepa- 
rately. As technology ad- 
vanced, it became prudent 
and often necessary to 
develop doctrine to deconflict the battlespace 
among the services by, for instance, establishing a 
fire support coordination line to separate air and 
ground fires from ground forces. 

In the 1980s, jointness started becoming a 
means to a more effective end. The AirLand Battle 
doctrine was progressive because it recognized 
the interdependent relationships air and land 
power had in defeating Soviet forces on the plains 
of Europe. 

Likewise, today's Army officers recognize 
their dependence on Air Force and Navy assets 
to provide more effective fires and conduct op- 
erational maneuver from strategic distances. De- 
veloping further trust is critical because these 
interdependencies will remain relevant given 
recent operations and emerging joint concepts. 
Conversely, Air Force and Navy operational fires, 
particularly aircraft, can be more effective when 
Army forces flush targets from restrictive and 
urban terrain or force them to mass, as demon- 
strated during recent conflicts. 

As the authors intended, war planning has 
also become more joint since the Goldwater- 
Nichols Act. Regional combatant commands, 
which are primarily responsible for developing 
and managing such plans, almost invariably de- 
velop fully integrated plans using the capabilities 
of each service. This interdependence continues 

Regional combatant commands 
almost invariably develop fully 
integrated plans using the 
capabilities of each service 

to make warfare more joint as it reshapes the at- 
titudes, values, and beliefs of our profession. 

Service identities remain strong and at the 
center of our capabilities, but they have been 
assuming a joint perspective to meet new war- 
fighting requirements. Indeed, service cultures are 
adapting to the whole joint force. 

The intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was 
to leverage the capabilities of the individual ser- 
vices to more effectively meet the requirements 
of the joint force as a whole. The operational 
challenge now is to take this to the level of joint 
interdependency, where service capabilities are 
combined to maximize their total capacity, rein- 
forcing their effects while minimizing their rela- 
tive vulnerabilities. 

The key provisions of the act established 
clear authorities for joint commanders and leg- 
islated a specific process to develop and man- 
age joint expertise within the officer corps. It 
clarified these authorities by placing the combat- 
ant commanders directly under the Secretary 
of Defense and requiring the services to assign 
all their combat forces to them. It established 
means to develop and manage joint expertise by 
legislating educational standards for the joint 
force, requirements for joint utilization tours, and 
specific standards to control the quality of joint 
officers. After nearly two decades, these factors 
have developed a joint profession, and we should 
examine them individually before recommending 
further improvements. 


The Goldwater-Nichols Act placed new em- 
phasis on joint organizations, empowered their 
commanders, and resourced them with quality 
officers from each service. This has contributed 
to the emergence of the joint profession. The 
emphasis on joint organizations recognized the 
necessity of employing integrated force packages. 
Lessons from the Vietnam War demonstrated that 
the Department of Defense (DOD) was not prop- 
erly organized to achieve the level of interoper- 
ability required. 

Placing the combatant commands directly 
below the Secretary in the chain of command 
and giving them authority to reorganize and 
command their forces have largely resolved this 
issue. Combatant commanders and subordinate 
joint task force (JTF) commanders have exercised 
this authority in their assigned missions, demon- 
strating the important contribution this reorga- 
nization offers. These joint organizations provide 


JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

C o s s 

Army Apache lifting off the structure in which quality officers from each 
USS Nassau during joint service practice the craft of joint warfighting. 

shipboard weapons New joint processes were another outgrowth 

and ordnance training, , , ' , „ T . , . 

February 2005 °f t ^ le Goldwater-Nichols Act. The legislation 

sought to provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and combatant commanders a stronger 
voice in determining requirements. The Joint Re- 
quirements Oversight Council (JROC), Military Ed- 
ucation Coordinating Committee, and integrated 
priority lists are examples of joint processes codi- 
fied after the act was passed. While these processes 
are not flawless, they help require the services to 
advance their interests within the joint context. 

This trend continues with the publication of 
Joint Operations Concepts, which provides a vision 
of future joint warfare and a conceptual frame- 
work from which future capability needs will be 
determined. Similarly, the Joint Capabilities Inte- 
gration and Develop- 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought men t System (jcids), 
to provide the Chairman and which replaces the re- 

combatant commanders a stronger quirements generation 
voice in determining requirements system, utilizes joint 

concepts, validated 
by experimentation, to derive and assess critical 
capabilities from a joint and operational perspec- 
tive and then determine capability gaps, shortfalls, 
and redundancies. 

Both Joint Operations Concepts and JCIDS 
further strengthen the Chairman's and combat- 
ant commanders' influence in developing joint 
capabilities. Each provides a means of grading the 
services in meeting joint capability needs and en- 
courages them to develop "born-joint" solutions. 
They further the development of joint culture 
and provide additional means for joint profes- 
sionals to practice their craft. 

Education and Training 

The education and training of joint officers 
provide the foundation for enhancing these orga- 
nizations and processes. The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act established joint officer management poli- 
cies and joint professional military education 
programs that required subsequent employment 
in joint-coded billets. To establish and maintain 
quality across service programs, it also required 
the Secretary to revise the curriculum of each 
school periodically "to strengthen the focus on 
joint matters and on preparing officers for joint 
duty assignments.” Such refinements have es- 
sentially established an education process for the 
joint force, including general and flag officers. 

First, service staff colleges expose selected 
officers to the fundamentals of jointness prior 
to joint assignments. Students learn about joint 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 95 

USS Nassau (Brian McFadden) 

■ joint professionals 

Pre-mission briefing on organizations and processes and how to meet the 
operational and tactical strategic and operational requirements of corn- 
effectiveness through batant commands. Additionally, Joint Forces Staff 
joint integrated training College (National Defense University at Norfolk, 
Virginia) provides officers more detailed educa- 
tion while they are assigned or en route to joint 
billets. It provides in-depth exposure to the pro- 
cesses and procedures they will need to function 
in combatant command headquarters. 

Next, the senior service colleges and the Na- 
tional Defense University's National War College 
and Industrial College of the Armed Forces teach 
the strategic art of developing and practicing 
national security strategy and policy and of com- 
manding joint organizations. Finally, general and 
flag officers receive further instruction on how to 
plan and employ forces in joint and combined 
operations in a variety of courses and continuing 
educational programs. 

This training helps prepare officers to serve 
in joint billets, but actually serving is the primary 
means for developing the appreciation and exper- 
tise for employing the joint force. Before detailing 
the benefits of this on-the-job-training, how well 
does the joint curriculum prepare officers for 
joint assignments? 

Instruction at the captain/major and lieuten- 
ant/lieutenant commander level provides the 
basics of national military capabilities and com- 
mand structure, joint doctrine, joint and multina- 
tional forces at the operational level, joint plan- 
ning and execution processes, and information 

operations. It also introduces national security 
and military strategy in developing theater strate- 
gies, theater engagement and campaign planning 
with joint and multinational and interagency or- 
ganizations, the Joint Strategic Planning System, 
the Joint Operations Planning and Execution Sys- 
tem, and operational-level battlespace systems in- 
tegration through deliberate and crisis planning. 

These subjects are addressed more fully at 
the senior service colleges and the National De- 
fense University, where military leaders prepare 
for joint service at the highest levels. These ven- 
ues educate leaders on national security respon- 
sibilities in joint, multinational, and interagency 
settings — what is now called integrated opera- 
tions — through teaching, research, and outreach. 

Finally, the general/flag officer instruction 
teaches national security strategy and the joint 
operational art. The first overall joint flag course 
is known as Capstone, an intensive 6-week course 
examining national security decisionmaking, mil- 
itary strategy, joint/combined doctrine, interoper- 
ability, and allied-nation issues. The JFCOM role 
as the joint force trainer and integrator has led 
the command to host a portion of the Capstone 
training so all rising flag officers receive more 
specific instruction on how to operate as JTF 
commanders. It also conducts refresher training 
for all selected three-star commanders consistent 
with its view that the business of flag officers is 
commanding joint formations. 

Such training is necessary but not sufficient. 
It teaches the basic structures, organizations, and 
statutes on which the joint system is founded but 
cannot deliver the in-depth warfighting knowl- 
edge joint commanders need. That comes only 
after an officer is well versed in the skills of his 
service and rises to a level where he applies those 
skills in a joint context. A fundamental strength 
of our system is that the services provide the joint 
community with officers who are adept at their 
service core competencies prior to developing 
joint competencies. 

The services teach the basic skills the joint 
force requires. It is akin to offensive blocking and 
defensive tackling in football where the groups 
must master their fundamentals, play as a team, 
and depend on each other to interoperate and 
win. A quarterback or coach must be skilled in 
the fundamentals of the game yet need not be an 
expert in every facet — just in knowing how the 
parts interoperate. 

The joint force is similar. The services are 
adept at providing skilled offensive and defensive 


JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

C o s s 

players, and from those we select the most quali- 
fied to coach our formations. The services remain 
at the center of the process for developing joint 
professionals as they retain control and promote 
their best officers. 

Due to the Goldwater-Nichols quality stan- 
dards for officers in joint billets, service compe- 
tency has become a prerequisite to the joint tran- 
sition. These standards provide joint commanders 
the quality officers from each service, and as they 
serve in joint billets and train and fight within a 
joint context, they develop the expertise to fight 
the joint force. This on-the-job training — practi- 
cal joint experience — is key to developing the 
expert knowledge and jurisdiction of the joint 

Joint Assignments 

There is no substitute for experiential learn- 
ing, especially in the joint warfighting profession, 
which relies on officers bonding by serving in 
joint organizations charged with accomplish- 
ing real-world missions. Joint professionals are 
expected to cast aside service prejudices. In the 
process, they learn more about their sister services 
than is possible in the classroom. 

Officers in joint assignments typically serve 
on three types of staffs: the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense or Joint Staff in Washington, combat- 
ant commander staffs across the globe, or defense 
agency staffs. Joint task forces 
the services teach the basic are a subset of the second cat- 
skills the joint force requires egory and are established to 

accomplish specific missions. 
Each of these staffs, however, develops joint offi- 
cers by enabling them to work with the other ser- 
vices to accomplish military missions, which gives 
them the expertise to produce and manage joint 
doctrine, perform joint assignments, and work in 
other joint jurisdictions. 

Additional joint expertise comes from the 
services' training programs as well as from the 
Chairman's Joint Training and Exercise Program. 
Such exercises occur at combat training and flight 
centers, while others are conducted by JFCOM 
and other combatant commands. During many of 
these drills, the services practice their core compe- 
tencies in the context of joint warfare. These ven- 
ues increasingly apply combined and joint arms 
in accomplishing missions on the battlefield. 

Quality Controls 

The quality standards in the Goldwater- 
Nichols Act require that officers serving in joint 

billets be promoted at rates equal to or higher 
than those on service staffs. Furthermore, the 
act established Congress as the watchdog for 
monitoring service compliance by requiring 
annual promotion reports. Although the services 
continue to miss select portions of the quotas, 
this problem is generally on the margins, and 
these joint staffs largely continue to be populated 
by each of the services' brightest officers. This is 
due to the assignment process itself, incentives to 
serve in joint billets, and the growing importance 
of joint warfare. 

The services remain at the center of the 
assignment process, and since they run their 
own promotion boards, those they select for 
advancement are generally the most qualified 
in their own core competencies. Because the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act stipulated the promotion 
rate, assignment detailers are constrained 
to nominate officers of at least comparable 
quality to both service and joint assignments. 
But congressional oversight has caused the 
services to become risk-averse where jointness is 
concerned, so the joint staffs routinely receive 
the higher quality. 

Next, Goldwater-Nichols has worked because 
it incentivizes officers to serve in joint billets. 
The reasons are threefold. First, officers compete 
for joint assignments because they bring more 
status than assignments on service staffs. Second, 
most joint assignments have an operational 
flavor that is generally preferred over service 
staff assignments. Finally, such assignments are 
required to achieve general or flag rank. 

Another reason quality has gravitated to 
joint staffs is that fighting jointly has become 
more important, and a service often receives 
missions in proportion to its participation in 
planning and execution. A service provides its 
better officers to joint staffs because it is most able 
to protect and advance its institutional interests 
in that environment. Essentially, the services 
compete so some of their brightest officers have 
the opportunity to perform in this increasingly 
important environment. In turn, those officers 
help the service compete for premier missions. 

This profession recognizes that fighting 
jointly is the only effective way to win in 21 st - 
century warfare. There is an active effort to 
develop and internalize the joint skills needed, 
and the military must preserve its quality 
management system. Preserving the system 
ensures that joint force commanders will continue 
to receive only the most qualified officers, who 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 97 

■ joint professionals 

can then contribute to the growing body of 
knowledge concerning modern warfare. 

Improvements Needed 

Given the joint context in which future 
wars will be decided, the wisest course is to 
continue managing joint knowledge at the 
broadest level while diffusing jointness to the 
lowest level necessary. This provides the widest 
dissemination of knowledge and prepares the 
overall force more fully for joint warfare. It also 
allows for quicker experimentation, validation, 
and dissemination of emerging ideas to enhance 
the body of joint knowledge. Finally, it offers the 
widest base to develop and select joint experts for 
staff and command positions. Two changes would 
dramatically help accomplish this. 

First, we must better leverage the joint 
lessons learned (JLL) from previous exercises 
and operations by establishing a Joint Doctrine 
and Capabilities Center that links training and 

education to joint experimentation and analysis 
to help inform and shape the development of 
future joint capabilities. This will ensure that we 
maintain and properly promulgate the body of 
expert knowledge our joint profession requires. 

Second, we must create more standing joint 
task forces to confront growing demand. This will 
better meet combatant command requirements 
and allow officers to fashion greater capacities for 
employing all joint instruments while preserving 
service core competencies. These changes 
will maintain the joint profession and create 
conditions where jointness truly becomes the 
means to more effective military operations. 

Joint Doctrine and Capabilities Center 

The first step to establishing more effective 
processes for incorporating JLL and doctrine is to 
make JFCOM the standing repository for linking 
service and joint lessons learned. Further, to 
properly translate such lessons into doctrine and 
capability requirements, JFCOM must continue to 
transform into the Joint Doctrine and Capabilities 
Center for the joint force. This will improve the 
development and promulgation of joint doctrine, 
requirements, and capabilities by allowing the 
joint force provider to validate them, especially 
when compared to the complex systems we 
currently use. 

With this authority, JFCOM would formulate, 
staff, and approve the joint doctrine, requirements, 
and capabilities the joint force needs. Placing the 
service component command elements involved 
in these areas directly under JFCOM would greatly 
facilitate this. 

Air Combat Command and Fleet Forces 
Command already serve as the JFCOM Air Force 
and Navy component commands, and they also 
help develop these services' doctrine and tactical 
fighter and ship requirements. These commands 
could be expanded to look more holistically at 
global requirements to resource the entire air and 
naval forces while retaining their force provider 
roles. The Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) and the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command develop Army and 
Marine Corps doctrine and requirements, and the 
components of these commands that perform this 
mission in a joint context could be transferred to 
JFCOM to establish joint requirements for land 
and littoral forces. 

For the Army, this would require a 
fundamental reorganization of both TRADOC 
and Forces Command, but that may be long 

98 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

C o s s 

overdue. The other services have developed agile 
doctrine and requirements shops within their 
JFCOM component commands that also serve as 
force providers, and the Army and Marine Corps 
should as well. 

JFCOM provides the most likely place to 
integrate these functions for the joint force. It 
is already the joint force provider, integrator, 
and trainer and serves as the executive agent for 
joint experimentation. Additionally, the Secretary 
has used it to gather the lessons learned from 
recent conflicts — a testament to the importance 
he places on gathering a joint perspective of 
future requirements. JFCOM could blend the 
lessons learned into doctrine and a vision of 
future capabilities while still allowing the services 
to compete in both defining and fielding the 
solution sets. 

The solution sets would still need to be 
reviewed and validated by JROC prior to service 
acquisition. That would help ensure proper 
synchronization with other service and joint 
interoperability requirements. To level the playing 
field, JFCOM should have a formal seat at JROC 
to ensure that joint capabilities get equal billing. 

The advantages of this system lie in creating 
standing and dedicated analysts to manage each 
capability area and having a more impartial 
joint forum to advance the solution sets. These 
forums could establish the joint standards each 
solution set must meet, a step missing from the 
separate service approaches, and these could 
be programmed and then procured within the 
current planning, programming, budgeting, and 
execution processes already in place. 

JFCOM provides a level of impartiality 
in developing joint doctrine and requirements 
since it is a joint headquarters. The time has 
come to permanently assign it the mission of 
developing the joint doctrine and capabilities the 
joint force needs. 

Standing Joint Headquarters 

Recent operations have shown that 
the U.S. Armed Forces are still not organized 
to fully prosecute joint operations. The four- 
star combatant command headquarters was 
established as the joint organization that 
executes enduring missions assigned to unified 
commanders. For more time-sensitive missions, 
combatant commanders have the authority to 
create joint task forces; however, manning them 
has been ad hoc and strains the services that 
must provide the personnel. As an example, DOD 

had some 35 standing JTFs in 2004. In Enduring 
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom alone, U.S. Central 
Command was augmented with over 3,000 
additional billets it deemed necessary. Judging by 
the progress, these JTFs appear more permanent 
than temporary, yet they are still filled in an ad 
hoc manner. 

The time has come for the joint force to 
be permanently organized at levels lower than 
the combatant command headquarters. As a 
start, each of the services' three-star headquarters 
should be reorganized into joint headquarters. 
That would establish a repository of deployable 
joint headquarters capable of meeting the growing 
demand for such elements without diverting 
officers from other valid requirements. It would 
preclude the need to form the JTFs in an ad hoc 
manner and foster the type of joint capabilities 
envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 

Jointness truly is the means to an end — 
successful military operations. Goldwater- 
Nichols moved the force dramatically forward 
by providing the organizational structure and 
joint officer management system, but it is now 
time to create a better process for developing and 
managing joint capabilities and doctrine and 
for prosecuting joint missions. We do not need 
to rewrite the Goldwater-Nichols Act to do this. 
Rather we must codify the lessons of ongoing 
operations by empowering JFCOM as the Joint 
Doctrine and Capabilities Center for the joint 
force and by establishing standing joint task force 
headquarters from the existing service component 
headquarters in each geographic and functional 
combatant command. These efforts will further 
enhance joint culture, improve joint warfighting, 
and strengthen the joint profession. JFQ 


1 For a description and argument for a new joint 
profession, see Don M. Snider, "Jointness, Defense 
Transformation, and the Need for a New Joint Warfare 
Profession," Parameters (Autumn 2003), 17-30. 

2 Ibid, 19. 

3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957); and Don 
M. Snider et al., eds., The Future of the Army Profession 
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 6-9, 15, 24-32. 

Do you have another point of view? Consider JFQ as 
an outlet. See for 

information on submitting articles and letters to the editor. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 99 

Joint Operations in 
the Southwest Pacific, 



I n the last strategically signifi- 
cant amphibious landing in the 
Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) 
during World War II, the Armed 
Forces landed 175,000 men — organized 
into I and XIV Corps — on a 20-mile 
stretch of beach on the Philippine is- 
land of Luzon. The operation capped 
a 2-year campaign that spanned thou- 
sands of miles of ocean and included 
73 amphibious assaults. While difficult, 
all of these landings and subsequent 
actions succeeded. Indeed, U.S. joint 

operations in SWPA — involving Army, 
Navy, and air assets — contributed sig- 
nificantly to Japan's defeat. 

The few historians who have 
treated joint operations in SWPA — 
most prefer the Marine Corps in the 
Central Pacific — fall into two schools. 
The larger and more traditional school 
argues that these operations succeeded 
because the area had an overall com- 
mander, General Douglas MacArthur, 
USA, who unified the services. The 
smaller and more recent school pins 

success on General Walter Krueger, 
USA, who not only helped develop 
joint operations doctrine in the inter- 
war era but also executed it as com- 
mander of U.S. Sixth Army. However, 
neither explanation is sufficient by 
itself. This article examines joint opera- 
tions prior to World War II and offers 
an explanation for the success of joint 
operations in SWPA despite the lack of 
joint doctrine and command. 

Reserved and Fastidious 
versus the Frontier Type 

The Army and Navy first seriously 
considered joint operations in the wake 
of the Spanish-American War. The 
campaign against Santiago de Cuba, 
in particular, starkly showed the two 
services that planning and executing 
joint operations required substantial in- 
vestment. Army and Navy commanders 
were subordinate to their own chains 
of command instead of unifying under 
a joint campaign commander. With no 
way to develop or coordinate a single 
plan, the services conceived their cam- 
paigns independently. With the Spanish 
squadron bottled up in Santiago Bay, for 

Kevin C. Holzimmer is assistant professor of comparative military studies at Air 
Command and Staff College. 

lOO JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

pjeno jseoo ST1 


example, Rear Admiral William Samp- 
son of the North Atlantic Squadron — 
described as a reserved and fastidious 
technician — suggested that the Army, 
under Major General William Shatter, 
take out the fortifications guarding the 
mouth of the bay so his ships could 
engage the Spanish fleet. Overweight, 
often profane, and called the "frontier 
type" by his biographer, Paul Carlson, 
Shatter wanted his V Corps to focus on 
capturing Santiago itself. 

These divergent views and per- 
sonalities led to poor coordination and 
likely prolonged the campaign. A short 
time later, even after the Spanish fleet 
had been sunk or grounded while at- 
tempting to escape, Sampson refused 
another request from the V Corps com- 
mander to bombard Santiago de Cuba 
and its fortifications on the grounds 
that the Army had not yet cleared the 
entrance of the bay so his ships could 
safely pass. 

Assessing the two commanders' 
roles in the ineffective joint operations, 
Carlson concluded that: 

[Shatter and Sampson] could not cooper- 
ate. Too often Shafter thought in terms of 
a frontier command where he alone held 
authority and did not, could not, share 
responsibility for success or failure of an 
expedition. Conditioned by such narrow 
thinking and piqued by the difficulties 
with Sampson, Shafter refused to recognize 
the equal role the Navy shared in the war. 
His position wrecked chances for a smooth 
campaign, but Shafter was not alone at 

fault. Sampson, too, possessed a short 
temper as well as a desire to claim the 
major honors for success in war. 1 

Just as the joint military opera- 
tion lacked an overall coherent strat- 
egy, the landing operations reflected 
a lack of prewar consideration. Ships 

were loaded in haphazard fashion, as- 
sembled from a wide variety of sources, 
and approached the landing sites with- 
out a standard operating procedure. 
Chaos marked the actual landing as 
the Army lacked adequate command 
and control procedures and enough 
boats. As William Atwater suggested: 

In sharp contrast to the relatively efficient 
Navy/Marine Corps landing at Guanta- 
namo, the Army and Navy in a slipshod 
operation barely managed to put ashore 
an expeditionary force at Daiquiri, about 
15 miles east of Santiago. The entire 
amphibious phase of this expedition was 
marked by inefficiency, inexperience, and 
simple incompetence. 2 

Two themes concerning joint op- 
erations emerged from the war with 
Spain. The first surrounds the tactical 
issue of procedures that govern load- 
ing, transporting, and landing troops 
on hostile shores. The second and more 
contentious theme involves command. 
As Shatter's and Sampson's divergent 
plans illustrate, deciding who com- 
mands joint operations is paramount. 
Throughout the first half of the 20 th 
century, the Army and Navy settled 
the first issue but not the second. They 
failed to articulate a doctrine for estab- 
lishing unified command structures 
in joint operations between the Span- 
ish-American War and World War II 
and beyond. 

Nevertheless, largely owing to 
joint operations problems in the war 
with Spain, the ser- 
vices did address the 
issue, specifically at 
the Army and Naval 
War Colleges and 
the Joint Army and 
Navy Board (created 
in 1903 and usually called the Joint 
Board). The Armed Forces published 
documents that addressed joint opera- 
tions throughout the early 20 th cen- 
tury. While many dealt with the tac- 
tical issue of landing procedures and 
made great strides in formalizing ways 
for the Army and Navy to reach and 

then assault beaches, none adequately 
addressed who would command the 
joint force. In fact, while the War and 
Navy Departments tried to create a 
common doctrine for joint command, 
the proposed solutions often caused 
more confusion. 

Cheerful Cooperation 

The years up to 1941 fall into 
three periods of thinking about joint 
command. The first was introduced 
by a 1905 Army and Naval War Col- 
lege study, Rules for Navy Convoy. Re- 
vised in 1917, the inquiry suggested 
that command arrangements in a joint 
operation should not rely on a single 
joint commander, but on cooperation, 
which Atwater described as "a form of 
command whereby neither . . . com- 
mander would be placed in an infe- 
rior position or be placed under the 
command of the other. Command is- 
sues would be settled by agreement 
and compromise . . . rather than by 
issuance of an order." 3 While pains 
were taken to define separate Army 
and Navy functions to minimize fric- 
tion, the War and Navy Departments 
never tackled exactly how this coop- 
eration would work under the stress 
of war. Instead they left command to 
the whims of individuals who were in 
actual command of their respective ser- 
vice components. An officer wrote in 
1910, "Above all else is the importance 
of a hearty and cheerful cooperation 
between the two services in all matters 
pertaining to these operations." 4 

The issue of command was further 
clouded, if relying on cheerfulness did 
not sufficiently cloud it, when Joint 
Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense 
(JANA) of 1920 replaced the principle 
of cooperation with that of paramount 
interest, which gave command to ei- 
ther an Army or Navy officer, based on 
which service "function and require- 
ments are, at the time, of the greater 
importance." In this second period, the 
joint commander had the authority 
to designate missions for both services 
while the subordinate commander 
did not yield actual command of his 

the Army and Navy failed to articulate a 
doctrine for establishing unified command 
structures in joint operations between the 
Spanish-American War and World War II 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ lOI 

■ joint operations in the southwest pacific 

own forces. Obviously that would 
only work with a common concep- 
tion of the circumstances making one's 
service functions and requirements 
of "greater importance." Neither edi- 
tion of JANA defined the parameters 
of "function and requirements." As 
Atwater concluded, "The problem in 
utilizing this form of coordination is 

case would have to be dealt with on 
its own merits." As the Santiago cam- 
paign made clear, two strong-willed 
individuals leading their own service 
components may have radically differ- 
ent notions. 

The third period in the evolution 
of joint command came after the fail- 
ure of a joint Army-Navy exercise in 
1938. As a result, Admiral Wil- 
liam Leahy, Chief of Naval Op- 
erations, suggested in the late 
1930s that the services should 
replace the unworkable system 
of paramount interest. He re- 
jected the principle of unity of 
command except through Presiden- 
tial mandate and instead advocated 
the old concept of cooperation. Gen- 
eral Malin Craig, Chief of Staff of the 
Army, agreed, and it was made official 

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander, Southwest 
Pacific, surveying beachhead on Leyte Island, 1944 

in Change Number 2 to Joint Action of 
the Army and Navy (1935) in 1938. The 
return to cooperation left the Armed 
Forces without a coherent doctrine of 
joint command on the eve of World 
War II. As Atwater pointed out, the 
adoption was a "tragic choice" that 
caused confusion not only for com- 
manders at Pearl Harbor who faced the 
Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, 
but also for leaders on the operational 
level who had to create and execute 
plans that would help translate tactical 
military victories into strategic wins. 

Moving against and landing troops 
on enemy-held beaches emerged as the 
only bright point in joint operations 
through the first half of the 20 th cen- 
tury. Both the Army and Navy worked 
the issue through extensive joint ma- 
neuvers and such publications as An 
Overseas Expedition (1923) and Joint 
Overseas Expeditions (1933). 5 Despite 
the success of amphibious landings, 
thorny issues of joint command were 
never settled beyond vague notions of 

Just as service leaders faced their 
tasks without a coherent and usable 
joint command doctrine, the internal 
command arrangements in SWPA did 
not foster an institutional or organiza- 
tional structure suitable for joint op- 
erations. While historians often assert 
that MacArthur was the de facto op- 
erational joint commander, the specific 
command arrangements suggest other- 
wise. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) — 
with the approval of President Franklin 
Roosevelt — limited MacArthur's ability 
to command troops assigned to him 
when SWPA was created in March 
1942. MacArthur was ineligible to di- 
rectly command any national force, 
unlike Admiral Chester Nimitz. 

Furthermore, MacArthur never at- 
tempted to act as a joint commander 
despite JCS restrictions. Nor did he ap- 
point one, although he had the author- 
ity. Instead, the SWPA commander's 
standard way of conducting an opera- 

landing troops on enemy-held 
beaches emerged as the only bright 
point in joint operations through 
the first half of the 20 th century 

how to define the circumstances under 
which it would apply and then assign- 
ing command to a particular service. 

What 'paramount interest' meant in a 
practical sense was that each specific 

102 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


tion was to provide a broad directive, 
stating both objectives and the forces 
available. It was then up to his lieuten- 
ants of all services to breathe life into 
his strategic plan. It was up to them to 
bury interservice rivalry. And it was up 
to them to plan, integrate, and execute 
the operation. In short, operations for 
all practical purposes fell under the 
challenging principle of cooperation 
rather than unity of command. 

An Attitude without 
Service Bias 

In light of the limitations that 
worked against joint operations — lack 
of joint operational doctrine and 
MacArthur's command structure — it 
is useful to consider how SWPA staffs 
planned joint operations before exam- 
ining why they succeeded. 

Although MacArthur was not the 
operational commander and refused 
to appoint one, he sought to establish 
a command system that was often a 
throwback to the principle of coop- 
eration. Subordinate organizations in- 
cluded three service commands: Allied 
Land Forces, Allied Naval Forces, and 
Allied Air Forces. Complicating this 
organization was that in early 1943, 
MacArthur designated his major Army 
formation, Sixth Army under General 
Walter Krueger, as Alamo Force, thereby 
keeping his ground forces independent 
of Allied Land Forces, led by Australian 
General Sir Thomas Blarney. The lead- 
ers of the Army, naval, and air units 
were to coordinate their planning in 
the absence of a joint task force com- 
mander. MacArthur's own instructions 
to his lieutenants betray the lack of 
doctrine or serious consideration of 
the demands of joint operations. His 
component commanders were to rely 
on "personal relationships" to plan 
and execute their missions. His head- 
quarters had "developed an attitude... 
without service bias," a notion many 
Navy, Marine, and Army Air Corps per- 
sonnel eventually found unlikely. 

In practice, MacArthur designated 
Krueger to coordinate planning for the 
ground, naval, and air forces. As the of- 

ficial Army historian put it, "Krueger's 
authority to coordinate planning gave 
him a preeminent position; he was first 
among equals.'' 6 Ironically, on arriving 
in early 1943, Krueger argued against 
MacArthur's command arrangement 
and urged the SWPA commander to 
adopt the principle of unity of com- 
mand. Throughout the interwar era, 
Krueger was one of the few officers 
who thought carefully about joint op- 
erations. As early as 1925, he concluded 
that unity of command must be ad- 
opted instead of the principles of mu- 
tual cooperation or paramount interest. 
Now working in a joint environment, 
Krueger found MacArthur's arrange- 
ment awkward at best and dangerous at 
worst. Nevertheless, MacArthur would 
not budge. From 1943 until the end 
of the war, when the bulk of offensive 
operations took place in SWPA, the 
services would have to cooperate de- 
spite differences in culture and perspec- 
tive. Krueger reflected in 1947 that "our 
command arrangements in [SWPAJ left 
a good deal to be desired. . . . There is 
no doubt in my mind that split com- 
mand, especially in a crisis, is fatal. 

To be sure, we had excellent coopera- 
tion — but we were lucky.'' 7 

Acting as coordinator, Krueger 
had to make the system work, lucky or 
not. After receiving MacArthur's broad 
directives — again usually covering 
objectives, mission, and forces — the 
principal commanders would offer any 
objections, which could be handled 
by letter, radio, or conference. Overall, 
however, the directives were accepted 
without much disagreement. 

Krueger would next assemble a 
joint planning group (JPG) within 
Sixth Army to work on the particular 
operation. Usually headed by Krueger's 
component operations staff officer, 
the group included members from 
the naval and air forces and met at 
Sixth Army headquarters. Krueger only 
intervened if the members could not 
solve their disagreements, which were 
usually interservice. Then he would 
consult his air and naval counterparts. 
As Krueger recalled, "It is remarkable 
that we always managed to adjust ex- 
isting differences, and it was this and 
the spirit of cooperation displayed by 
ground, naval, and air forces that made 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 103 

Troops watching U.S. and Japanese 
planes fighting while preparing to 
land on Leyte Island, October 1944 

it possible for us to operate as an Army- 
Navy-air forces team." 8 

Once JPG finalized its plan, it 
needed approval from the ground, 
naval, and air commanders, usually at 
a commanders' conference. Although 
Krueger suggested that "all spade work 
had as a rule been done by the joint 
planners [by conference time]," 9 there 
was often considerable haggling over 
issues that needed the attention of the 
commanders. Whether by telephone, 
radio, letter, or conference, divisive is- 
sues invariably got hammered out. 

Improving Coordination 

By examining an operation, we 
may obtain a clearer picture of the joint 
planning process in SWPA. The Hol- 
landia campaign ( Reckless ) merits con- 
sideration because it was conducted as 
the planning process began to mature. 

As the official Army historian pointed 
out, "Indeed, the planning for Hol- 
landia provides an excellent case study 
for most amphibious undertakings in 
the Southwest Pacific." 10 

While command in SWPA can- 
not be described as organizationally 
or structurally unified, other factors 
made the exercise difficult on the op- 
erational level not only for Hollandia, 
but also for other operations. Vice 
Admiral Daniel Barbey, commander 
of Seventh Amphibious Force, recalled 
the locations of the headquarters 
of the various commanders during 
Reckless planning: 

General MacArthur was in Brisbane, Aus- 
tralia. Admiral Nitnitz was in Pearl Har- 
bor. General Krueger, the commander of 
the Sixth Army . . . was at Finschhafen 
[Papua New Guinea]. General [Robert] 

Eichelberger, who would command the 
ground forces, was at Goodenough Island, 
three hundred miles to the eastward. My 
flagship was anchored at Buna, about 
midway between the two places. Air Force 
headquarters was at Brisbane, and the 
headquarters of those bits of the Austra- 
lian Navy that would operate under my 
command was at Melbourne. The various 
units of the Central Pacific Force that were 
involved were scattered from the Hawaiian 
Islands to the Solomons. 11 

MacArthur's headquarters was 
over 1,500 miles from Sixth Army's. 
"Joint planning," Barbey concluded, 
"posed more than the usual problems 
because of the great distances." 12 

Formal planning for Reckless began 
March 5, 1944, after the receipt of the 
general headquarters (GHQ) SWPA 
order, but actual planning began in the 

104 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 

U.S. Coast Guard 


wake of the Admiralty Islands success. 
According to Krueger, a series of confer- 
ences took place to refine the plan his 
JPG created. The meetings included 
the obligatory commanders' conference 
consisting of Major General Stephen 
Chamberlain, G-3, GHQ SWPA; Major 
General Ennis Whitehead, commander, 
Fifth Air Force; and Major General 
James Frink, commander, U.S. Service 
of Supply, along with Krueger and Bar- 
bey. Several days later, a task force com- 
manders' conference was held at Sixth 
Army headquarters at Finschhafen, at- 

whether by telephone, radio, letter, or 
conference, divisive issues invariably 
got hammered out 

tended by Fieutenant General Robert 
Eichelberger, commander, I Corps, who 
led one task force, and Brigadier Gen- 
eral Jens Doe, who led another. The 
commanders discussed the timing of 
D-day and H-hour, securing air supe- 
riority, shipping schedules, deception 
measures, naval support, command ar- 
rangements, and intelligence reports. 
More conferences followed, including 
one in Brisbane at GHQ SWPA and an- 
other involving Alamo Force and Sev- 
enth Amphibious Fleet. The last took 
place April 12 between the staffs of 
Krueger and Barbey on the headquar- 
ters ship of the fleet and apparently 
finalized shipping issues for the over- 
water movement of personnel, equip- 
ment, and supplies. The frank tone 
described in accounts of the meetings 
showed that if a joint atmosphere did 
not permeate GHQ SWPA, it existed at 
headquarters Sixth Army. 

While these conferences were 
important, they do not tell the whole 
story. The journal of Sixth Army head- 
quarters shows a steady stream of com- 
manders of all services coming and 
going throughout the planning of Reck- 
less, demonstrating a less formal yet 
intensive joint planning process than 
Krueger suggests. Distances between 
headquarters notwithstanding, these 
visits indicate the degree to which 

Army, Navy, and air leaders worked to 
forge a joint operational planning team. 

There were problems. Navy com- 
manders felt overshadowed by the Army 
in the planning process. During the 
Hollandia operation, Barbey suggested 
that the Army use a different landing 
beach than Krueger's staff offered and 
believed the Army was rejecting Navy 
advice. Krueger responded that Barbey 
was the one placing naval over military 
interests and offered a lengthy critique 
of Barbey's proposal. The Sixth Army 
commander reminded Barbey that 
while the beaches the admi- 
ral proposed would be bet- 
ter for the Navy, they would 
place the ground forces of 
Reckless "in a pocket from 
which they may find it ex- 
tremely difficult and time-consuming to 
extricate themselves in order to attain 
their objective." Nevertheless, Krueger 
admitted that the alternate site might 
indeed be better after "further study and 
reconnaissance." In the end, the Sixth 
Army site was used and proved the right 
choice. Having rejected Barbey's sugges- 
tion, Krueger told him, "While I am 
not unmindful of the naval difficulties 
you present, such as the necessity of 
minesweeping, I urge that you give seri- 
ous consideration to the disadvantages 
to the ground forces when the naval 
viewpoint is given undue weight in the 
selection of landing beaches." 13 

Such frank exchanges occurred 
not only in planning, but also as op- 
erations were ongoing. During the 
land campaign against the Japanese on 
Leyte, for example, planes of Fifth U.S. 
Air Force, commanded by Fieutenant 
General George Kenney, strafed Ameri- 
can troops. In a fit of anger, Krueger 
fired a radio message to Kenney blam- 
ing Fifth Air Force for deliberately at- 
tacking his men. Kenney reacted defen- 
sively. After a heated conversation with 
Krueger's chief of staff, he talked with 
Krueger personally. During this conver- 
sation, Krueger not only apologized for 
the accusations but also agreed to work 
with Kenney on improving coordina- 
tion between their services. 

The joint planning process for 
Hollandia, along with the Leyte in- 
cident, demonstrated that while the 
Navy sometimes felt shunned by the 
Army and there was interservice bick- 
ering over serious issues, overall plan- 
ning took place in a joint environment 
on the operational level largely due to 
Walter Krueger, who was responsible 
for planning. But beyond that, what 
enabled effective joint planning and 
execution remains unclear. One might 
argue that, unlike during the Spanish- 
American War, the personalities were 
more conducive to a joint environment 
so the principle of cooperation worked. 
But that thesis does not recognize that 
SWPA commanders could be as unco- 
operative as their counterparts 50 years 
before. Krueger was criticized as being 
stubborn and difficult to work with. 
Kenney was outspoken and confident 
to the point of arrogance. Barbey was 
known as self-serving and pushy. 

Military Managers and the 
Applicatory Method 

Neither personalities nor concepts 
of command arrangements in joint op- 
erations changed significantly after the 
Spanish-American War and therefore 
cannot account for the joint success in 
SWPA. However, both the way senior 
commanders viewed their profession 
and the manner in which high-ranking 
officers worked together did fundamen- 
tally change. What separates Sampson 
and Shatter from Krueger, Barbey, Ken- 
ney, and Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid 
in terms of organizing and executing 
joint operations is the rise in the early 
and middle 20 th century of what Morris 
Janowitz characterizes as the manage- 
rial style of military leadership. Janow- 
itz utilizes heroic and managerial styles 
to explain the modern professional 
officer corps: 

The history of the modern military es- 
tablishment can be described as a strug- 
gle between heroic leaders, who embody 
traditionalism and glory, and military 
"managers," who are concerned with the 
scientific and rational conduct of war. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 105 

■ joint operations in the southwest pacific 

This distinction is fundamental. The mili- 
tary manager reflects the scientific and 
pragmatic dimensions of warmaking; he 
is the professional with effective links to 
civilian society . 14 

What stands out is characteriza- 
tion of the military manager as "con- 
cerned with the scientific and ratio- 
nal conduct of war" and "pragmatic 

dimensions of warmaking." Also of 
note in Janowitz's thinking is the divi- 
sion of managerial style leaders into 
"skill groups," one being the staff of- 
ficer — "essentially a specialist in coor- 
dination." While not all senior com- 
manders in SWPA could be classified 
as solely staff officers, they were com- 
petent in staff work, as was manifested 
through the planning and execution of 
joint operations. 

To be an effective staff officer, one 
must cultivate the ability to commu- 
nicate and work with others. Explains 

Interpersonal skill is of the essence for 
those who must operate in the ever-chang- 
ing environment of the higher levels of 
military administration. . . . The results 
reveal that, for officers from all three ser- 
vices, the higher the administrative level, 
the greater the emphasis on interpersonal 
skill. . . . The conference technique is not 
a foreign importation, but an inevitable 
aspect of modern managerial techniques . 15 

The conferences and the overall 
dialogue between SWPA commanders 
betray the high degree of coordination 
and communication, especially com- 
pared to the Spanish-American War. 

While several institutions and fac- 
tors played a role in developing the 
managerial style, one stands out with 
regard to joint operations in SWPA: 
education, derived specifically from the 
Army and Naval War Colleges. Educa- 

tion — receiving information about a 
subject — does not mean the same thing 
as managerial style here. Shafter and 
Sampson, Civil War veterans, were well 
aware of the joint operations in that 
war. That knowledge did not translate 
into a joint working environment. An 
increased emphasis on the larger dimen- 
sions of strategy and operations at the 
war colleges contributed to the manage- 
rial style. However, the 
collective approach to 
learning and planning 
in professional mili- 
tary education (PME) 
no doubt helped turn 
officers from heroic to managerial lead- 
ers, particularly in its emphasis on the 
cooperative nature of managerial lead- 
ers. From their days at intermediate and 
senior service schools, these officers 
worked in groups and seminars, analyz- 
ing readings and lectures, planning and 
executing war games, and participat- 
ing in problem-solving exercises. Many 
activities involved joint considerations, 
and all were part of the applicatory 
method of instruction adopted by both 
war colleges in the early 20 th century. 
That method proved to be the most 
important mechanism of PME in creat- 
ing managerial officers and was vital to 
joint operations in the absence of joint 
doctrine and command arrangements. 

Modified from the German appli- 
catory method, the American version 
was an approach to solving military 
problems. Both the Army and Naval 
War Colleges adopted the same basic 
educational methodology in 1903 and 
1909, respectively. The first phase — the 
heart of the method — was the estimate 
of the situation, described by the Naval 
War College faculty as a "logical pro- 
cess of thought, which, applied to a 
concrete strategical or tactical problem, 
enables one to arrive at a definite stra- 
tegical or tactical decision." The early 
list that comprised the estimate incor- 
porated four considerations: the mis- 
sion; enemy force strength, disposition, 
and intentions; friendly force strength, 
disposition, and available courses of 
action; and the decision. 

The second phase of the applica- 
tory method was to translate the deci- 
sion into clear orders for subordinates. 
The third phase translated "the mental 
processes into action” for "carrying out 
on the field or in the game the tactical 
or strategical dispositions made in the 
order." In other words, the final phase 
evaluated the estimate of the situation 
and the orders to subordinates through 

While the colleges adopted the 
method in the early 20 th century, both 
schools had the goal of creating a truly 
corporate atmosphere from the be- 
ginning. Admiral Stephen Luce, first 
president of the Naval War College, 
remarked that in his institution, "Of- 
ficers meet together to discuss ques- 
tions pertaining to higher branches of 
their profession." 16 Similarly, the Army 
War College stressed that "solutions to 
problems were found by a group, not 
by the individual." 17 

In a lecture at the Naval War Col- 
lege in 1914, for example, Captain Wil- 
liam Sims, who became president in 
1917, expanded on Luce's vision, em- 
phasizing that the conference method 
of learning was central: "The War Col- 
lege is an organized body of naval of- 
ficers who are trying to arrive at the 
truth concerning the best methods of 
conducting war. . . . The basis of its 
methods of research is discussion. This 
discussion is free and frank. . . . The 
War College is a team." Contrasting 
the traditional method of command in 
which "the old man" made a decision 
on his own — a characteristic of the 
heroic leader — the "organized-team” 
concept promoted an atmosphere in 
which ideas were raised, discussed, 
and passed to the commander, who 
made the final decision based in part 
on his staff's work. Concluded Sims, 
"The conference method develops a 
real team spirit, and this makes every- 
thing else comparatively easy. The of- 
ficers feel that to them alone — to their 
team — is due the credit." 18 

The Army War College likewise 
fostered teamwork as an essential fea- 
ture of modern warfare. Extolling the 

senior commanders were competent in 
staff work, as was manifested through the 
planning and execution of joint operations 

106 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


Destruction of Admiral Cervera’s 
Spanish fleet off Santiago, Cuba, 1898 

virtues of joint effort for the General 
Staff as Sims did for the Navy, Major 
George C. Marshall lectured the college 
in 1922 about what makes a general 
staff officer, a position for which the 
college prepared students. He suggested 
that the Army needed the spirit of "per- 
fect cooperation" and "a sympathetic 
understanding with the other elements 
of the Army. . . . The success of the War 
Department General Staff, however, is 
believed to depend primarily on the 
diligent efforts of its membership to 
promote a spirit of cooperation and, 
most important of all, to develop and 
maintain a sympathetic attitude of un- 
derstanding with the services and line 
of the Army.” A successful commander 
is "aware of the vital importance of 
maintaining a spirit of good will and 

generous understanding among the 
officers of the command. He realizes 
the battle cannot be won without an 
harmonious, united effort." 19 An Army 
leader had to listen, understand, and 
work with his colleagues, skills that 
were taught and practiced by students 
both in Washington and Newport. 

Although both Sims and Marshall 
emphasized the need to work with 
one's own service, they taught a way 
of working within groups, including 
interservice groups. Within this frame- 
work of the applicatory system, stu- 
dents and faculty alike explored the 
possibilities and systemic shortcom- 
ings of joint operations within the War 
and Navy Departments. Krueger — who 
instructed at both colleges during the 
interwar period — taught that should 

the two services not formalize the is- 
sues of command in joint operations, 
they "must have a common, definite 
understanding of their respective func- 
tions in national defense and of the 
best method for attaining coordination 
in operations. . . . They must speak the 
same language." 20 This ability came in 
large part from PME offering a formal 
setting in which to analyze, discuss, 
and provide solutions via the appli- 
catory method. Reflecting on joint 
operations in SWPA, Krueger told the 
Armed Forces Staff College in 1947, 
"Many problems arising during the op- 
erations themselves, due to conflicting 
demands that seemed incapable of ad- 
justment, required much time, energy, 
and patience for solution . . . clearly 
[indicating] the vital necessity of close 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 107 

■ joint operations in the southwest pacific 

and sympathetic understanding ... of 
the powers, limitations, and require- 
ments of the other services ." 21 

With applicatory instruction in ad- 
vanced PME, it was no longer expected 
that leaders such as Shatter would by 
themselves formulate battle plans based 
on their own experience and expertise 
in complex joint operations. No lon- 
ger was the individualistic and heroic 
leader the ideal. Instead, officers col- 
lectively analyzed issues from a broader 
vantage point, seeking inputs from sis- 
ter-service counterparts. With the rise 
of the managerial style — introduced 
in part via PME — the commanders of 
SWPA defaulted to skills they acquired 
at the war colleges. Within a coopera- 
tive framework, they first analyzed the 
problem before planning and finally 
executing, perhaps not even recogniz- 
ing that the frontier individualism of 

Missing 9 

an issues 

Copies of back numbers of JFQ are 
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public institutions. Please send your 
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the old Army epitomized by Shafter 
had passed. The managerial style of 
leadership that allowed cooperation to 
work at all is what explains the success 
of joint operations in SWPA. 

Being military managers allowed 
SWPA leaders to function on the op- 
erational level without a unified com- 
mand structure or a history of joint 
doctrine. While the personal charac- 
teristics of Krueger, Kinkaid, and Ken- 
ney resembled those of Shafter and 
Sampson, their ability to settle per- 
sonal and professional differences dur- 
ing both planning and operations by 
conference, letter, radio, and telephone 
demonstrated the degree to which the 
managerial style had overtaken the 
senior military leadership. Facing the 
complexity of joint operations in the 
absence of a unified task force com- 
mander, the Army, Navy, and air com- 
manders resorted to the techniques of 
analyzing problems and decisionmak- 
ing they employed in the war colleges 
in the interwar period. The manage- 
rial style thus played its biggest role in 
SWPA in how the service commanders 
thought and solved problems. It was 
not doctrine, knowledge, or organiza- 
tion that played the decisive factor, but 
rather a mental outlook. JFQ 


1 Paul H. Carlson, "Pecos Bill": A Mili- 
tary Biography of William R. Shafter (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 

2 William Felix Atwater, "United States 
Army and Navy Development of Joint Land- 
ing Operations 1898-1942" (Ph.D. disserta- 
tion, Duke University, 1986, UMI order no. 
8718403), 8. 

3 Ibid., 22. 

4 Wyatt I. Selkirk, "The Co-Operation 
of Land and Sea Forces," Journal of the Mili- 
tary Service Institution of the United States 
(March-April 1910), 324. 

5 General Service Schools and Naval 
War College, An Overseas Expedition: A Joint 
Army and Navy Problem (Fort Leavenworth: 
General Service Schools Press, 1923); War 
Department and Navy Department, Joint Over- 
seas Expeditions (Washington, DC: Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1929, re. 1933). 

6 John Miller, Jr., "Cartwheel: The Re- 
duction of Rabaul," United States Army in 
World War II: The War in the Pacific (Wash- 
ington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military 
History, 1959), 26. 

7 Walter Krueger, letter to Oscar W. 
Griswold, February 14, 1947, Krueger Pa- 
pers, box 11, U.S. Military Academy, West 
Point, NY. 

8 Walter Krueger, From Down Under to 
Nippon: The Story of Sixth Army in World War 
II (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 
1953), 136-37. 

9 Ibid., 137. 

10 Robert R. Smith, "The Approach to 
the Philippines," United States Army in World 
War II: The War in the Pacific (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1979), 

11 Daniel E. Barbey, MacArthur’s Am- 
phibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Op- 
erations, 1943-1945 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval 
Institute Press, 1969), 159-160. 

12 Ibid., 159. 

13 Walter Krueger, letter to Daniel E. 
Barbey, March 26, 1944, Krueger Papers, box 
7, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. 

14 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Sol- 
dier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: 
The Free Press, 1971), 21. 

15 Ibid., 70-71. 

16 Stephen B. Luce, address to Naval 
War College, 1896, Naval War College Ar- 
chives, Record Group 1. 

17 Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Com- 
mand: A History of the U.S. Army War College 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: The Alumni Associa- 
tion of the U.S. Army War College, 1983), 

18 William S. Sims, "Naval War College 
Principles and Methods Applied Afloat," 
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 41, no. 2 
(March-April 1915), 386, 401. 

19 George C. Marshall, "The Develop- 
ment of the General Staff," lecture, Army 
War College, September 19, 1922, in The Pa- 
pers of George Catlett Marshall, volume 1, The 
Soldierly Spirit, ed. Larry I. Bland (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 

20 Walter Krueger, "Command: The Mil- 
itary Command System," lecture, Naval War 
College, 1930-1931, 23, Krueger Papers, box 
16, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. 

21 Walter Krueger, "Command Responsi- 
bilities in a Joint Operation," lecture, Armed 
Forces Staff College, April 18, 1947, 3-4, 
Krueger Papers, box 12, U.S. Military Acad- 
emy, West Point, NY. 

108 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


A Book Review 


Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions 
in Military Affairs and the 
Evidence of History 

by Colin S. Gray 
London: Frank Cass, 2002 
310 pp. $33.95 
| ISBN: 0-714-65186-9] 

trategy for Chaos by Colin S. 

Gray is an uneven work of good 
intentions. Its goal is to use the 
concepts of revolutions in military 
affairs (RMAs) and nonlinearity to 
improve understanding of war and 
strategy by balancing pure theory and 
the singularities of military history. Gray 
observes that social scientists have been 
prone to force square pegs of military 
history into round holes of theory 
regardless of the resulting distortions. 
Conversely, military historians have been 
chary of even modest generalizations 
from the historical record on the 
grounds that events are unique both in 
themselves and in context. Strategy for 
Chaos attempts to avoid erring in either 
direction by elucidating the "nature, 
structure, and dynamics" of both war 
and strategy while respecting history by 
reviewing the RMAs of the Napoleonic 
period, World War I, and the Cold War 
nuclear era. 

There is much that is sensible, 
praiseworthy, and even true in the 
resulting book. Gray argues, for example, 
that insofar as strategy and war are 
fundamentally about use of organized 
violence between opposing polities to 
achieve their conflicting ends, their 
natures have never changed, nor 
are they likely to regardless of how 
"revolutionary” alterations in warfighting 
may prove to be. Conversely, he insists 
that the character of war and strategy is 
"ever changing” in response to changes 
in society, economics, technology, 
and politics. 

Gray's first point was made repeatedly 
by Carl von Clausewitz, perhaps most 
memorably when he observed that war 
can have its own means or "grammar," 
but not its own ends or "logic." Gray's 
second point is more obvious to those 
who have lived through the emergence 
of nuclear weapons and airliners being 
flown into buildings than it may have 
been to Clausewitz. Both theoretical 
claims have broad empirical support and, 
taken together, offer a needed corrective 
to much of the conceptual and verbal 
excesses in the RMA and nonlinearity-of- 
war literature. Gray is right to condemn 
incautious assertions — even by American 
Secretaries of Defense — that precision 
munitions or cyberspace weapons are 
altering the nature of war or strategy. 

Nevertheless, the book is not entirely 
successful in laying out either theory or 
evidence. Because certain misconceptions 
have become so widespread in RMA 
debates, this review attempts to clarify 
two key points: the central implication 
of nonlinear dynamics for war and 
strategy, and the historical origins of the 
RMA hypothesis in the Department of 
Defense (DOD). 

Gray's deepest concern about 
nonlinearity and strategy is their seeming 
incompatibility. If war is chaotic, how can 
purposeful strategy be possible? Gray's 

solution is to argue that "the proposition 
that it is the nature of war to be chaotic 
[is] an insightful fallacy. ... A misreading 
of Clausewitz on the importance of 
friction, chance, risk, and uncertainty in 
war, combined with an appreciation of 
the chaotic conditions of actual combat, 
has encouraged a newly orthodox view 
that chaos rules in war and, in reality, 
over strategy." This orthodoxy, he 
concludes, is mistaken. 

The main argument behind these 
conclusions is in Gray's fourth chapter. 
Given the confusion between nonlinear 
and complex-adaptive systems evident 
in phrases such as "chaos-complexity- 
nonlinearity theory,” Gray's reasoning 
is not easy to follow. For example, he 
appears unaware that the dynamical 
systems of physics, whether linear or 
nonlinear, process information strictly 
through mechanical iteration, whereas 
complex-adaptive systems such as 
humans and stock markets look for 
regularities or patterns that can be 
condensed into schemata describing 
aspects of reality and then act on those 
schemata, a radically different way of 
processing information. Moreover, he 
concedes that "strategy is nonlinear 
in that strategic consequences, 
or effectiveness, can show radical 
discontinuities." Such discontinuities 
clearly suggest a loss of universal 
predictability in strategy, which is a 
key feature of nonlinear systems. Yet 
Gray also insists that "much of strategic 
behavior is linear” and subject to 
"sensible prediction," and therefore 
purposeful predictive strategy can 
confound chaos. In summarizing his 
assessment of three historical RMAs — 
Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, 
and the Soviet Union in the nuclear era — 
he argues that all three were "massively 
overmatched by their enemies," which 
is to say that "the bigger battalions" 
eventually won all three contests. 

Ignored, however, are cases such as the 
American failure in Vietnam and the 
Spanish conquest of the Incas in which 
the bigger battalions lost. 

The larger question in Strategy 
for Chaos is whether the absence of 

Lieutenant Colonel Barry Watts, USAF (Ret.), is a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments. 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 109 

■ off the shelf 

universal predictability for combat 
outcomes renders strategy moot. This 
reviewer's answer is a resounding no. If 
combat outcomes were computationally 
reducible in the way the movements 
of the planets around the sun are, then 
appropriately programmed computers 
could replace strategists. War's 
nonlinearities are what make strategy an 
art, demanding rare levels of discernment 
and judgment (Clausewitz's coup d'oeil). 
Rather than rejecting nonlinearity 
in strategy, Gray the strategist ought 
to embrace it. But like 18 th - and 19 th - 
century physicists such as Pierre Simon 
de Laplace, he feels compelled to 
insist that strategy is for the most part 
predictable, when in truth predictability 
can vanish in the next moment with 
devastating strategic consequences. 

Turning to the origins of RMA 
discussions in DOD, Gray asserts 
that "various official and commercial 
patrons ... in the 1990s undoubtedly 
were motivated largely by parochial — 
albeit legitimate — concerns of U.S. 
defence policy and even simply by 
business opportunity." Given his 
acknowledgement of Andrew Marshall's 
role in pushing him to declare where 
he stands on the RMA debate, this 
denigrating characterization of how and 
why the debate emerged does not reflect 
the facts as this reviewer understands 
them. After Marshall became the Director 
of Net Assessment in 1973, he saw 
the need to develop plausible Soviet 
assessments of the nuclear competition 
with the United States and the military 
balance in Europe. While that effort took 
over a decade to mature, it became the 
single most important body of research 
he pursued from 1973 to the end of the 
Cold War. Besides a substantial impact on 
the major assessments Marshall's office 
produced during the 1980s, this research 
also provided insight into Soviet thinking 
about past and future military-technical 
revolutions (MTRs). 

Reflection on Soviet theorizing 
together with ongoing technical 
advances in guided weapons, sensors, and 
automated control systems led Marshall, 
through the late-1980s Commission 

on Long-Term Integrated Strategy, to 
conclude that changes in the conduct of 
war lay ahead. Further, based on historical 
research into the period 1918-1939, 
he suspected that these changes, when 
integrated with new operational concepts 
and organizational arrangements, 
would be as significant for war's conduct 
as was the rise of blitzkrieg, strategic 
bombardment, and carrier aviation 
during the interwar period. Marshall’s 
subsequent decision to undertake an 
MTR assessment for the Secretary of 
Defense, far from being either parochial 
or casual, was made for the eminently 
serious purpose of alerting senior DOD 
decisionmakers to prospective changes in 
the conduct of war. Moreover, Marshall 
substituted the term revolution in military 
affairs for MTR in July 1993 to emphasize 
the importance of operational concepts 
and organizational adaptations in turning 
technological advances into greater 
military effectiveness. Strategy for Chaos 
distorts the origins of the RMA debate by 
ignoring this early history. 

Contrary to Gray's claim that the 
debate was merely about definitions, 
Marshall's choice of the term hypothesis 
to refer to the possibility of far-reaching 
changes in war signified that the 
reality and character of the conjectured 
revolution were matters of fact. Gray's 
argument that RMAs are moot unless 
they can directly produce victory is itself 
predicated on a definitional sleight of 
hand, namely conflating strategic and 
military effectiveness. 

Williamson Murray's assessment 
that Strategy for Chaos "has framed 
debate about RMAs for the foreseeable 
future" seems overblown. First, the 
changes in American military practice 
from 1991 to 2003, of which growing 
reliance on guided weapons is but the 
tip of the iceberg, are too substantial 
to be dismissed on such grounds as the 
weakness of Arab opponents. Gray may 
be correct in arguing that the military's 
growing use of guided weapons does not 
equate to an order-of-magnitude increase 
in strategic effectiveness, but there 
seems little doubt that such increases 
in military effectiveness have occurred. 

Second, there are historical cases in 
which increases in military effectiveness 
did drive the strategic outcome. Again, 
the conquest of Amerindian civilizations 
in the early 1500s is nigh impossible to 
explain without acknowledging the roles 
of Spanish weaponry (including horses), 
tactical cohesion, and military culture. In 
the Andes, for example, Spanish tactical 
superiority crushed Incan forces time and 
again no matter how heroic, tenacious, 
skillfully led, or numerically superior 
they were. 

Despite these objections, Strategy for 
Chaos will be of interest to those who 
follow the RMA debate. The book is an 
invaluable goad for thoughtful readers 
to think beyond the RMA bumper 
stickers and slogans Gray rightly 
condemns and to determine their own 
positions on the subject. JFQ 

A Book Review 


The Modern Prince: 

What Leaders Need to Know Now 

by Carnes Lord 

New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003 
304 pp. $26.00 
[ISBN: 0-3001-0007-8] 

F or a variety of reasons, ranging 
from swinging academic trends 
to the democratic dislike of great 
men, the study of leadership is not a 
popular field in modern political science. 
Carnes Lord offers a valuable work that 
goes against the prevailing fashion and 
underscores the importance of leadership 
in modern politics. The author, a 
professor of strategy at the Naval War 
College in Newport, Rhode Island, brings 
to his work an impressive scholarship 
combined with extensive policy 

Jakub J. Grygiel is assistant professor of 
international relations at the Paul H. Nitze 
School of Advanced International Studies at 
The Johns Hopkins University. 

IIO JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


experience in the executive branch. 

The Modern Prince is a highly readable 
book in which classical wisdom on 
leadership is incorporated with modern 
examples of leaders. The result is a work 
that analyzes such political theorists as 
Aristotle, Tocqueville, James Madison, 
John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and 
Machiavelli — and illustrates its points 
using 20 th -century leaders from Bill 
Clinton to Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and 
France's Charles de Gaulle. 

The methodology is analogous to that 
of the original Prince, written by Niccolo 
Machiavelli. Like Carnes Lord, the 
Florentine was a practitioner of politics, 
but also, and most famously, a writer and 
political theorist in 15 th -and 16 th -century 
Italy. The purpose of Machiavelli's 
Prince was to present, as he wrote in the 
dedication, "knowledge of the deeds of 
great men which I have acquired through 
a long experience of modern events and 
a constant study of the past." Lord does 
exactly that, updating both the "modern 
events" and the "past" to reflect current 
political life. 

The subject of The Modem Prince is 
leadership. Lord begins by justifying 
the need for leadership in a democracy. 
There is a strong temptation to look at 

history as an effect of impersonal forces, 
not individuals. Democracies, according 
to this view, are ruled by laws, not men, 
and consequently great leaders are not 
necessary for the well-functioning of 
the state. But, as Lord observes, the 
tendency in many modern democracies 
is the opposite: the executive power is 
becoming stronger, underscoring the 
importance of knowing what leaders are 
expected to do, what skills they need, 
and what their strategic priority should 
be. Moreover, democracies need leaders, 
especially in moments of crisis when 
"authoritative decisionmaking" capable 
of resolving dangerous disputes between 
different interests is indispensable 
for the survival of the polity. Finally, 
leaders are necessary because, in Lord's 
words, they are "a vital mechanism for 
bringing political knowledge to bear on 
the business of politics." This political 
knowledge is the key to understanding 
the meaning of leadership. 

What then should the "modern 
prince" know? Lord shuffles through 
the areas of indispensable knowledge, 
from understanding strengths and 
weaknesses of democracies to the 
ability to manage elites in a society. On 
a fundamental level, great leadership 



% Prince 





Carnes Lord 

means a combination of what the 
ancients defined as ars gerendi and ars 
administrandi, which loosely translate 
to the art of leadership and the art of 
administration, strategy, tactics, vision, 
and management. 

The leader — the prince — cannot limit 
his knowledge to one or the other because 
that would imply knowing how to 
administer politics without knowing the 
goal, or vice versa, knowing the objective 
but being ignorant of how to attain it. 
Because leaders must be adept at both 
vision and management, what they need, 

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issue thirty-eight / JFQ I'll 

■ off the shelf 

according to Lord, is common sense. 
Writing about strategy, which is one 
aspect of leadership, Lord argues that it 
"is a plan of action; it applies means or 
resources to achieve a certain end; and it 
presupposes an adversary. Understood in 
such terms, strategy is really an element 
of common sense, something that 
pervades much of daily life." Leadership, 
therefore, is grounded in common sense. 
Specifically, it needs prudence, which is 
"the faculty we use in applying general 
principles to particular circumstance that 
require decision and action." 

The Aristotelian virtue of prudence 
is very different from what we moderns 
expect from policymakers. It is not 
expertise. Leaders should not, and 
cannot, be foreign policy, regional, social 
policy, or economic experts. Leadership is 
not mathematical knowledge and leaders 
are not technocrats. But they must 
possess a reasoned knowledge that allows 
them to choose among the various policy 
options that are presented to them. As 
an example, the President cannot be an 
expert in every field of policy under his 
control, but he needs sound judgment in 
the choice of his advisers. They are the 
experts; he is the leader. As Lord writes, 
leaders are "general contractors" of sorts: 

[They] do not have detailed knowledge of 
all the crafts that are needed to build a 
house. What they must know, rather, is how 
to coordinate and integrate the activities 
of the specialized craftsmen who work for 
them. And, equally important, they must be 
capable of judging the final products of these 
craftsmen, in terms both of their intrinsic 
excellence and of their contribution to the 
success of the overall enterprise. 

In fact, there is a danger in experts 
taking over the decisionmaking 
process. Experts, by the nature of their 
specialization, are more prone to see 
only the interests of their own field and 
are reluctant to make decisions on the 
basis of the "common good." Lord gives 
the example of the scientific community 
being unable, and perhaps unwilling, 
to stop the "morally monstrous 
undertaking" of human cloning, in large 

measure because of the belief in the need 
to continue scientific progress regardless 
of its social, human, and moral costs. 

It is in such cases that leadership — or 
prudential judgment — is most needed to 
preserve the common weal. 

How does one acquire common sense 
or prudence? It appears deceivingly 
easy, in large measure because it does 
not require struggling through degrees, 
academic theories, or books. In fact, 
prudent judgment cannot be attained, 
according to Lord, in a library or a 
school. It is not a technical expertise that 
can be studied as one studies architecture 
or economics. Prudence, or reasoned 
knowledge, is a rare talent, similar to 
another characteristic of leadership, 
charisma. And there is no easy formula 
to acquire prudence. Lord again cites 
Aristotle, who argued that prudence 
could be developed only through 

Carnes Lord concludes by 
examining the main challenges faced 
by democracies. This final chapter is a 
modern version of the last chapter of 
the Prince, which Machiavelli wrote as 
an "exhortation to liberate Italy from 
the barbarians." In the 15 th and 16 th 
centuries, Italy was divided among 
several city-states, unable to offer a 
united front to the growing powers 
of Spain and France. Luckily, modern 
democracies are prospering and do not 
appear near collapse, but Lord cautions 
against complacency. In chapter 26, 
he exhorts us to "preserve democracy 
from the barbarians." Democracies may 
appear stable, but like past regimes, they 
are also prone to collapse under external 
or internal pressures. The external threats 
are perhaps the most evident. Over the 
past few years, the "holy warriors of a 
radicalized Islam are . . . the obvious 
barbarians at the gates of the new 
Rome of Western liberalism." But the 
threats to democracy come also from 
within, in the form of unassimilated 
minorities from immigration or decay 
of democratic ideals and practice. Lord 
is particularly critical of the rise of 
plebiscitary leadership, which leads to 
decisions based on public opinion polls 

and the abdication of difficult decisions, 
especially in science and technology. 

The Modern Prince makes ancient 
wisdom accessible and relevant to 
modern policymakers. It brings back to 
political science insights that have been 
lost amidst sterile academic theories. In 
many ways, the greatest praise for this 
book is the fact that it restores rather 
than innovates. JFQ 

A Book Review 


A War of a Different Kind: 
Military Force and America's 
Search for Homeland Security 

by Stephen M. Duncan 
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004 
366 pp. $29.95 
[ISBN: 1-5911-4220-2] 

I n the preface to A War of a Different 
Kind, Stephen Duncan quotes an 
observation from Will and Ariel 
Durant: in 3,421 years of recorded 
history, there have only been 268 years 
free of war. Furthermore, Duncan states 
that since 1783 the United States has 
sent sizable military forces into harm's 
way every 20 years. In a world of rapid 
change, war is therefore a constant. 
However, warfare in the opening decades 
of the 21 st century will be "a different 
kind of war." Duncan's superb analysis of 
this new threat, new battlefield (both at 
home and abroad), and new challenges, 
requirements, and missions for the Armed 
Forces makes this a must-read for all 
military officers and for those interested 
in national and homeland security. 

The book is readable, informative, 
and thought-provoking and is an 
invaluable reference tool. Many recent 

Colonel Randall J. Larsen, USAF (Ret.), is 
CEO of Homeland Security Associates and 
was Director of the Institute for Homeland 
Security and Chairman of the Department 
of Military Strategy and Operations at the 
National War College. 

112 JFQ / issue thirty-eight 


works on this subject have been long on 
opinion but short on facts and analysis, 
but A War of a Different Kind combines 
well-documented facts and analysis with 
a minimum of opinion. The endnotes 
alone are of great value to the student of 
homeland security. 

Duncan's analyses range from 
a perspective on strategic security 
("conquering nations will threaten the 
U.S. less than failed nations"), to the 

organizational challenges, planning, 
and coordinating defense "of a nation 
of 87,000 different and sometimes 
overlapping jurisdictions," to the 
technological revolution that makes 
the use of weapons of mass destruction 
by either small nations or even well- 
financed nonstate actors a certainty. 

An overview of the "early years" 
(1993-2001) highlights the frustrations 
of those focused on the growing threat 
to the American homeland. Despite 
increasing numbers of attacks on 
diplomatic and military targets overseas 
and extensive intelligence analyses and 
high-level commission reports warning 
of attacks at home, the U.S. Government 
failed to take action much beyond 
cruise missile strikes aimed at empty 
buildings and tents in the desert. The 
General Accounting Office reported that 
no coherent counterterrorism strategy 
existed. Terrorism was treated as a crime. 
However, former Clinton administration 
officials have stated that neither the 
Congress nor the electorate would have 
supported significant military action 

against al Qaeda or the Taliban in the 
1990s. But that changed after 9/11. 
Terrorism transformed from a crime to 
a national security threat. Preemption 
became a topic of hot debate, and 
America once again looked to the Armed 
Forces for answers. 

The military stepped forward, but 
according to Duncan, it was 40 percent 
smaller than in 1989 and had seen 37 
separate deployments between 1991 
and 1999. The events of 9/11 sent 
that military into hyperdrive. This 
overstressed force is a theme throughout 
the book. Of particular concern to 
Duncan are the demands on the National 
Guard and Reserve: "Army Reserve 
Soldiers have been deployed 10 times in 
the past 12 years. During the 75 years 
before that, the Army Reserve had been 
mobilized just 9 times." The problem 
of dual hatting is also highlighted. (A 
report from the John F. Kennedy School 
of Government at Harvard University 
highlighted the problem of triple hatting, 
as with firefighters who moonlight as 
ambulance drivers and also serve in the 

l\lew from NDU Press 

fjXTO Expeditionary 


NATO Expeditionary Operations: 

Impacts Upon New Members and Partners 

by Jeffrey Simon 

In this paper, a foremost NATO expert examines the lessons learned from recent operations 
and the implications for member and partner countries for transforming their defense 
postures. Available from NDU Press only 

w >Ws ar Stake? 

Eliminating Adversary Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: What's at Stake? 

by Rebecca K.C. Hersman 

Published for the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction by NDU Press 

Available from the WMD Center at: (202) 685-4234 or: 



Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on occasional papers and other publications at: 

issue thirty-eight / JFQ 113 

■ off the shelf 

Guard or Reserve.) Governors and mayors 
depend on first responders and expect 
augmentation from the Department 
of Defense in major crises. Yet in the 
summer of 2001, 652 officers and civilian 
employees of the Los Angeles Police 
Department and 236 deputies from the 
Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department 
were members of the Reserve component. 
(A U.S. Northern Command exercise 
demonstrated this problem when the 
Nevada National Guard activated military 
police units to assist during a mock 
attack on Las Vegas that resulted in the 
activation of scores of Las Vegas police 
officers. This procedure is not additive 
and can be disruptive.) Some would 
say the Reserve component was well 
organized, trained, and equipped for the 
challenges and requirements of the Cold 
War, but Duncan concludes that major 
changes in the Reserve component are 
necessary for this war of a different kind. 

As the requirements change, so do the 
rules. The chapter on posse comitatiis and 
the following chapter on due process and 
rules of war are arguably the highlights of 
the book. 

Joint Force Quarterly is 
interested in your research! 


Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submissions of 
scholarly, independent research from members of the 
Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, 
defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians 
from the United States and abroad. 

Submit articles for consideration to Joint Force 
Quarterly, ATTN: Acquisition and Review Editor, 300 
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JFQ reserves the right to edit all contributions. JFQ 
will afford authors an opportunity to review an edited 
version via email and will consider changes, updates, 
and comments within the given deadline. 

Duncan, a highly experienced 
lawyer and a former Assistant Secretary 
of Defense who once served as the 
Pentagon's senior drug war official, 
explores the myths and facts of posse 
comitatiis. Few legal issues are more 
misunderstood by the military — 
including some very senior officers. For 
years, military leaders have used posse 
comitatiis to avoid certain missions. While 
understandable in terms of operations 
tempo and cultural prohibitions, the fact 
is that Federal forces have been used in 
the past to enforce the law within the 
American homeland, and they could be 
called on again. 

Terrorists operate outside the accepted 
rules of conflict, sometimes causing 
societies to change their rules regarding 
due process and war. Duncan provides 
insight, analysis, and comment on a 
subject that should be of great interest to 
all. The most interesting case concerned 
terrorists arrested on U.S. soil and 
tried in military courts. One suspect 
even claimed U.S. citizenship. All were 
convicted and sentenced to death. 
Appeals took the cases to the Supreme 

Court, arguing that these individuals 
should be tried in Federal or state civilian 
courts. The Supreme Court upheld the 
military convictions. This case, known 
as Ex Partre Qiiirin from World War II, 
is of particular interest considering the 
ongoing controversy in the case of Jose 
Padilla, a U.S. citizen currently held in a 
military brig for his alleged conspiracy to 
use dirty bombs on homeland targets. 

These two chapters on the legal aspects 
of the post-9/ 11 environment are worth 
the price of the book. They provide a 
legal analysis that has sufficient detail for 
lawyers yet is understandable to laymen. 

This book also provides a superb 
overview of Federal actions since the 
attacks of 9/11. From the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq to the bureaucratic 
and political battles on the home front, 
Duncan provides facts, analysis, and 
commentary on this critical period. 

A War of a Different Kind provides 
a readable and informative history 
plus analysis of the war on terror. I 
recommend it to military officers and 
others interested in 21 st -century national 
and homeland security. JFQ 

Contributions are submitted to the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense for security review. 
Servicemembers and Government employees are 
not authorized payments or honoraria for publication 
of articles. 

JFQ is actively seeking 
informative security studies 
essays or joint research on: 

■ Total Force and Reserve component issues 

■ War on terror, battling extremists, lessons learned 

■ interagency coordination and integration — 
integrated operations 

■ Transformation, experimentation, and 
emerging capabilities 

■ Homeland security and defense 

■ interoperability (allies, services, U.S. Government 
agencies, state and local government, support 
personnel, etc.) 

■ Coalition warfare/multinational response 
to conflict/disaster 

■ Logistics, intelligence, and 
stabilization operations 

■ U.S. security strategy or regional issues 

■ Joint military history 


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114 JFQ / issue thirty-eight